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ABSTRACT 
 
Microfinance research concerns addressed in this thesis relate to: (1) targeting of 
clients vis-à-vis financial sustainability; (2) loan size effect of interest rate and 
clients’ well-being status; (3) economic governance and the dual objectives of 
microfinance institutions; and (4) patterns, trends and drivers of microfinance 
institution’s efficiency. The thesis emphasises operational issues that affect 
institutional performance and outreach of microfinance institutions rather than 
impact of microfinance intervention on poverty reduction. The thesis revolves 
around four empirical chapters that seek to address the above research concerns.  
 
Both micro and macro-level analyses have been explored with the aim of identifying 
institutional and public policies that drive the success of microfinance interventions. 
Micro level data from households in Ghana and cross country data mainly from the 
Microfinance Information Exchange (MIX) market are used. Varied 
microeconometric techniques (ordinary least squares, instrumental variable 
estimation, quantile regression, pooled regression, fixed and random effects 
estimations, Hausman-Taylor, Fixed Effects Vector Decomposition, stochastic 
frontier analysis and non-parametric efficiency estimations) are used depending on 
the hypotheses being considered in each of the empirical chapters.   
 
The main findings are: observed trade-off between financial sustainability and 
reaching poorer clients; formal institutions dispensing their own funds target poorer 
clients; pronounced variations in responsiveness of loan size to interest rate changes; 
semi-elasticity of loan amount responsiveness to a unit change in interest rate is 
more than proportionate and very significant for the poorest group; lesser time in 
securing property and availability of credit information show positive effects in 
targeting poorer clients; both type (pure technical and scale) and scope (narrow and 
broad) of financial efficiency show varying trends; and lastly, negative effects of 
bureaucracies in property registration and lack of credit information on social 
efficiency are also observed.  
 
This thesis suggests the following recommendations both for management of 
microfinance institutions and other stakeholders including international 
microfinance investors and government: harmonizing microfinance programmes 
irrespective of the source of funds; segmenting microfinance outreach markets based 
on socio-economic well-being; curtailing bureaucracies in property registration; and 
providing credit related information. These are paramount to the success of the 
microfinance paradigm, especially in achieving its social objective. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.0 Background 
The notional view of microfinance as a panacea to poverty reduction has attracted 
wide empirical research and public policy discourse in the past couple of decades. 
For instance, claims such as: “In 2007, more than 100 million of the world’s poorest 
families received a microloan…. this goal touches the lives of an estimated half a 
billion family members” (Daley-Harris, 2009; p. 1) have contributed to the growing 
literature on microfinance paradigm. Microfinance has emerged as a developmental 
strategy in the past four decades, with the aim of reducing poverty by building 
financial, human, physical and social capital. Through the delivery of both financial 
and non-financial services, microfinance loyalists have consistently articulated the 
paradigm’s capability and resilience even during the global economic turmoil which 
was ignited by crisis in the financial sector (Littlefield and Kneiding, 2009).   
 
In 2007, it was estimated that the amount of funds invested into microfinance by 
development partners totalled approximately five billion USD. Further, the past four 
decades has witnessed a tremendous proliferation of MFIs across Asia, Africa and 
Latin America. Global trends between 2004 and 2006 continue to show rapid growth 
in loan portfolios (34 percent), borrowers (23 percent) and deposits (24 percent) 
(Microbanking Bulletin, 2008). In spite of theoretical concerns about bottom-up 
development paths and scepticism about microfinance being over ambitious, the 
sector possesses a strong goodwill among development partners and tends to be a 
core component of the development strategy of most developing countries.  
 
1.1 Microfinance Knowledge Gap 
The microfinance literature in the past decade has produced a plethora of poverty 
impact studies. This is precedent on the assumption that all MFIs have a poverty 
reduction orientation. A question then emerges as: what is the extent of MFIs’ 
inclination to poverty reduction, given the over-riding profitability (financial 
sustainability) priority of most business entities? While policy makers, researchers 
15 
 
and practitioners grapple with the search for a response, an urgent resolution is 
imperative given the increasing mixed microfinance-poverty impact study results 
(Khandker 2005 and Roodman and Morduch 2009)1. Although the mixed impact 
results have largely been attributed to methodological limitations (Mosley, 1997; 
Hulme, 2000; and Karlan, 2001), reflecting on the wide variation in operational 
strategies of MFIs provides an alternative perspective for assessing the validity of 
microfinance impact studies. Thus, while most of the recent microfinance impact 
studies are making conscious effort to resolve methodological limitations (Roodman 
and Morduch 2009; Banerjee et al. 2009, and Karlan and Zinman, 2009), an 
examination of potential differences in delivery strategies and cost structures of 
MFIs is worth considering. The rationale for this examination is motivated by the 
‘ying-yang’ problem of microfinance (Rhyne 1998) and Cull et al’s (2009) assertion 
that, heterogeneity of microfinance operations implies multiple paths of impact in 
the future. These arguments suggest that microfinance debates on poverty reduction 
and financial sustainability are probably misplaced given the wide contextual and 
differences in operational features, delivery strategies and cost structures of 
microfinance institutions.  
 
To this end, resolving methodological limitations will only deal with one part of the 
reasons for the mixed findings. It is therefore imperative for some empirical studies 
to investigate the determinants of successful MFI operational issues such as 
targeting, pricing, governance and efficiency. This in our opinion is an equally 
important policy inquest compared to impact studies. Also, identifying differences in 
operational characteristics and delivery strategies2 will enhance the classification of 
MFIs into homogenous groups for impact studies to be carried out. Though the latter 
is not categorically addressed in this thesis, the findings on determinants of 
successful MFI operational indicators is a major step to categorizing MFIs based on 
their delivery strategies and operational characteristics. This thesis therefore side-
                                                 
1
 In spite of the use of the same data, different impact outcomes are observed for the two studies. 
2
 While some impact studies have identified acknowledge the importance of the effect of different 
MFI characterisation, use of legal status fails to capture differences in operational features and 
delivery strategies. Apart from the broad limitation of the use of legal status in revealing the 
operational features of MFIs, we find country level variation in the characterisation of MFIs. 
16 
 
steps impact studies and makes a case for the implications of variations in 
operational features of microfinance institutions. 
 
Typically, variations in operational strategies of MFIs have generated adverse 
concerns. The pessimism have been ignited by the following: (1) changing trends of 
microfinance funding; (2) high operational costs relative to traditional banking 
institutions; (3) low repayment rates that can be linked to inefficiency in monitoring 
loans; and (4) lack of evidence in support of the connection between the broader 
economy and microfinance.  For instance, the recent drive towards commercializing 
MFIs has partially led to a vindication of the concerns of microfinance sceptics. 
Recent evidence of MFIs’ commercialization points to their engagement in initial 
public offerings 3  (IPOs) and structured finance such as collateralized debt 
obligations (CDOs). The undisputable profit motivation underlying such sources of 
funds generates debate on the relationship between financial sustainability and 
poverty reduction. Furthermore, while microfinance has proven insulate to previous 
financial crises in different regions, the immediate past’s global downturn has 
signalled signs of repayment difficulties and pessimism in some regions (Chen et al., 
2010).  
 
Further to the above, the heterogeneity and dominance of most MFIs in the informal 
sector have yielded an unrestricted scope and undefined mode of operations, 
especially in terms of service delivery among institutions. MFIs’ evolution, like any 
other institution, is influenced by historical and legal factors, sources of funds, 
prevailing wave of the development paradigm, international practice, and cultural, 
individual and social motivation. Depending on the economic governance of a 
country, the above set of issues can potentially inhibit the ability of microfinance 
institutions in achieving the simultaneous goals of poverty reduction and integration 
into the broader financial sector.   
 
 
                                                 
3
 Examples are Compartomos, Mexico (2007) and SKS, India (2010) 
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1.2 Objectives  
In the light of compelling positive evidence between institutions and development 
(Casson et al., 2010; and Pande and Udry, 2005), this thesis attempts to identify 
specific channels through which microfinance institutions (MFIs) contribute to 
poverty reduction without compromising their financial sustainability. As a de facto 
institution, differences in financial delivery strategies and external factors have 
contributed to wide knowledge gaps. We broadly argue that these differences have 
contributed to mixed perceptions and contrasting empirical evidence on the impact 
of microfinance. Microfinance research concerns addressed in this thesis relate to: 
(1) targeting of clients vis-à-vis financial sustainability; (2) loan size effect of 
interest rate and clients’ poverty status; (3) economic governance and the dual 
objectives of microfinance institutions; and (4) patterns, trends and drivers of 
microfinance efficiency. The thesis emphasises operational issues that affect the 
institutional performance and outreach of microfinance institutions rather than 
impact. 
 
The specific objectives are to: 
i. investigate the trade-off or mutuality between financial sustainability and 
outreach of MFIs in Ghana; 
ii. examine loan size sensitivity to interest rate changes given the poverty level 
of clients in Ghana; 
iii. identify internal and external governance mechanisms that are likely to 
influence the dual objectives of microfinance paradigm (MFIs reaching poor 
clients and being financially viable); and 
iv. examine patterns, trends and drivers of efficiency of microfinance 
institutions. 
 
In view of the above microfinance knowledge gaps and objectives, the four 
empirical chapters of this thesis respectively test the following eight hypotheses: 
i. formal MFIs mobilizing their own funds through loans, equity, shareholding 
capital and/or deposits target clients who are relatively less poor; 
18 
 
ii. concentrating on the achievement of financial sustainability causes MFIs to 
target non-poor clients; 
iii. clients at the margins of socio-economic status are sensitive to interest rate 
changes relative to the majority in the middle band; 
iv. external governance (property rights, contract enforcement and voice and 
accountability) enables microfinance institutions to achieve their poverty 
lending objective better than internal governance systems; 
v. internal governance systems (corporate governance) coupled with better 
operational performance are sufficient for the financial viability objective of 
microfinance institutions; 
vi. operational financial sustainability4  complements efficiency (financial and 
social) of MFIs;  
vii. MFIs targeting women trade-off their financial efficiency for social 
efficiency; and 
viii. external environment (credit information, property rights and financial 
development) has a significant positive effect on MFIs’ social efficiency, 
while financial development impacts only on financial efficiency. 
 
 
1.3 Contribution 
The contribution of this thesis is viewed from three perspectives. First, from a policy 
perspective, operational and interventional guidance have been provided to both 
management of microfinance institutions and other stakeholders including 
government and development partners. The following are the policy 
recommendations. First, to help achieve the social objectives of MFIs, the following 
are important. Harmonization of microfinance programmes irrespective of the source 
of funds; setting interest rates based on client’s responsiveness; reducing delays in 
property registration and providing credit information on both MFIs and clients. 
                                                 
4
 Sustainability is measured either from an operational perspective or financial perspective 
(Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP)’s distinction between operational and financial self 
sufficiency). The difference depends on the treatment of subsidies. In the context of microfinance, it 
is important to distinguish between social and financial objectives. Hence the phrase ‘operational 
financial sustainability’ refers to the financial objective of MFIs but from an operational sustainability 
view point. 
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Second, the application of varied microeconometric analysis generates academic 
discourse on the validity of the several microfinance conjectures. Using ordinary 
least squares, instrumental variable estimation, quantile regression, pooled 
regression, fixed and random effects estimations, Hausman-Taylor, Fixed Effects 
Vector Decomposition, stochastic frontier analysis and non-parametric efficiency 
estimations provides a platform for  scientific validation of the various hypotheses 
on microfinance institutional performance and outreach. In a wider context, the 
range of microeconometric techniques can be replicated for different sectors. 
 
Finally, this thesis adds to the scant literature on evidence of microfinance 
operations in sub-Saharan Africa, especially Ghana. More specifically, the thesis 
incites studies on operational performance to understand the latent behaviour of 
economic agents on issues such as motivation, preferences and then attitudes and 
performance. This will help link objectives of MFIs with exact outcomes and 
provide a better understanding on impact results. 
 
1.5 Structure of Thesis 
The thesis is structured around four empirical chapters that seek to address the above 
research objectives. The empirical chapters are preceded by two chapters that 
respectively introduce the thesis and provide a discussion on the relationship 
between finance and development. While the latter discusses the finance-growth 
nexus, its emphasis is on microfinance paradigm. The last chapter of the thesis 
provides a summary of the empirical chapters and policy recommendations, caveats 
and areas for further work. Appendices are included with the aim of providing 
further clarity on the following: financial sector stylized facts; country context 
(Ghana); poverty measurement and details of estimation technique. This has been 
detached from the respective chapters to prevent distraction from each of the 
hypotheses under consideration. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
FINANCE AND DEVELOPMENT: MAKING A CASE FOR 
MICROFINANCE PARADIGM 
 
2.0 Introduction 
This chapter reviews literature on the functioning of a financial sector in an 
economy. This is imperative as the ramification of the 2008 financial crisis has 
unveiled the extent of knowledge gap on the operations of the financial sector and its 
implication for the real economy. Momentarily, this has rekindled the discourse on 
finance and development. As this thesis focuses on a sub-sector (microfinance) of 
the broad financial sector, we cursorily review some of the debates surrounding the 
complex relationship between finance and the real economy, with the aim of 
contextualizing microfinance paradigm. Green et al. (2005) provide a detailed 
perspective on the links between finance and development by discussing the 
theoretical relationships and collating a number of empirical papers. We discuss the 
finance-development nexus followed by an attempt to identify perceived and 
potential linkages between microfinance, the broad financial sector, economic 
growth and/or development and poverty reduction. A discussion of the microfinance 
paradigm precedes the chapter’s conclusion.   
 
The rationale of this chapter is to; (1) identify the functional link between 
microfinance sub-sector and an economy’s overall financial sector and (2) broadly 
motivate the need for empirical studies on microfinance operations. Though the 
broad literature on finance and opportunity is explored, we focus relatively more on 
the latter rationale in this chapter. Other literature review related issues are 
addressed in each of the four empirical chapters. For instance, in the first empirical 
chapter (Chapter Three) of this thesis, we rationalize the choice of focusing on 
microfinance operational issues as opposed to impact studies. 
 
 
2.1 Historical Overview 
King and Levine (1993) argue that Schumpeter might have been right about the 
importance of finance and economic development. Since at least the 18th Century, 
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interest in monetary functioning and systems has clouded an important segment in 
discussing the determinants of real growth and development of an economy. The 
1911 famous paper by Joseph Schumpeter inspired the consideration of key 
elements such as the role of the financial sector, innovation, inventions and 
technology for any economic development path. Financial markets’ primary 
functional roles were specified as: first, to facilitate the accumulation of capital, and 
second, manage the risk inherent in particular investment projects and industries 
(Bagehot, 1873; cited in Boissonneault, 2003). These early conceptualizations in the 
19th and the first decade of the 20th centuries were among the initial notions that 
incited discussions on the role of money markets, interest rates, capital 
accumulation, and allocation and inflation in an economy pre and post the great 
depression in the 1930s. Modern macro theories of finance from an economist’s 
perspective are attributed to the Modigliani and Miller (1958) 5  theorem, which 
espouses the linkage between macroeconomics and finance.  
 
The role of monetary policy (instruments) in triggering or subverting recessions 
and/or booms was an element of the earlier strands of discussion between the 
Classical and Keynesian, which later resurfaced between the monetarist and the real 
business cycle. The argument pivoted around the notion that either money is a veil 
or that it does affect real variables such as unemployment and growth in an 
economy.  While the latter posits that monetary policy is pro-cyclical, that is, it 
influences the business cycle, the former argues that financial sector development is 
an off-shoot of a developed economy. This dual proposition was informed by the 
demand-side and supply-side mitigating strategies that followed from the Great 
Depression in 1930. The policy direction of either fiscal or monetary policy attracted 
much concern for both academic and political attention. Milton Friedman, who is 
associated with monetarism, in 1956, attributed the Depression to the flaws of the 
operations of Central Banks in regulating money supply. This viewpoint suggested 
                                                 
5
 The theorem is premised on the argument that the manner by which a firm finances its operations 
either through equity or debt is independent of the value of the firm. This theorem dismisses the 
sources of funds on the assumptions of the efficient market hypothesis, equal borrowing cost, perfect 
market, and no income tax. 
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his inclination to the view that money was not a veil and that a poor monetary 
instrument is capable of dampening the real growth cycle of an economy. Friedman, 
a decade later, argued that monetarism was effective only in the short-run but indeed 
is a veil in the long-run. This ‘time-influenced’ contradiction spurred on deeper 
discourse on the role of monetary policy in an economy.  
 
Proponents of the former argument, that money is a veil, include Joan Robinson and 
Robert Lucas. Both assert that although there appears to be some association 
between money and growth, causation remains unfounded. Robust and efficient 
financial markets, however, were acknowledged to be an off-shoot of an advanced 
economy. The period between 1950 and 1970 witnessed minimal use of monetary 
instruments, which accounted for interest rate caps and government direction of 
credit allocation to ‘preferential sectors’. Most developing economies that followed 
a controlled financial sector regime, according to McKinnon (1973), were repressed, 
which defeated Schumpeter’s advocacy for finance promoting innovation and 
technological progress. Reviewing the thinking that emerged in the later part of the 
1960s without mentioning the influence of the stylized facts developed by 
Goldsmith (1969) leaves the discussion incomplete (see Appendix I). On the basis of 
the broad finance and development academic antecedents, our next sub-section 
reviews the observed functional role of financial intermediaries, particularly, during 
the second half of the 20th century. 
 
2.2 Financial Intermediation     
To explore the importance of financial intermediation6 in an economy, it is essential 
to understand carefully its meaning, scope, and agents (institutions) as well as its 
main and auxiliary functions. Lack of this exploration (conceptualization) and 
contextualization partly accounts for the mixed findings that characterize the 
finance-growth nexus. The scope of finance, for instance intermediation between 
and within different countries, generates varied concerns in terms of what is 
                                                 
6
 Worth mentioning is the range of terminologies that have been used in the literature, barring their 
adjectival, verbal and noun interpretations. These include: financial development, financial 
systems, and financial mechanisms.  A review of the usage of various terms and measure 
(indicator) provides an inclination for the expected results given any shock or policy intervention. 
23 
 
expected to be achieved. In the context of microfinance, there is the tendency of an 
over-concentration of microfinance investment by development partners and 
domestic governments to the detriment of much more important sectors (USAID, 
2006). This section of the chapter outlines some of the conditions identified for 
harnessing the full potential of financial intermediation with a focus mainly on bank-
like financial intermediaries. 
 
The theoretical debate on the linkages between financial intermediation and other 
macroeconomic variables such as inflation, foreign direct investment, exchange rate, 
consumption, savings, investment and ultimately growth, is quite extensive. The 
debate is informed by the twists of whether or not financial intermediaries are a veil. 
The discourse, succinctly, focuses on whether or not financial intermediation 
achieves both economic and distributive efficiency through transfer of funds from 
excess sectors to deficit sectors with a number of caveats. Economic efficiency is to 
be achieved with minimizing cost and reaching out to all segments of the market 
while distributional efficiency targets risk diversification in investment portfolios. 
Financial institutions’ ability to operate at a minimum cost, reach out to all segments 
of the market and diversify risk is perceived as a precursor to the finance led growth 
hypothesis. 
 
Among the notable and recent definitions and attempts to conceptualize financial 
intermediation include: Diamond (1984; 1996), who identifies with the initial 
proposition that information asymmetry between lenders and borrowers forms the 
most essential argument for the existence of financial intermediaries. This concern 
has gained a prominent stance in the literature due to the accompanying problems of 
moral hazard (hidden action) and adverse selection (hidden information), 
precipitating market failure. Contributions made by Diamond to the literature are 
centred on how to reduce the transaction cost based on the argument that sourcing 
information through monitoring and providing incentives for financial intermediaries 
is costly. In this respect, diversification through the dual process of sub-dividing 
individual risks and adding more independent risk is proposed. To this end, financial 
24 
 
intermediaries increase and transform the set of economic activities that can take 
place both within and across communities, alongside monitoring and controlling 
activities, and providing asset transformation services at lower cost. A more succinct 
definition of the functional roles of financial intermediation was made evident by the 
work of Levine (1997). According Levine (1997), from a functional role perspective, 
four (but detailed) channels of intermediation can be identified. These are: enhances 
savings mobilization; ensures resource allocation; exerts corporate control and 
monitoring managers; and facilitate trading, hedging, diversifying and pooling risk. 
The end product is physical capital accumulation and allocation, which are essential 
for growth.  
 
While these functional roles have well been documented, clear, distinctive features 
of financial intermediaries in developed and developing countries have spurred on 
massive debate from approximately the end of 1990 until the present. Characteristic 
of the differences are: density of financial institutions; availability and mutuality 
between types of financial products, for instance, insurance, mortgages and support 
services; extent of reliability within the legal and broad institutional systems that 
complement the activities of financial institutions, especially the risk component; 
and diversity of the scope of financial products in absorbing risk. Partly, these 
variations led to the exploration of the relative influence of different types of 
financial intermediaries by mainly distinguishing between bank-based7 and market-
based8 driven economies. Though these distinctions had been previously identified 
in the early part of the 1990s by Mayer (1990) and Allen (1990), recent studies have 
deepened the empirical search. Most recent studies have tilted more in favour of 
bank-based economies (Chakraboty and Ray, 2006), while a considerable number of 
the studies still identify mixed and inconclusive findings depending on the financial 
structure of the economy (Demirguc-Kunt and Levine, 1999; Levine, 2002).  
                                                 
7
 Gorton and Winton (2002), provide a clear distinction on ‘bank-like’ financial intermediation and 
capital markets. They posit with evidence from Mayer (1990) that in the savings and investment 
process, households with resources to invest will deposit them with the bank through the purchase 
of securities. In turn, the banks will invest the money by lending it to borrowers. 
8
 These are stock and security markets from which firms can directly source funds for investment at 
the neglect of the bank. 
25 
 
 
The path of transition in the literature still leaves the state (structure, performance 
and channels of operations) of a developing economy’s financial sector in the dark. 
As envisaged by McKinnon (1973, p.3), “accepted theories of monetary and 
financial processes – whether they be it the Keynesian or Monetarist - cannot 
explain the dominance of real money balances in the operation of capital markets in 
poor countries. Both of these prevailing theories assume that capital markets are 
essentially “perfect” with a single governing interest rate or a term structure of 
interest rates, whereas the brute fact of underdevelopment is overwhelmingly 
fragmentation in real rates of interest”. In no unambiguous term, such brute facts 
complicate empirical research in developing countries. 
 
Financial sectors in developing countries, especially in Africa, are characterized by 
mainly bank-like financial institutions that are primarily foreign owned banks with 
limited scope of storing the funds of potential depositors. The drive for competition 
that is expected to push real interest rates down is still missing, coupled with 
stringent regulation that prevents innovation, and a high level of transactional cost. 
Among the factors engendering the above scenario are weak institutional 
arrangements such as the legal systems and a heavy reliance on the informal sector. 
Table 2.1 gives evidence of the disparity of some selected financial indicators in a 
number of developed and developing countries. In a sequence, the countries reflect 
characteristics of high income, upper middle income, low middle income and low 
income economies. Firsthand observation supports the notion that the structure of 
influence of the financial sector is diversified in developed countries. Both bank-like 
and stock markets are well developed relative to developing countries.  The selection 
of the financial indicators provides a snapshot overview of the three main indicators 
of financial depth (bank deposit and stock market capitalization both as a proportion 
of GDP), financial penetration (domestic credit provided by the banking sector), and 
access to financial services (bank branches per 100,000 people). Evidently, all three 
indicators in high income economies far outpace all the lower income economies 
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with the exception of the South Africa stock market capitalization, which in this 
context is an outlier.  
 
 
 
TABLE 2.1 - SELECTED FINANCIAL INDICATORS 
 
COUNTRY 
BANK 
DEPOSIT/GDP 
STOCK MARKET 
CAPITALIZATION/
GDP 
DOMESTIC CREDIT 
PROVIDED BY BANKING 
SECTOR  -  percent OF GDP 
BANK 
BRANCHES PER 
100,000 PEOPLE 
UNITED KINGDOM 0.68 1.30 215.5 18.3 
UNITED STATES 1.32 1.34 159.1 30.9 
SOUTH AFRICA 0.57 2.53 86.7  6.0 
MEXICO 0.23 0.35  38.4 7.6 
BOLIVIA 0.34 0.22 52.5 1.5 
INDONESIA 0.35 0.30 48.8 8.4 
GHANA 0.21 0.12 30.5 1.6 
UGANDA 0.14 0.01 11.0 0.5 
Source: World Development Indicators, 2006 and 
http://econ.worldbank.org/programs/finance 
 
 
In spite of the ‘misdirection’ of the literature against the realities of developing 
countries, there is another emerging wave that fails to capture the peculiar state of 
financial markets in developing countries. Central to this are questions of the role of 
financial intermediaries in an era of rapid technological advancement, which again is 
also not a germane argument for developing countries.  These new trends in the 
literature have revisited the role of financial systems with the mind of value-creation 
and market segmentation as the reasons for the existence of financial intermediaries.  
Value creation through risk absorption has been identified as a more optimistic 
justification for the existence of financial intermediaries (Scholtens and Wensveen, 
2003). The argument of value creation is precedent on the assumption that financial 
intermediaries have sufficiently large portfolios of investment that enhance their 
capacity to absorb risk and operate in a very competitive industry. These 
assumptions facilitate product development, which adds value, to both savers’ and 
investors’ satisfaction. The risk embedded in product development for different 
market niches is the central contemporary function of financial intermediation.  
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While these theoretical arguments have been empirically verified in the context of 
most developed economies, this has not been the case for developing economies. 
Poor infrastructure culminating in information asymmetry is among the factors 
leading to lack of supporting evidence in developing economies. 
 
The motivation for heavy reliance on microfinance by developing countries is 
informed primarily by ‘opportunity’ 9, positing the existence of a huge unserved 
market and its consequential usury interest rates by informal money lenders. Limited 
outreach capacity and the stringent requirements of traditional institutions are also 
among the overarching reasons for the emergence of microfinance. The operations 
of moneylenders have created a further gap between the path pursued by developed 
countries and the state of financial systems in developing countries. Operations of 
moneylenders have derailed the quest of driving interest rates down through 
competition, minimizing information asymmetry with advancement in technology, 
developing comprehensive financial systems (bank-based, market-based, insurance 
and support systems), and integrating the financial markets with the goods markets.   
 
Microfinance institutions emerged, quite ambitiously, not only to demise the 
operations of moneylenders but to deepen financial sector performance and end the 
poverty menace. The point of entry (resolving the market distortion caused by 
informal money lenders) and the ultimate goal of microfinance institutions have 
created teething concerns regarding its capability. Without a clear model of 
operation, the microfinance paradigm has generated enormous discourse. Wide and 
complex systems of operations that cut across all three categories of institutional 
arrangement (formal, semi-formal and informal) have emerged under the umbrella 
of microfinance. This has created inconsistent revelations of the sub-sector’s 
                                                 
9
 The operational characteristics such as short term loan schemes and relatively high interest rates 
provide an impulse for financial entrepreneurs with short-term goals to flood the market. Euphoria 
synonymous to speculative pressure (expectation-induced) is created to incite potential financial 
entrepreneurs to enter the market. The euphoria stimulates illusive gains for financial entrepreneurs 
with short term ambitions at the expense of long term investment goals. 
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capability in achieving two of its primary objectives (financial sustainability and 
poverty reduction).  
 
In addition to the growth of microfinance programmes and institutions in developing 
countries, the sub-sector’s attraction of huge capital flows across borders requires 
careful investigation. According to Stiglitz (2005), the strength of a country’s 
financial system is its ability to channel capital to appropriate sectors. This requires 
equipping and incentivizing financial institutions. Further to this, financial 
institutions must be geared to providing capital for small businesses and micro-credit 
facilities, attracting foreign direct investment, specifically for long term investment 
portfolios to enhance economic development, and promoting domestic savings. 
Finally, Stiglitz (2005) alludes to the fact that high interest rates have a detrimental 
effect by increasing the return to asset stripping. To this end, any discussion on the 
performance of a country’s financial sector should explore issues of incentives, 
intermediation and interest rates. 
 
The literature on microfinance performance has two broad dimensions: (1) assessing 
institutional level performance (internal characteristics) that enhances the 
identification of best practices for the achievement of proposed goals, and (2) 
determining external (exogenous) factors. The latter investigates issues related to 
both the macroeconomic and global context.  
 
The literature on the macroeconomic and the global context of microfinance 
institutions though scant reveals interesting results. Synonymous to the broad 
literature on finance and growth as per the earlier discussion of this chapter, a 
plausible conjecture in the microfinance-macroeconomic debate is that microfinance 
institutions can thrive better in a fast growing economy (Ahlin et al., 2010). In this 
case microfinance performance is a function of the economy (Ahlin and Lin, 2006). 
The reverse causality hypothesizes that either growth in the macro economy or 
foreign direct investment (proxy for global context) is a function of the degree of 
financial sustainability of MFIs in a country. Though empirical studies on either of 
these conjectures are quite grey, some work has emerged on the former. While 
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significant variations exist among the GDP growth rates of major microfinance 
economies coupled with wide gaps in the flow of foreign direct investments (FDIs), 
studies on microfinance seem to relegate the impact of these exogenous factors.  
 
2.3 The Microfinance Paradigm 
Microfinance is defined as the informal and formal mechanisms of offering financial 
services to the poor (Brau and Woller, 2004). The informal character of the 
microfinance paradigm allows for an unrestricted scope and undefined mode of 
operations among institutions. Its evolution, like any other institution, is precedent 
on diverse causes, notably: historical, legal, source of funds, wave of development 
paradigm, international practice, and cultural, individual and social motivation. 
These varied and unsystematic reasons augment criticisms of the role of institutions 
in development. However, the purported capability and substantial financial inflows 
(Xavier et al., 2008) into the subsector make it imperative for academic research to 
be carried out. 
 
The orientation of microfinance has been broadly categorized into the minimalist 
and integrative perspectives (Woodworth and Woller, 2001). Reaching the poor 
through a minimalist perspective restricts the operational function of MFIs to 
financial services. Conceptualizing microfinance from a minimalist perspective is 
built on some perceptions about the poor’s financial dealings. Reviewing the 
literature, this thesis identifies the following eight notions which have either been 
validated or not:  
• presence of an unserved market by the traditional banking sector (Anand and 
Rosenberg, 2008; World Bank, 2006) and labelled as poor; 
• unserved market hitherto perceived as ‘unbankable’ in reality,  are 
‘bankable’ (Rutherford, 2000; World Bank, 2006); 
• willingness and ability of the unserved market to engage in economic activity 
(Imran et al., 2002; Mondal, 2002); 
• access to financial services, especially credit, is the major constraint of 
microenterprises (Parker et al., 1995; Psaila, 2007); 
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• group solidarity, a potential guarantee for high repayment in the absence of 
collateral (Ledgerwood, 1998; Armendariz de Aghion and Morduch, 2000);  
• group solidarity, forced/compulsory savings and social punishment are 
expected to minimize traditional lending constraints such as: fungibility, 
moral hazard and adverse selection (Ghatak and Guinnane, 1999; Fiebig et 
al., 1999); 
• ability to save as the poor set aside their excess resources in very small 
amounts or as other forms of assets (Rutherford, 2000; Deshpande, 2006); 
• transacting with the poor is financially viable either because the poor are 
insensitive to high interest rates or because costs can be minimized through 
economies of scale, diversification and value-chain (economies of scope), 
market segmentation, and technological innovation (Morduch, 2000; Cull et 
al., 2008) . 
 
These issues, though extensive, are not exhaustive of the reasoning underpinning a 
minimalist perspective of microfinance. In the past decade and a half, a plethora of 
microfinance empirical studies have been produced with the aim of addressing some 
of the above notions. Some of these have yielded mixed results and added to the 
dilemma as to whether microfinance is simply a wellbeing strategy or can contribute 
to development. In spite of huge research interest in microfinance, some of the 
notions outlined above remain unresolved especially from a contextual perspective. 
For instance, spatial variability questions the generic adaptation of the above notions 
across continents based on a framework of ‘microfinance best practices’.  
 
The above notions have culminated in delivery strategies with a wide scope, 
extending beyond merely mundane financial services (credit, savings and insurance) 
to non-financial services. MFI non-financial service delivery can be identified along 
the lines of credit with education programmes, reaching out to post-conflict 
geographical areas, and packaging products for vulnerable people including 
HIV/AIDS patients. These varied delivery mechanisms and non-financial services 
reinforce the sub-sector’s commitment as a developmental tool and especially its 
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capability of achieving the Millennium Development Goals. Woodworth and Woller 
(2001) refer to this as the integrative perspective of microfinance. Further to this, 
recent literature advocates a scaling-up of the integrative perspective; that is, from 
an intra-institutional perspective to an inter-institutional/policy perspective. The 
inter-institutional integrative perspective is aimed at tapping synergies between 
development programmes and microfinance activities. In the light of this, Hashemi 
and Rosenberg (2006) assert the need to harmonize microfinance intervention with 
other social protection10 programmes such as safety nets11. This prescription holds 
on to well-identified comparative advantages of programmes/institutions to fully tap 
the benefits of division of labour and specialization. 
 
The evolution of MFI non-financial services directly underlies the double and triple 
bottom line objectives of the microfinance paradigm. Spill-over effects such as 
better nutrition, improved education and empowerment are among the most widely 
touted non-financial attributes. 
 
The forgoing points to a complex relationship (both direct and indirect) between 
microfinance, financial development and the real sector of an economy. At all three 
levels of an economy (micro, meso and macro) the direct and indirect linkages 
between microfinance, the financial sector and the real economy can be identified. 
Svensson (2007) shows the micro and macro direct and indirect relationship between 
microfinance, financial systems and the real sector. The meso-level effects can be 
identified through the spill-over effects harnessed by the solidarity approach that 
underpins microfinance delivery.  
 
While we grapple with the relationship between microfinance and the rest of an 
economy, the quest of achieving the dual objectives of poverty reduction and 
financial sustainability has eluded most MFIs. The latter has been the major 
constraint for most MFIs, especially in sub-Saharan Africa. Microbanking Bulletin 
                                                 
10
 Defined as public interventions to assist households and communities to manage risk and provide 
support to the critically poor. 
11
 Safety nets include food aid or guaranteed employment. 
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(2009) shows that all regions but sub-Saharan Africa consistently recorded an 
average financial self sufficiency score of less than 100 percent over the period 
2005-07. The intractable constraints faced by MFIs are akin to issues identified with 
earlier financial oriented development interventions such as rural finance. Among 
the problems are: high transactional costs, information asymmetries, social 
networks, high covariance of cash flows between rural depositors and borrowers, 
and market distortions (Gonzalez-Vega, 2003; Binswanger and Rosenzweig, 1986).  
In microfinance, client targeting, especially farmers, has been less successful in view 
of their lending product strategy which is usually short term in nature. This has 
generated another wing of criticism of the sub-sector’s desirability for development 
given the dominance of agricultural sector’s contribution to gross domestic product 
(GDP) in most developing countries. Among the questions is how microfinance 
envisages averting the initial problems of rural finance in deepening access to 
finance. That is, researchers are faced with the question: how can MFIs contribute to 
improved financial sector performance in the face of their typical constraints of high 
transactional costs, limited risk diversification and stimulate growth, by channelling 
resources to sectors where long and optimal gains can be ascertained?   
 
Sen’s (2005) comment on Armendariz de Aghion and Morduch’s (2005; back page) 
book, calls for circumspection by asserting that:  
 
“the microfinance movement is bringing hope, prosperity, and progress 
to many of the poorest people in the world. It is necessary to use critical 
economic reasoning to understand why the movement is such a success 
and how its exact achievements can be assessed and scrutinized”. 
 
In the context of the above statement, academic researchers cannot be better 
motivated to engage in both theoretical and empirical research that tries to 
understand the microfinance movement. 
 
2.4 Conclusion 
The above suggests that after four decades of microfinance emergence, the sub-
sector still grapples with cutting edge issues that contrast with some economic 
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theory. For instance, the notion of clients’ interest rate insensitivity to 
borrowing/loan size contrasts the core tenets of neo-classical economics which is 
premised on rationality and completeness of information that enables decision-
making. Some presumptions are also rather difficult to assimilate. For instance, 
mutuality between financial sustainability and targeting poor clients, and 
microfinance capability in driving the entire economy whilst bearing in mind their 
small loan amounts and operational difficulties in reaching clients. 
 
The next four chapters address some of these issues by revisiting some presumptions 
(mutuality between financial sustainability and targeting poor clients, and interest 
rate insensitivity) and identify drivers (external governance and efficiency) of the 
dual objectives of microfinance institutional operations. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
 
TARGETING THE POOR VERSUS FINANCIAL 
SUSTAINABILITY AND EXTERNAL FUNDING:  EVIDENCE 
OF MICROFINANCE INSTITUTIONS IN GHANA 
 
 
3.0 Introduction 
In view of the current global financial crisis and economic turmoil it is imperative to 
question the vulnerability of Micro Finance Institutions’ (MFIs’) financial 
sustainability and targeting of poor clients. MFIs’ receive a substantial share of both 
government and development partners’ planning and budgeting. Relying on data 
from 2005 to 2007 there was a potential annual increase of 55 percent 12  in 
outstanding portfolios of Development Finance Institutions to microfinance 
institutions (Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP), 2008). Subsequently, 
the number of borrowers across the globe increased on the average by 23 percent 
(Microbanking Bulletin, 2008). In sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), as at 2007, Ghana was 
ranked the highest recipient (about USD$186m) of development partner’s donor 
funding into microfinance (CGAP, 2008). We therefore provide an empirical 
investigation into the challenge posed by the reliance on external sources of funding 
to MFI institutional building. The specific objective is to estimate the effect of 
financial sustainability13  and source of funds on client targeting.  Rhyne (1998) 
argues that as opposed to external funds sourced by MFIs, institutional own funds 
that are mobilized through owner’s equity, savings and shares aim at financial 
sustainability rather than poverty reduction. In the light of this, we find a knowledge 
gap with empirical studies that only investigate the relationship between financial 
sustainability and reaching poorer clients, without considering the effect of source of 
funds. 
 
                                                 
12
 The computation is based on Compound Annual Growth Rate.  
13
 As the measure of financial sustainability is self-sufficiency the terms are used interchangeably in 
the hereafter. 
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Microfinance, indicative of reducing poverty by building financial, human, physical 
and social capital, has received mixed recognition partially due to the lack of strong 
evidence on its impact. Architects of microfinance, mainly practitioners, 
development partners and government, assert its capability. However, some sceptics, 
mainly academics contend the paradigm’s resilience to the test of time. For instance, 
Navajas and Gonzalez-Vega (2000), Sautet and Daley (2005) and Ditcher and 
Malcolm (2007) argue, among other issues, that disbursement of meagre loan 
amounts and covariate risk characterizing group methodology as pioneered by the 
Grameen model 14  threatens the success of microfinance. Barr (2005) further 
questions the ability of microfinance to achieve financial stability through sustained 
operations to stimulate the economy’s broad financial sector operations and reduce 
national poverty. Imperative to these concerns is the association and/or causation 
between a microfinance institution’s (MFI’s) financial sustainability and targeting of 
poor clients. Current research in microfinance is skewed towards poverty oriented 
impact studies to the neglect of a potential trade-off between financial sustainability 
and targeting of poor clients. This chapter tests two principal hypotheses; (i) 
interacting own mobilized funds with formal institutions microfinance organizations 
reach less poor clients and (ii) concentrating on the achievement of financial 
sustainability causes an institution to target non-poor clients. 
 
Research on the trade-off or mutuality between financial sustainability and outreach, 
and the overall impact of microfinance abounds in different forms but with mixed 
findings. Zeller and Meyer (2003) tagged the triple point relationship between 
financial sustainability, outreach and impact as ‘the critical triangle of 
microfinance’. The base of the triangle, impact, has attracted much interest, both 
among researchers and policy makers as it is perceived as the ultimate target of 
microfinance. The process 15  of achieving impact, however, seems to have been 
ignored despite early concerns about the potential divide between financially and 
socially oriented microfinance paradigms. Variation in institutions’ operational 
                                                 
14
 Mohammed Yunus was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize partly for his contribution to the success of 
Grameen Bank (a microfinance institution in Bangladesh), the much touted microfinance model. 
15
 The Social Performance Management Tool has been introduced in recent years to track the gradual 
process from mission through to objectives and targeting and to desired outcomes. 
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mission, vision, goals, objectives and targeting has been minimally researched 
although these determine the outcome of any impact study. Investigations into the 
socio-economic characteristics of clients being reached (targeting/market niche) and 
the implications for financial performance have been swamped by impact studies 
that seek to investigate whether poverty levels have been reduced as a result of 
microfinance intervention. 
 
The motivation for an institution’s existence crucially determines who and how to 
deal with a potential beneficiary. The Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (2001; 
p.1), poses two questions: “Does the substantially larger average loan balance of 
regulated microfinance institutions represent a natural evolution toward a maturing 
target group or does it represent a mission drift?” And “Are today’s unregulated 
NGOs aiming at a target group poorer than the target group of the pioneering 
institutions that have transformed themselves into regulated entities?” These 
questions underlie the motivation to consistently revisit the nature of MFIs’ 
operations. The ‘institutionist-welfarist’ (commercialization-targeting poor clients) 
debate sums up the different orientations of microfinance institutions (Woller et al., 
1999; Morduch, 2000). The discourse in some arena of the literature has been 
misconstrued as an issue of strict precedence in opting initially for either poorer 
clients or financial sustainability. However, Rhyne (1998) categorically states that 
the debate is not an ‘either-or’ argument but an issue of the degree of emphasis and 
what happens when trade-offs appear. The lack of clarity of an institution’s initial 
mission on the degree of inclination has led to different impact outcomes and this 
has created a rift between the two schools. While financial systems approach at the 
outset of their operation advance concerns for break-even16, the poverty approach 
charts a path of reaching poorer clients and therefore explores the demographic and 
socio-economic characteristics of potential clients. 
 
Microfinance literature in the past decade has produced volumes of impact studies 
on the general assumption that all MFIs are strictly poverty reduction oriented 
                                                 
16
 Cost of operations compared with profitability/revenue. 
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(Hulme and Mosley, 1996; Coleman, 1999, 2002; Khandker, 2005; Imai and Arun, 
2008). The inherent assumption underpinning impact studies of microfinance 
intervention is the rhetoric of poverty reduction. Parallel orientation and practices 
other than poverty reduction suggest a tendency to provide mixed and misleading 
results in microfinance poverty impact studies (for instance Pitt and Khandker, 1998, 
compared to Morduch, 1998). This may have contributed to the mixed pattern of 
impact study results, although it has mainly been attributed to limitations associated 
with methods of study (Mosley, 1997; Hulme, 2000; Karlan, 2001). The over-
concentration on impact studies has led researchers to abandon rudimentary 
questions and interrelationships such as: (i) what are the implications of the varied 
sources of funds? (ii) who and what are the socio-economic characteristics of an 
institutional clientele base? (iii) does institutional financial sustainability matter in 
targeting poor clients? (iv) do household and external characteristics preclude certain 
categories of households from participating in microfinance? and (v) what is the 
accuracy level of indicators used in measuring socio-economic characteristics and 
financial performance? 
 
We revisit the 1990’s agenda of trade-off or mutuality between financial 
sustainability and targeting poor clients in microfinance and extend the empirical 
investigation to capture potential problems of endogeneity and sample selection. The 
empirical evidence suggests a trade-off between financial sustainability of 
microfinance institutions and targeting of poorer clients. The use of Instrumental 
Variable (IV) estimation offers insights into the possibility of measurement error. 
The policy relevance points to streamlining microfinance activities to allow them to 
achieve the mutual goals of serving poorer clients on a commercial and sustainable 
basis. This generates the need for integrated poverty reduction strategies, as the 
beneficiaries of microfinance programmes tend to possess initial peculiar socio-
economic and financial characteristics. 
 
The remaining sections are organized as follows. The two succeeding sections 
review literature with an emphasis on sustainability and outreach and their 
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connection, and present potential data and measurement problems characterizing 
microfinance intervention. The methods of study are then described, with description 
and justification for the sampling approach, univariate estimation of both dependent 
and main independent variables and estimation models. The results and discussion 
section precedes the conclusion, highlighting points of departure from previous 
studies, the contribution of the current study, making policy recommendations and 
suggestions for future research directions. The limitations of this chapter are 
acknowledged in the course of discussion. 
 
3.1 Related Work 
This section contextualizes the need for an empirical paper that seeks to revisit the 
trade-off or mutuality between microfinance institutional sustainability and socio-
economic characteristics of their clients. The need for this study is driven by the 
overt implications of the current financial and global economic turmoil on 
developing economies especially African countries that are heavily dependent on 
donor funds. The theoretical debate revolves round the capability of institutions to 
concurrently operate in a competitive environment and target poorer clients. 
Proponents of New Institutional Economics (NIE), including Ronald Coase, Douglas 
North, Robert Bates, Oliver Williamson and John Toye, provide insightful literature 
on paths of development via institutions in contrast to ‘institution free’ neoclassical 
economics. Thus, premised on the new institutional economics framework, we assert 
that distinguishing between different types of institutions based on source of funds 
distorts the capability of microfinance in achieving the desired goals of poverty 
reduction and financial deepening. In this sub-section, we provide a theoretical 
discussion of outreach in the first part followed by a review of the empirical 
relationship between financial sustainability and outreach in the context of depth of 
poverty. 
 
Theoretical Framework 
Schreiner (2002) was the first to provide a theoretic framework of self sustainability 
and poverty approaches to microfinance by reconciling these schools of thought to 
the long standing social welfare theory in economics. The basic difference between 
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these approaches according to Schreiner (2002) rests on the logic of selfishness and 
selflessness. In the case of self sustainability, microfinance institutions seek to reach 
less poor clients in the early stages of operation with the aim of building a sound 
financial base prior to targeting very poor clients. The poverty lending approach in 
contrast, makes a case for fulfilling the poverty objective of microfinance paradigm 
in the very short term by targeting poorer clients. From a client perspective, the 
contrasting feature between self-sustainability and poverty lending approaches is 
number and depth of poverty of microfinance beneficiaries, respectively. 
 
Schreiner (2002) proposes a framework of outreach (net social benefits of 
microfinance) to facilitate an understanding of the assumptions that underpin the two 
approaches to microfinance. The rationale for the theoretical framework is to 
identify the motivation for the different approaches and its implications for society 
as a whole (wider impact of microfinance). Identifying six dimensions of outreach, 
namely; worth17, cost, depth, breadth, length, and scope, Schreiner (2002) argues 
that the poverty lending approach measures social benefits and the self sustainability 
approach concentrates on the social cost. The first three dimensions focuses on the 
poverty approach while the latter three perspectives are associated with the self 
sustainability debate. In effect, society will only benefit based on the net gain 
between social benefit and social cost. This is summed as “the social benefit of the 
outreach of a microfinance organization is the net gain weighted by depth, summed 
across breadth of clients and across scope of contracts and summed and discounted 
through length of time” (Schreiner 2002, pp. 12 ).  
 
In spite of the contrasting perspectives, a closer observation at the orientation of the 
two approaches shows that these schools of thoughts are constrained not in terms of 
                                                 
17
 Rather than defining each of these dimensions, two measurable indicators of each dimension based 
on USAID (2006) has been provided to facilitate an understanding of the intent underlying each of 
them. Worth (client retention rate and type of market research conducted); Cost (Real yield on gross 
loan portfolio and weighted average number of days to approve and disburse loans after completion 
of loan application); Depth (Average loan size as a percentage of GNI per capita and percentage of 
female clients); Breadth (Number of borrowers and voluntary savers as a percentage of borrowers); 
Length (Profit margin and return on assets); and Scope (Number of distinct enterprise loan products 
and number of other financial services) 
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opinion but by the degree of weight attached to either self sustainability or poverty 
lending. Rhyne (1998) could possibly be right in indicating that, a hard stance on 
either side of the debates is inappropriate. While Schreiner’s (2002) theoretic 
framework has been pivotal, the concluding note of a trade-off between the six 
dimensions of outreach has complicated the interpretation of empirical studies that 
either uses one dimension or a few of them. However, most studies as per the 
empirical section below tend to rely on either one or just a couple of the six 
dimensions. 
 
Empirical Literature on Depth of Poverty Outreach and Financial Sustainability 
 
The literature on the realism of microfinance, promises a ‘three plus one’18 strands 
of possibilities. The first strand outlays mutuality between microfinance 
sustainability and serving the poorest clients (Christen et al., 1995; Simanowitz and 
Walter, 2002). This side of the ‘three plus one’ possibilities, though marginally 
supported with less rigour on the methods of study justifying its realism is, 
paradoxically, the pivot of the microfinance hype. The second possibility runs 
parallel to mutuality and asserts a trade-off between achieving financial self-
sufficiency and reaching the poorest clients (Rhyne and Otero, 1994 and Morduch, 
2000). Thirdly, a bunch of evidence (see Brau and Woller, 2004; Armendariz de 
Aghion and Morduch, 2005) reveals mixed findings on the achievability and posits 
of conditional mutuality 19  or trade-off. The mixed findings and conditional 
association between financial sustainability and serving poor clients is accounted for 
by (i) narrow definitions of both poverty outreach (henceforth outreach) and 
financial sustainability as argued in the preceding section; (ii) influence of other 
institutional practices or delivery mechanisms such as lending mechanism (group or 
individual), loan structure, repayment rates, corporate governance, type of institution 
(formal or informal), etc. (Park and Ren, 2001; Hartarska, 2005); and (iii) variations 
                                                 
18
 Three main outcomes have emerged from studies on the association between financial 
sustainability and serving poorer clients, and a fourth outcome inferred from an impact study which 
suggest targeting of MFIs. 
19
 Conditional mutuality refers to the ability to achieve both objectives subject to certain ‘good 
practices’ such as efficient management. 
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in the theoretical perspectives and methods of study applied to the empirical 
exposition (Conning, 1999; Navajas et al., 2000).  
 
The fourth possibility or ‘plus one’ is from studies that sit on the fence. These 
studies approach the argument from a defensive angle as they do not make any 
assertion but rather claim the implausibility of enough evidence to make an assertion 
of either mutuality or trade-off (Balkenhol, 2007). Also close to this category is the 
study by Hulme and Mosley (1996) that propose the need for institutions to make a 
choice of either striving to achieve financial sustainability or making a dent on 
poverty. Hulme and Mosley (1996) assert a transmission mechanism in explaining 
trade-off between serving poorer clients and financial sustainability. Their argument 
posits that higher interest rates and voluntary and/or compulsory savings crowds out 
poor clients. Known characteristics of the poor, including (i) living in remote rural 
areas; (ii) dispersed populations; (iii) lack of infrastructure and institutions; (iv) 
volatile economic activities predominantly dependent on the vagaries of the weather 
and other natural occurrences; and (v) weak and fragmented markets for goods and 
services, justify the need for higher interest rates and initial forced or voluntary 
savings. Von Pischke (1996) summarizes these into three factors, namely increasing 
marginal costs of delivery, bad debt losses and a poor nose for risk. The last is 
associated with the monotonic nature of economic activities of microfinance clients. 
Based on this, Hulme and Mosley (1996) argue that the poorest clients served by 
microfinance institutions face a host of constrains that impair their ability to translate 
financial services into household income. This assertion partially generated the 
widespread interest in impact studies as their famous study inadvertently places a 
premium on the end of the microfinance paradigm. 
 
The notion of jointly achieving financial sustainability and serving poorer clients 
depends on perceived microfinance attributes of excess demand culminating in 
potential economies of scale and a variety of cost reducing delivery strategies such 
as group lending. These variations partially explain the mixed results, leading to 
sidelining of operational issues and paving the way for impact studies. Though 
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impact study is the definitive target, other potential mission drift factors 
(endogenous and exogenous to the institution) of financial services remain important 
and determine performance of MFI. For instance, as institutions determine their 
market niche by varying financial instruments and delivery strategies such as interest 
rate and lending mechanism, client responsiveness based on their needs and 
characteristics determines outcome. Also, anecdotes are available of external 
influence on principal-beneficiary relationships emerging from government and 
donor sources of funding. Situations such as interest rate cap dispensation and 
predetermination of clients hamper screening and subsequent monitoring.  
 
The reliance and implications of government and donor funding are currently mixed 
and geographically influenced. While Hulme and Arun (2008) suggest that most 
MFIs are adopting a financial systems approach, the Microbanking Bulletin (2008) 
shows an aggregate picture of African MFIs being financially unsustainable, which 
signals their reliance on other sources of funds. This parallel suggests a need for 
country-level assessment on the degree of reliance at the micro level and the extent 
of influence on institutional targeting and operation. In a recent finding, Zeller and 
Johannssen (2006) reveal that character type premised on legal status influences 
targeting of different socio-economic clients in microfinance. Providing country-
level evidence from Peru and Bangladesh, Zeller and Johannssen (2006) suggest that 
not-for-profit MFIs or Microbanks with not-for-profit MFI traits reach out to poor 
clients. Their finding suggests the potential of other institutional characteristics 
influencing outreach. This wave of study provides another justification to revisit the 
association between sustainability and outreach of microfinance institutions, taking 
into consideration other factors such as the source of funds, which varies across 
countries. 
 
3.2 Methods of Study 
Trade-off or mutuality between financial sustainability and outreach charts a 
different path from the routine impact studies that have characterized research in 
microfinance. Issues concerning unit of analysis and its characteristics, selection and 
estimation techniques vary with respect to the objectives underpinning the research. 
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The orientation of institutions is best assessed from the perspective of targeting. 
Hence, the focus of selection is new or potential clients. This enables a response to 
the question “given the financial resilience of the institution, which segment of the 
population is reached?”  
 
Data Sources 
Data for the study matched lender to borrower by randomly selecting households 
from institutions purposely identified. Non-client households are nationally 
representative and the random selection procedure was dependent on client location. 
The survey was conducted on behalf of the Rural Financial Services Project of the 
Bank of Ghana in 200420.  
 
Sampling 
Selection of Institutions 
The informal nature of microfinance as a development paradigm has allowed for a 
wide scope of institutional types. Most institutions aligned with microfinance 
evolved from a historical social mission to serve the needs of poor (religion 
inclined), government policy direction (rural and agricultural finance), donor 
motivation and private sector profit maximization. The microfinance landscape in 
Ghana is divided into seven broad categories, namely, Rural and Community Banks 
(RCBs), Savings and Loans Companies (S & Ls), Credit Unions (CUs), Financial 
Non-governmental Organizations (FNGOs), Susu Collectors and Associations 
(SCAs), other church-based organizations and government microfinance institutions. 
The rationale underpinning the evolution of each category of institution underscores 
its allegiance to the notion of ‘best practice’. Brau and Woller (2004) identify a 
number of management practices including outreach, financial viability, type of 
lending mechanism, targeting and regulation as the guidelines often used to 
characterize best practice in microfinance. For the study, institutional types that are 
not regulated in any form, do not keep records and possess a high instinct for social 
mission are excluded.  
                                                 
20
 The Consultancy Unit of the University of Cape Coast and Asamoah and Co. were the clients 
engaged by the Bank of Ghana to execute the household and institutional surveys respectively. The 
author was a member of the core team for the household survey. 
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Restricting choice to allow for commonality among institutions implied the use of 
purposive sampling through a consultative approach. This aided identification of 
institutions based on several factors including location, reporting standards and 
operational focus. Though marked differences (ownership structure, market niches 
and strategies) exist among the broad microfinance formal categories RCBs, CUs, 
FNGOs and S & L Companies, some balance was ensured to capture the diversities.  
 
A total of 16 microfinance institutions were used for the study with the following 
breakdown: nine rural banks, four credit unions, four financial non-governmental 
organizations and one savings and loan. The skewed distribution of institutional 
types was based on the multi-stage sampling which considered first the geographical 
spread of institutions and secondly their inclination to financial self-sufficiency and 
social mission. All categories of institutions, with the exception of rural banks, are 
disproportionately spread in the regions of the country due to their evolutionary 
orientation. Including these institutions in the study was imperative to enable at least 
some generalization for the industry. 
 
Selection of Clients 
Matching clients with institutions, random sampling was used to identify client 
household respondents. The sampling procedure considered some other issues, 
including financial product accessed by client and affiliation to a particular source of 
funding. This was occasionally invoked as institutions offered different products and 
administered a variety of programmes based on source of funding. The distinction of 
products is either informed by the type of financial service, such as credit, savings 
and transfer; or, given the same type of financial service, the delivery strategy such 
as group or individual lending mechanism; for instance, savings product based on 
compulsion is different from voluntary saving. Institutions administered different 
programmes depending also on the source of funding, that is institutional own 
mobilized deposits, government and donor funded programmes. Categorizing 
programmes in the context of sources of funds for different clients within the same 
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market niche is prudent due to the varied conditions that accompanied each type of 
funding. For instance, interest rate varied among the three types of sources of funds.  
 
This background information from the pilot survey guided the design of the sample 
frame. In spite of the diversity in product, credit and savings emerged predominantly 
in all the institutions although some did not have the mandate to mobilize savings. 
Clients of the selected microfinance institutions were randomly selected and their 
households served as the unit of analysis for the study. A sample of 1,589 clients 
was interviewed.  
 
Selection of Non-clients 
The selection of this sample, like the client selection, was nationally represented. 
Across the three ecological zones of the country, 70 enumeration areas (EAs) were 
randomly selected using the frame from the 2000 Population and Housing Census. 
The distribution of EAs was proportional to the total number in each ecological zone 
and consistent with the selection of households for the Living Standard Survey. All 
households (17 or 18) within the selected EA were targeted for interview depending 
on availability. This gave a potential sample size of between 1,190 and 1,260 
households. Out of the target, 1,102 non-client households were successfully 
interviewed and available for data analysis.   
 
Univariate Estimation 
Poverty  
The debate on poverty measurement has evolved at a tremendous pace in the past 
decade. Appendix II provides an extended review of poverty conceptualization, 
contextualization and measurement. Different perspectives on the drivers of poverty 
and its varied types (chronic, transient among others) have led to calls for both 
quantitative and qualitative as well as monetary and non-monetary approaches to 
poverty (Hulme and McKay, 2005 and Lawson et al., 2006). This chapter and the 
one immediately following rely on a poverty measure that combines both monetary 
and non-monetary indicators in measuring poverty. This section briefly discusses the 
Microfinance Poverty Assessment Tool (MPAT) used. 
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The theoretical underpinning of MPAT as developed by the Henry et al. (2003) is 
multidimensional (multiple indicator), in contrast to the uni-dimensional (single 
indicator) technique that has attracted widespread criticism because of its narrow 
perspective. In developing economies, uni-dimensional measures of poverty, 
especially those of income and money-metric characteristic, are problematic as some 
forms of assets do not translate easily into units of measurement. The 
multidimensional approach seems more convincing as it pools a multiplicity of 
factors and attaches relative importance to a number of dimensions to estimate well-
being. Compared to the Living Standard Measurement Survey (LSMS) which is 
credited for its detail, the MPAT approach is less expensive, is time saving and more 
importantly uses both ordinal and cardinal variables in its approach to estimating a 
household index. The MPAT surmounts the LSMS strict adherence to a monetary 
and an absolute approach. It relaxes the rigid adherence to cardinality and caters for 
ranked variables, subjective perspectives, a relative approach and comprehensible 
scope of poverty. 
 
The approach collects household-level data using a contextualized generic 
instrument which has six main subcomponents: Demographic structure and 
economic activities, footwear and clothing expenditure, food security and 
vulnerability; housing indicators; land ownership and ownership of assets. (See 
Table 3.1 for final variables used in computing the poverty score.) 
 
The estimation procedure is built on two main descriptive statistical methods: first, 
Linear Correlation Coefficient (LCC); and second, the Principal Component 
Analysis (PCA). The MPAT approaches the computational measure with a bias for 
household per capita expenditure on footwear and clothing as this is chosen as the 
benchmark variable. The LCC is the primary means of filtering poverty indicators to 
ascertain variables that best captures variations in relative household poverty (Henry 
et al., 2003). The initial step is to run a bivariate correlation test of all the other 
indicators against household per capita expenditure on footwear and clothing. The 
statistical criteria of P<0.01 and P<0.05 significance levels have been designated to 
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identify variables that correlate very strongly and strongly respectively. Further 
details of MPAT have been provided in Appendix III. 
 
Table 3.1 - Variables used in Constructing Poverty Index 
Components Indicators 
Geographical Location Urban or Rural location in rural savannah 
Food Security and Vulnerability Coping Strategy: frequency of reducing 
number of meals 
Quality of the House Index for type of ownership, access to water, 
electricity, quality of roof, walls toilets, etc. 
Assets of the Household  Motorcycle, bicycle, TV, stereo, radio, fridge, 
stove, sewing machine, fan, iron, etc. 
Access to basic needs Time (in minutes) to the nearest secondary 
school and pharmacist. 
Education Literacy and level of schooling of HH head, 
percent of adults who have completed primary 
schooling, ratio of literate adults 
Occupation Number of adults self-employed in food crop 
agriculture and distance to the nearest food 
market. 
Expenditures Clothing and footwear expenditures per person. 
Source: Derived from Field Survey Data, 2004. 
 
 
The PCA allows for the computation of a linear combination of indicator variables. 
The ‘component-loading’ which represents the amount of correlation between the 
component variable and the indicator variable is successively revised based on factor 
analysis to arrive at a household relative poverty score. Due to its multidimensional 
nature, the approach is very sensitive in discriminating among different levels of 
poverty (Henry et al., 2003). Computed household poverty scores normally range 
between ± 3. For both client and non-client households in this study, poverty scores 
ranged -3.05 and +2.65. The use of MPAT attracts the defect of a relativist measure 
and as such constrains comparability especially across space, however in the context 
of a country specific study it is useful for a baseline assessment on future 
benchmarking. 
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Use of Poverty Indices 
In spite of the validation check on our poverty scores with national estimates that are 
based on the LSMS – expenditure method, it is worth noting that the use of poverty 
indices is subject to theoretical limitations. Broadly, two strands of criticisms (1) 
general problems related to the use of indices or any summary measure that attempts 
to explain a complex and/or heterogeneous set of issues and (2) theoretical 
complexities on poverty conceptualization and measurement21 have been identified. 
While the theoretical literature is evolving and leading to a growing number of 
axioms being stipulated for any ‘good’ poverty measure (Bourguignon and 
Chakravarty (2003), translating these axioms into real world use remains a challenge 
especially for policy makers.  In this sub-section, we highlight the implications of 
using indices in the context of poverty measures. 
 
Following Sen’s seminal work on functionings and capabilities, leading to the 
widely used UNDP’s Human Development Poverty Index, a significant number of 
studies have evolved using an index (multiple indicator approach applying either a 
uni-dimensional and multi-dimensional measurement) to measure poverty. Filmer 
and Pritchett (2001) and Sahn and Stifel (2003) are examples of studies that use a 
uni-dimensional poverty index in a similar fashion as the MPAT used in this chapter. 
While the latter study shows that uni-dimensional poverty indices are comparable to 
expenditure (money-metric) measures, their use are susceptible to a number of 
constraints and as such must satisfy a number of properties. See Foster and 
Shorrocks (1991); Zheng (1997) and Thorbecke (2005) among others, for the 
required properties in using uni-dimensional and multi-dimensional poverty indices. 
In particular, poverty indices are susceptible to problems of weighting22 of different 
indicators constituting the index; differences in units of measurements (especially in 
the case of cardinal and ordinal indicators); aggregation complexities; the 
                                                 
21
 Central to this discourse is the issue of appropriate poverty space (in terms of indicators) and how 
the space maps unto real world experiences. 
22
 Although in the case of income/expenditure measure of poverty, use of prices as weights is also 
problematic, weights attached to each of the different components in the case multiple indicator 
poverty measures are more daunting given the variability of importance associated with each 
indicator/component by different people and overtime. 
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implications of substitutability and complementarity between the different 
indicators; determination of thresholds across different categories of indicators and 
for different people and choice of deflator for standardizing the index both over time 
and across different geographical settings. Standardization in the case of uni-
dimensional and multi-dimensional poverty tends to be more complex relative to 
expenditure poverty measures and inhibits comparison of poverty scores. In sum, 
our use of MPAT is theoretically susceptible to the above constraints and does not 
categorically address (either in terms of approach or validation) Sen (1976a and 
1979) basic axioms (focus 23 , monotonicity 24  and weak transfer 25 ) of poverty 
measures Appendix II further discusses the complexities in measuring poverty. 
 
 
Financial Self-sufficiency 
To arrive at a composite index for FSS, we apply the (CGAP, 2003) specification of 
the formula: Adjusted Financial Revenue/Adjusted (Financial Expense + Net Loan 
Loss Provision Expense + Operating Expense). The ratio adjusts for three main 
factors, namely subsidized cost of funds, in-kind subsidy and inflation.  
 
3Model Specification 
Ordinary Least Squares Regression 
The hypothesis of a trade-off is estimated by modelling a cross-section regression 
equation with poverty score of households on the left-hand side of the equation and a 
composite of institutional (endogenous to the institution) and household and external 
variables (exogenous to the institution) on the right-hand side. Alternative estimation 
techniques such as treatment effect estimation and non-parametric estimation were 
considered, however, the focus of identifying mutuality and potential measurement 
error allows for the use of comparing ordinary regression with instrumental variable 
estimation. Table 3.2 provides a summary of the variables, their measurement and a 
priori expectation. 
 
 
                                                 
23
 The measure should be focus on the income of the poor only. 
24
 There should be a positive relationship between the income of the poor and the measure. 
25
 Transfer of income among the poor should have a corresponding effect on the measure. 
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Table 3.2 - Description and a priori Expectation of Explanatory Variables 
 
Variable 
 
Description 
 
Measurement 
 A priori 
Expectation 
 
Financial Self-
sufficiency 
Provides MFIs’ financial viability in the 
context of zero subsidies. Therefore MFIs 
can expand only through the institutions 
commercial-cost liabilities.  
Adjusted Financial Revenue/ Adjusted 
(Financial Expense + Net Loan Loss 
Provision Expense + Operating 
Expense). 
 
+/- 
 
Operational Self-
sufficiency 
Provides MFIs’ financial viability in the 
context of subsidies. Technically, it is the 
ratio of operating revenue over its expense. 
However, it is recommended that financial 
expense and loan loss provision expense 
should be included in this calculation as 
they are a normal and significant cost of 
operating. (CGAP, 2003). 
Financial Revenue/ (Financial Expense 
+ Net Loan Loss Provision Expense + 
Operating Expense). 
 
- 
 
Efficiency 
Reflects an MFIs efficient use of resource 
in the context of its assets. 
Adjusted Operating Expense/ Adjusted 
Average Gross Loan Portfolio. 
 
- 
Interest Rate 
(Nominal) 
Normalized (duration and rolling over 
method) rate of interest without adjusting 
for inflation, opportunity and transaction 
cost.  
Institutional level rate of interest. 
 
+ 
Amount Borrowed Amount of loan received from MFI Amount of loan received from MFI. 
 
+ 
Gross Outstanding 
Loan Portfolio 
MFI’s outstanding loans, including current, 
delinquent, and restructured loans, but not 
loans that have been written off. It does not 
include interest receivable. Regulated 
MFIs include the balance of interest 
accrued and 
Receivable 
Gross Loan Portfolio, adjusted for 
standardized write-offs. 
 
 
 
+/- 
Lending Strategy Loan delivery strategy = 1 if client belongs to a group lending 
scheme. 
 
- 
Age of Programme Years of microfinance administering 
respondents programme. 
Completed years of microfinance 
administering respondents programme. 
 
- 
Number of Savings 
Account 
All types of institutional based savings. Number of functional savings account 
owned by respondent. 
 
+ 
Own Programme Ownership structure (funder) of 
microfinance programme 
= 1 if client belongs to a programme 
solely financed by the MFI. 
 
- 
 
Vulnerability 
 
Probability/risk of falling into poverty 
= 1 if respondent made a distress in the 
last twelve months. 
 
- 
Age of Household 
Head 
Age of household head Age (completed years) of household 
head 
 
+/- 
Female-headed 
Household 
Sex of household head = 1 if respondent household head is 
female. 
 
- 
Repayment Provides an indication of MFIs portfolio 
quality. 
Actual paid back loans within expected 
timeframe over amount outstanding yet 
to be paid. 
- 
Rural Bank Client Legal and operational type of MFI = 1 if respondent is a client of a Rural 
Bank 
 
- 
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The hypothesis of the study is addressed by regressing each vector of institutional 
and household factors on household poverty score (Equations 3.1a and 3.1b). Further 
to the main hypothesis we argue that use of MFIs’ own funding targets less poor 
clients. This inclination is supported by some anecdotes that government and donor 
funding are eager to make a rapid dent on poverty and as such target very poor 
clients relative to financial resources mobilized by the institution. The model 
bundles government and donor funding on the grounds of both being external to the 
institution relative to own mobilized funding. This enables the generation of a 
dummy (own funds or otherwise) to estimate its effect on client targeting. This 
subsequently allows for building an interaction term (own funds X Formal Ins.) that 
extracts the effect of these variables on client targeting. The relevance of interacting 
dummies is to generate different slopes and intercept terms (Wooldridge, 2006). For 
instance by interacting, we are able to estimate the joint effect of Rural Banks 
(representing formal institutions) dispensing programmes funded by their own 
mobilized funds.  
 
The respective true and estimated function and equation are specified in the form 
 
...),,( sticsCharacteriHouseholdServicesFinancialofuseandAccessfPov =
-   3.1a 
iiii UInsFormalXfundsOwnHHInsPov ++++= 3332'21'10 )(ββββ                  - 3.1b 
 
Where i denotes each observed household; Povi is the poverty index of the 
household; Ins and HH represent vector of institutional and household variables for 
each household respectively; Own funds X Formal Ins is the interaction between 
institutional type and source of fund for each household observed and U is the 
disturbance term. 
 
The true functional relationship specified in 3.1a, which is estimated by Equation 
3.1b, uses the vector of institutional factors (financial and operational self-
sufficiency, repayment rate, efficiency and interest) to explain household access to 
and use of financial services. Using institutional self-sufficiency (operational and 
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financial) as a demand-side measure of access to and use of financial services 
signals a potential measurement error capable of instituting endogeneity. This 
assertion is dependent on the broad limitations of using cost (supply side) and 
income (demand side) as a measure of access to and use of financial services. 
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) argue that other factors peculiar to the financial sector, 
such as information asymmetry obscure the use of cost and income to determine the 
relationship between access and use. Claessens (2006) further asserts that the 
potential disparity between access and use is dependent on the choice of financial 
indicator used. Depending on the type, range and quality of financial service, 
Claessens (2006) infers from Morduch (1999), four criteria (reliability, convenience, 
continuity and flexibility) for assessing household access to and use of financial 
services. Our use of operational and financial self-sufficiency at the outset fails to 
adequately measure access and use of financial services based on Claessens’ (2006) 
framework. In spite of the definitions of reliability, convenience, continuity, and 
flexibility26 being utopian, vague and non-quantifiable the choice of OSS and FSS 
fall short of demand-side arguments.  
 
These reasons and a plausible bi-causal relationship make operational and financial 
self-sufficiency susceptible to measurement error as one of the routes for 
endogeneity. Morduch (1999) and Honohan (2005) both allude to such threats and 
advocate a comprehensive assessment of measurement error leading to endogeneity 
and displacement effects. Displacement effects in quite recent studies (Khandker 
2005 and Imai and Arun, 2008) have witnessed the use of propensity score 
matching, treatment effects, randomised studies and Heckman-two-stage estimation 
to assess selection problems in microfinance impact studies. Although cognizant of 
this, germane to this study is endogeneity arising from measurement error. 
 
Second Stage Estimations 
Endogeneity emerging from measurement error in the case of the Classical error in 
Variable (CEV) is premised on the assumption of independence between the 
                                                 
26
 Flexibility means tailoring products to consumer needs, convenience refers to ease of access and 
reliability denotes availability at the time of need.  
53 
 
unobserved variable and error-in-variable. This accordingly engenders a correlation 
between the error term and observed variable. The direction and amount of 
inconsistency in OLS is a result of the covariance between the observed variable and 
measurement error (Hausman, 2001). The effect of the inconsistency is proven to 
drift close to zero based on the asymptotic properties of probability limits 
(Wooldridge, 2006). Wooldridge (2006) suggests that one possibility of obtaining an 
IV is to identify another measure of the unobserved term but on condition that the 
measurement error in the new term and that of the observed term are uncorrelated. 
The selection of an instrument is not limited to economic theory but considers 
practical issues, information from other sources (broader unit of analysis), adaptation 
from other empirical work and intuition (Angrist and Krueger, 2001; Larcker and 
Rusticus, 2008). Though the use of IV is quite nebulous, its use apparently is the 
most common way to overcome measurement error problems for linear models 
(Bascle, 2008). Bound et al. (2001) suggest that violating the independence between 
the unobserved variable and the measurement error which is the thrust of the CEV 
could be more damaging than OLS ignoring measurement error. However, in recent 
literature some tests, including Sarjan, Hansen and Hausman post-estimation 
techniques, have evolved to measure reliability or susceptibility to potential 
problems (Kennedy, 2008). In view of this, we correct for errors emerging plausibly 
from measuring both financial and operational self sufficiency using number of 
microfinance institutions in a region and lending mechanism (group/individual) as 
instrumental variables. 
 
The equations below set out the specification of the instrumental variable equations; 
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where equations 3.2b and 3.2c are the first stage (reduced form equations), 3.2a is 
the structural equation and 3.2d is the second stage. The instruments in each of the 
reduced form equations are represented by the coefficients γ and π. The set of other 
covariates in the model as per the original equation in 3.1b are represented by X. The 
empirical estimation uses a joint F-statistic test of the residuals on an OLS of the 
structural model to test for endogeneity. 
 
The choice of instrument is informed by both theory and practice. As explained 
earlier, access and use of financial services is uncorrelated with the measurement 
error in financial and operational self-sufficiency. Also, from a practical perspective, 
measurement error in either lending mechanism or number of microfinance 
institutions in a region is uncorrelated with the error in measuring financial and 
operational self-sufficiency. We apply the Hausman and Hahn (2002) test to validate 
the choice of IV in addition to the intuitive argument alluded. 
 
Potential selection bias is explored using Heckman two-stage estimation. This is 
possible with increased sample size to include non-clients and the identification of 
an exclusive variable explaining selection into a microfinance programme. 
 
We therefore estimate an outcome equation as; 
iiiiiiii zExtInsClxLS ηγτσαα +++== )(1;| 4'4
^^
12331
'
1  - 3.2e 
where σ12 denotes the error term emerging from the two equations; )( 4'4
^
γiz  is the 
variable representing Inverse Mills Ratio(IMR) for each of the observed households 
computed from a participation equation; τ is the
 
coefficient of the IMR and ηi is the 
normal stochastic term for an OLS. All other variables are consistent with their 
definitions in the earlier equations. 
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3.3 Results and Discussion 
Descriptive Statistics 
The socio-demographic data (Table 3.3) of clients and non-clients describes both 
general trends of household heads and more importantly the poverty description of 
client and non-client samples and key household features based on their 
discriminatory power. The pattern of the non-client sample for gender of household 
head, settlement, marital status and highest education of household heads was 
consistent with country-level demographics from other sources such as the Living 
Standard Measurement Survey (LSMS). For instance, consistent with the findings of 
Ghana Statistical Service (2007), female-headed household and rural settlement 
accounted for 23 percent and 62 percent respectively, compared to 24 percent and 63 
percent in this study. Also consistent with the Ghana Statistical Service’s findings 
(GSS) (2007) is the proportion of household heads engaged in the informal sector. 
Comparable figures of about 74 percent (current study) and 76 percent (GSS) 
represent the heads of household in the informal sector. Although in some cases, 
heads of household of the client sample followed the same pattern, this was not 
expected as the client sample was purposive to the focus of the research. However, 
settlement and occupation seemed to follow similar patterns of informal sector and 
male-headed household dominance. Settlement, on the contrary, showed a reversed 
pattern as clients of microfinance institutions were mainly peri-urban and urban, 
accounting for 54 percent of the sample. Comparing the current client and non-client 
datasets, it emerges that the heads of household of the client sample seem to have 
relatively higher levels of education and employment. For instance, there is a 5 
percent difference in the unemployment rate in favour of the client sample. This 
finding provides an initial signal of the capability of household variables to influence 
the decision to participate in microfinance programmes. 
  
The mean poverty score of (-0.001) for non-client households compared to 0.217 for 
clients (Table 3.3) evidenced higher poverty levels among non-clients than clients. 
The test of significance of the difference in the mean values was significant at one 
percent, signalling the relevance of the variation. As expected, the proportion of 
non-client households not having a savings account was almost twice that of the 
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client sample. This can be related to the impetus placed on savings (normally forced) 
and other financial demands required prior to joining a microfinance scheme. 
Although the difference between proportions of households that owned land in each 
of the two samples was small, it is worth mentioning that the client sample 
evidenced a greater margin of 8 percent in favour of land ownership.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
57 
 
 
Table 3.3a - Demographic and Poverty Characteristics of Households 
 
DEMOGRAPHIC/POVERTY ISSUES 
HOUSEHOLDS  -  (N=2691) 
CLIENT (1589) NON-
CLIENT(1102) 
Gender of Household Head 
  
Female 25% - (N=391) 24% - (N=269) 
Male 75% - (N=1198) 76% - (N=833) 
Settlement 
  
Rural  46% - (N=734) 62% - (N=679) 
Urban 54% - (N=852) 38% - (N=423) 
Marital Status of Household Head 
  
Married 80% - (N=1274) 71% - (N=783) 
Single 5% - (N=80) 8% - (N=86) 
Divorced 8% - (N=123) 10% - (N=107) 
Widowed 7% - (N=112) 11% - (N=126) 
Highest Education of Household Head 
  
None 32% - (N=503) 34% - (N=375) 
Primary 8% - (N=134) 10% - (N=112) 
Junior Secondary School 37% - (N=580) 38% - (N=415) 
Senior Secondary School 9% - (N=140) 8% - (N=87) 
Vocational 5% - (N=79) 3% - (N=37) 
Post Secondary/Vocational 10% - (N=153) 7% - (N=76) 
Occupation of Household Head 
  
Unemployed 6% - (N=89) 11% - (N=123) 
Informal 79% - (N=1258) 76% - (N=836) 
Formal 15% - (N=242)  13% - (N=143)  
Poverty Description 
  
Mean (SD) 0.217(0.025) -0.001(0.030) 
T-Test -5.5437 
Highest 2.40 2.65 
Lowest -2.49 -3.05 
Discriminatory Household Variables 
  
Number of Savings Account 
  
None 34% (N=538) 67% (N=746) 
One  53% (N=845) 27% (N=303) 
Two 10% (N=165) 4% (N=42) 
Three 2% (N=30) 1% (N=8) 
≥ Four 1% (N=11) 1% (N=3) 
Land Ownership 
  
Yes 58% - (N=926) 51% - (N=563) 
No 42% - (N=663) 49% - (N=569) 
Ratio of Children Attending School  
  
Mean  (SD) 0.681(0.011) 0.572(0.015) 
T-Test 5.948 
           Ratio of Sick Children  
  
Mean  (SD) 0.122(0.006) 0.156(0.009) 
T-Test -2.958 
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Benchmarking the distributional features of the dependent variable, poverty, with the 
country’s LSMS is imperative for later inferential derivations and reliability of 
policy recommendations. For this reason, location and household socio-demographic 
characteristics were compared and regressed on poverty scores to establish degree of 
comparability and consistency in patterns and magnitude of effects. This validation 
at the outset of the estimation reposes initial confidence in the use of the dataset. 
Figure 1, below, shows household mean poverty score over geographical location 
and compares the findings with the 2005 LSMS. Household mean poverty for Accra 
(National Capital) and Rural Savannah are at the polar opposites, with the former 
depicting less poor households. Broadly comparing the rural and urban patterns, it 
emerges that poverty in Ghana remains a rural phenomenon as all the urban areas 
from the study show higher mean scores depicting less poverty relative to their rural 
counterparts. The GSS summary report of the 2005 LSMS reveals similar patterns as 
it shows that the incidence of poverty in Rural Savannah is 45 percent compared to 
2.0 and 2.9 in the Urban Coastal and Urban Forest regions respectively. Another 
striking feature justifying consistency of the current dataset with LSMS is the higher 
incidence of poverty in the Urban Savannah than the Rural Coastal region.  
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Figure 3.1 - Mean of Household Poverty Score by Geographic Location 
 
 
 
The bivariate validation of the reliability of the current data was augmented with a 
multivariate analysis that estimated partial association between location and other 
household variables such as literacy and gender of household heads on poverty. 
From Table 3.4 the bivariate analysis further supports the geographic patterns of 
poverty as all the three northern regions evidence an inverse relationship, significant 
at one percent. This literally, is interpreted as - being poor as a result of residing in 
any of the regions in North. In a similar interpretation, residing in Accra indicated 
lower household poverty score. The two other household characteristics revealed the 
expected results, as literate and female heads of household tend show evidence of 
less poverty. The latter has been a consistent finding in Ghana over the last three 
LSMS (GSS, 2007).  
 
In addition to Table 3.3a, we present descriptive statistics of central tendencies for 
all variables and a correlation matrix (Tables 3.3B and 3.3C) to facilitate a better 
understanding of the estimations that follows in the next sub-section. 
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Table 3.3B Correlation Matrix  
Variable 
Poverty 
Score 
Financial 
Self 
Sufficiency 
Operational 
Self 
Sufficiency 
Log of 
Gross 
Loan 
Portfolio 
Interest 
Rate 
Repayment 
Rate Efficiency 
Age of 
Programme 
Source 
of 
Funds 
Number 
of 
Savings 
Account 
Poverty Score 1 -0.05 -0.51 0.22 0.12 0.04 0.2 -0.19 0.13 0.56 
Group Lending 0 0 -0.53 0.31 -0.5 -0.05 -0.02 -0.29 -0.18 -0.05 
Number of MFIS in a 
Region 0.62 0.14 -0.43 0.28 -0.13 -0.07 0.41 -0.21 0.4 0.39 
Operational Self 
Sufficiency -0.51 -0.18 1 -0.21 0.29 0.08 -0.26 -0.06 0.11 -0.37 
Financial Self 
Sufficiency -0.05 1 -0.18 0.16 -0.39 -0.5 0.67 0.17 0.16 0.07 
Vulnerability -0.32 -0.02 0.27 -0.13 0.01 0.01 -0.17 0.07 -0.11 -0.21 
Formal Financial 
Institution -0.26 0.82 0 0.01 -0.32 -0.47 0.54 0.01 0.12 -0.04 
Age of Household Head -0.25 0.15 0.09 -0.02 -0.08 -0.12 0.03 0.05 -0.07 -0.07 
Log of Gross Loan 
Portfolio 0.22 0.16 -0.21 1 0.18 0.34 0.09 -0.12 0.22 0.14 
Efficiency 0.2 0.67 -0.26 0.09 -0.23 -0.32 1 -0.23 0.26 0.13 
Age of Programme -0.19 0.17 -0.06 -0.12 0.11 -0.02 -0.23 1 0.26 -0.01 
Household Size -0.15 0.08 0.13 -0.07 -0.03 -0.13 -0.04 0.04 -0.04 0.03 
Location 0.14 -0.03 -0.09 0.42 0.04 0 -0.1 0.03 0.09 0.05 
Source of Funds 0.13 0.16 0.11 0.22 0.19 0.05 0.26 0.26 1 0.07 
Interest Rate 0.12 -0.39 0.29 0.18 1 0.51 -0.23 0.11 0.19 0.13 
Formal MFI*Source of 
Funds -0.08 0.71 -0.07 0.07 -0.14 -0.32 0.62 0.06 0.45 0.05 
Female Head 
Household 0.07 -0.02 -0.12 0 -0.03 0.03 0.04 -0.07 0 0 
Repayment Rate 0.04 -0.5 0.08 0.34 0.51 1 -0.32 -0.02 0.05 0.03 
Number of Savings 
Account 0.56 0.07 -0.37 0.14 0.13 0.03 0.13 -0.01 0.07 1 
Ratio of Children 
Attending School 0.08 0.02 -0.01 -0.00 0.06 0.04 0.10 -0.05 0.10 0.10 
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Table 3.3c Summary Statistics 
Variables N Mean SD MIN MAX 
Poverty Index 1589 0.217 1.002 -2.487 2.396 
Financial Self Sufficiency 1589 98.629 25.13 41 133 
Operational Self Sufficiency 1589 134.219 50.074 76 323 
Log of Gross Loan Portfolio 1589 22.064 1.048 19.75 23.974 
Interest Rate 1589 32.067 8.843 0 48 
Repayment Rate 1589 77.018 23.838 19.35 100 
Efficiency 1589 45.707 20.186 7 97 
Age of Programme 1589 6.661 6.109 1 30 
Source of Funds 1589 0.877 0.328 0 1 
Number of Savings Accounts 1589 0.827 0.758 0 6 
Female Headed Household 1589 0.246 0.431 0 1 
Age of Household Head 1589 46.927 11.995 21 88 
Rural Bank 1589 0.648 0.478 0 1 
Location 1589 0.050 0.219 0 1 
Vulnerability 1589 0.256 0.437 0 1 
Household Size  1589 5.335 2.317 1 17 
Group Lending 1589 0.82 0.384 0 1 
Number of MFIs in a Region 1589 68.768 38.728 11 151 
Ration of Children Attending School 1589 0.636 0.470 0 1 
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Multivariate Analysis 
The estimation of a plausible mutuality between institutional sustainability and 
reaching the poorest, as specified in Equation 3.2b and informed by the true 
functional relationship of Equation 3.2a, is preceded by a correlation matrix of the 
variables with the aim of minimizing some potential rudimentary problems. The 
estimations also corrected for possible heteroskedasticity by applying robust 
standard errors. The initial estimation of poverty determinants as reported in the 
second column of Table 3.5 reveals contrasting results to institutional ability of 
simultaneously reaching poorer clients and being financially independent. 
Comparing the signs of the two main variables describing financial dependence 
(OSS and FSS) of a microfinance institution and its effect on targeting, the 
regression output shows that by ignoring the effect of subsidies (operational self-
sufficiency), poorer clients are reached. However, assuming that all funds available 
to MFIs are sourced at commercial and competitive interest rate thereby discounting 
subsidies (financial self-sufficiency), institutions fail to reach poorer clients. The 
initial glimpse of the result’s reliability of ‘fit’ and directional effect of these 
variables is strongly supported with an R-squared of 62 percent and a p-value of one 
percent for both OSS and FSS. Although the study reports robust standard error, and 
precedes the regression with a correlation matrix, post-estimation tests using 
STATA commands ‘hettest and VIF’ were explored to test potential violation of 
these OLS assumptions. However the coefficients associated with the explanatory 
variables are interpreted with much caution due to the concentration and 
characteristics of the poverty index.   
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Table 3.4 - Cross Section Regression Validating Household Poverty Scores 
Dependent Variable – Household Poverty Score 
Covariates  Robust Coefficients    t-Value 
Upper West Region -1.006***      -5.83     
Upper East Region -1.212***      -7.01 
Northern Region -0.913***      -5.27    
Brong Ahafo Region 0.058        0.34 
Ashanti Region 0.009        0.05 
Eastern Region -0.086       -0.51 
Volta Region -0.041       -0.24 
Greater Accra Region 0.285**         1.67 
Central Region 0.150         0.89 
Western Region 0.023         0.13 
Female-headed Household 0.135***         6.18 
Literate Headed Household 1.120***        44.64 
Number of observations            =                                2691 
R-squared           =                             0.7515 
***Significant at one percent & ** Significant at five percent 
 
The findings at the outset are consistent with Morduch’s (2000) and Cull et al.’s 
(2006) scepticism of mutuality. The signs of the coefficients of FSS27 and OSS 
indicate that the former constrains the targeting of poor clients while with the aid of 
external funds institutions are capable of targeting poor clients. The magnitudes of 
the coefficients are however incredibly small. In the case of OSS, a 10 percent 
increase causes a change in reaching poorer client’s households by a marginal 
difference of 0.08 poverty score. Given that poverty score of client households range 
between -2.49 and 2.40 a drift from one poverty band to another on a quartile 
threshold will require at least a change in poverty by 1.0. Compared to a change in 
poverty score of 0.08 for a 10 percent increase in OSS post estimation concerns and 
theoretical concerns are imperative. Compared to the ‘three plus one’ possible 
outcomes of the theoretical and empirical relationship between sustainability and 
outreach, the current study concurs with the second and part of the third possible 
outcomes alluding to a trade-off.  
 
                                                 
27
 The degree of association between FSS and OSS is 0.18. 
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However, three variations can be identified with both the second and third clusters of 
outcomes suggesting a trade-off. Firstly, evidence on reaching poorer clients and 
operating profitably in a commercial and competitive environment (discounting the 
effects of subsidy) are mostly verified by individual client and/or single institutional 
performance scenario (Armendariz de Aghion and Morduch, 2005). Secondly, 
sample-based studies (Cull et al., 2006) have been masked with the use of financial 
practices (lending mechanism) and proxies in measuring sustainability and socio-
economic characteristics of clients. Brau and Woller (2004), report the use of loan 
size/structure, repayment rate and efficiency as proxies for measuring profitability. 
Thirdly, studies such as Christen et al. (1995) and Park and Ren (2001) have 
demonstrated some results of mutuality based on merely univariate and bivariate 
analysis.  
 
The current study overcomes these criticisms through the application of: (i) broader 
as well as phenomenon-specific indices, that is financial and operational self-
sufficiency, in measuring institutional sustainability and a multidimensional poverty 
index in assessing the socio-economic characteristics of clients; (ii) encompassing 
financial indicators (interest rates, gross outstanding loan portfolio, repayment rate, 
efficiency, FSS and OSS) to investigate their concurrent partial effect in targeting 
clients; and (iii) post-estimation techniques to explore  potential data and 
measurement problems from (i) and (ii). Specifically, measurement errors and 
sample selection bias that might lead to a misjudgement of actual directional and 
magnitude of interrelationships and causation between microfinance variables are 
explored. 
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Table 3.5 - Ordinary Least Squares and Instrumental Variable Regression 
Results 
Explanatory Variables 
OLS IV Test for Endogeneity OSS 
Test for 
Endogeneity FSS 
Hausman 
IV-OLS 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Financial Self Sufficiency 0.02 0.11 0.01 0.01 0.090 [11.77]** [11.06]** [7.89]** [6.93]** 
Operational Self Sufficiency -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
-0.003 [-18.07]** [-9.39]** [-17.52]** [-18.62]** 
Log of Gross Loan Portfolio -0.08 -0.61 0.02 0.25 -0.528 
 [-4.12]** [-7.78]** [1.33] [10.62]** 
Interest Rate 0.03 0.06 0.02 -0.01 0.033 
 [11.87]** [10.67]** [7.78]** [-3.02]** 
Repayment Rate -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.011 
 [-6.50]** [2.30]* [-6.60]** [-9.14]** 
Efficiency -0.01 -0.06 -0.01 -0.00 -0.052 
 [-4.96]** [-9.98]** [-3.79]** [-0.30] 
Age of Programme -0.07 -0.20 -0.03 -0.05 -0.128 
 [-15.90]** [-13.19]** [-6.11]** [-8.84]** 
Source of funds (Own or otherwise) 0.44 0.58 -0.82 0.41 0.136 [6.69]** [3.18]** [-8.62]** [4.19]** 
Number of Savings Accounts 0.37 0.13 0.36 0.30 
- 0.241 [14.92]** [2.65]** [17.22]** [13.85]** 
Female Headed Household -0.14 -0.32 -0.16 -0.19 -0.183 
 [-3.71]** [-4.53]** [-4.87]** [-5.72]** 
Age of Household Head -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
- 0.002 [-7.34]** [-5.26]** [-8.03]** [-6.83]** 
Type of institution (Formal) -1.77 -5.52 -2.08 Dropped -3.753 
 [-14.84]** [-13.10]** [-17.38]** Dropped 
Vulnerability -0.14 -0.20 -0.15 -0.07 -0.057 
 [-3.75]** [-3.37]** [-4.31]** [-2.05]* 
Household Size -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 0.002 [-1.73]+ [-0.85] [-2.85]** [-2.07]* 
Interaction  (Own funds *Formal 
MFI) 
0.61 2.27 1.41 0.10 1.660 [5.80]** [9.55]** [13.08]** [1.59] 
Predicted Operational Self Sufficiency - - 0.01 - - 
- - [13.27]** - - 
Predicted Financial Self Sufficiency - - - -0.03 - 
- - - [-10.94]** - 
Group - - Dropped -1.44 - 
- - Dropped [-17.24]** - 
Number of MFIs in a Region - - 0.01 0.00 - 
- - [15.05]** [3.05]** - 
Constant 2.07 8.26 -0.33 0.36 - 
 [5.85]** [6.40]** [-0.91] [0.95] - 
N 1589 1589 1589 1589 - 
Adj. R2 0.658 0.110 0.713 0.713 - 
F – Statistic 258.73 147.56 286.84 286.84 - 
Log-likelihood -1397.61 - -1256.29 -1256.29 - 
Hausman Test             - 80.91(0.00) - - - 
Robust score chi2(2)             - 35.76  (0.00) - - - 
Robust regression F(2,1563)       - 18.63  (0.00) - - - 
*** Significant at one percent; **   Significant at five percent - Coefficients & Robust Standard Errors 
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The second column of Table 3.5 shows evidence of all exogenous variables being 
significant at one percent, but family size, which is significant at five percent. 
Clients receiving financial services from institutions that are efficient, with a high 
repayment rate and possessing a huge gross outstanding loan portfolio, fall within 
lower socio-economic categories. Like OSS and FSS, the coefficients associated 
with these indicators are quite negligible given the poverty score of households. For 
instance, a 10 percent increase in gross outstanding loan portfolio impacts on 
reaching a household with a lower poverty score by 0.0079. Worth recognizing, 
however, is the effect of interest rate in reaching clients. Unlike other financial 
indicators, interest rate like FSS posits a positive causation with household poverty. 
The estimated coefficient indicates that a 1percent increase in interest rate causes 
institutions to reach less poor households by 0.028 poverty score. Although also 
marginal, that is comparing its magnitude, moving a household from one poverty 
quartile to another seems to have a relatively higher effect than other financial 
performance indicators.  
 
Institutional character based on regulation and source of funds both had a significant 
and hefty impact on household poverty scores. Characterization based on regulation 
and licensing (formal) showed an effect of reaching extremely poor clients by 1.765 
in the case of a formal MFI. On the other hand, categorizing institutions based on 
source of funds showed that institutional funding reached less poor clients. Both 
observations were consistent with a priori expectations; as in the case of the latter, 
the general expectation is that institutions tend to be much more circumspect in 
dispensing their own mobilized funds relative to government and donor funding. 
Comparing this finding to the argument underpinning the two main variables of 
interest (OSS and FSS), some common ground can be identified. Comparing own 
funds with formal institutions, it is observed that clients fall in the relatively non-
poor category. The coefficient for the interaction term posits that formal institutions 
dispensing their own funds target less poor clients by 0.612, relative to other 
combinations between categorization of institutions based on regulation and source 
of funds. It is, however, not surprising to see huge effects associated with the 
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characteristics (type) of institutions as the sample is constrained to microfinance 
institutions. This raises the possibility of sample selection endemic in the estimation. 
Comparatively, direct household variables showed less impact (magnitude) on 
household poverty scores. The number of savings accounts held by a household 
appeared to have a 0.37 increase in household poverty level.  
 
The potential problems of measurement error and sample selection bias and slight 
empirical indication of a violation of the normality assumption suggest the test for 
endogeneity and sample selection bias. The third and fourth columns of Table 3.5 
identify lending mechanism and number of MFIs in a region as an instrument to test 
for endogeneity. As alluded to earlier, both variables are theoretically expected to 
deepen competition which is argued not to be directly related to access and use of 
financial services (unobserved variable), but is related to institutional sufficiency as 
measured by OSS and FSS. Both regressions in columns three and four are preceded 
by first stage regressions (reduced form) that regresses two separate models using 
OSS and FSS. In each of these the predicted values are estimated and plugged back 
into the structural equation together with the identified instruments. In both 
instances, predicted financial self-sufficiency and operational self-sufficiency exhibit 
significant values of one percent, which rejects the null hypothesis of exogeneity. 
These results make it imperative to run an instrumental variable equation in the 
fourth column to identify the two main variables of interest with lending mechanism 
and number of MFIs in a region. Although in the case of multiple covariates 
attenuation bias is quite complicated and, more importantly, cannot be the only 
attribute for smaller/bias coefficients in OLS, measurement error remains a 
possibility. A comparison of columns 1 and 4 shows consistent directional effect for 
all the covariates but notable increases in the coefficients of the IV as evidenced in 
column 5 of the Hausman Test. The Hausman chi-square test, as reported in the last 
but one row, shows significant differences between the OLS and IV estimates.  
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Table 3.6 - Ordinary Least Squares and Heckman Regression Results 
 
 
Dependent Variable – Poverty Score 
Coefficients & z and  t-Values 
 
Covariates 
OLS [Robust] 
(1) 
Participation Equation 
(2) 
Outcome Equation 
(3) 
Operational Self Sufficiency -0.010 
(-20.26) *** 
-0.135 
(-7.04)*** 
-0.010 
(-23.47)*** 
Predicted Financial Self 
Sufficiency 
0.099 
(20.29) *** 
1.445 
(7.17)*** 
0.102 
(20.84)*** 
Age of Pr. -0.175 
(-24.10)*** 
-3.745 
(-7.30)*** 
-0.180 
(-24.51)*** 
Rural bank -5.128 
(-22.57)*** 
-49.191 
(0.000) 
-5.176 
(-22.53) *** 
Efficiency -0.053 
(-18.24)*** 
-2.001 
(-7.38)*** 
-0.055 
(-18.20) *** 
Own Programme 0.505 
(7.29)*** 
-37.731 
(-4.64)*** 
-0.494 
(-6.53) *** 
Interest Rate 0.051 
(19.21)*** 
-2.612 
(-7.00)*** 
0.053 
(19.93)*** 
Own Prog. X Type of 
Institution 
2.090 
(15.98)*** 
131.039 
(0.000) 
2.168 
(15.70) *** 
Repayment 0.002 
(2.14)*** 
1.038 
(7.32)*** 
0.003 
(3.05) *** 
Log of Gross L. Portfolio -0.489 
(-14.62)*** 
-10.711 
(-7.25) 
-0.523 
(15.20)*** 
Location -0.309 
(-4.52)*** 
-2.531 
(-4.77) 
0.0296 
(3.69) *** 
No. of Savings Acct. 0.276 
(12.21)*** 
0.954 
(6.23) 
0.275 
(12.73)*** 
Vulnerable -0.174 
(-4.98)*** 
-1.897 
(-6.41)*** 
-0.185 
(-5.52)*** 
Household Size -0.023 
(-3.15)*** 
-0.095 
(-2.46)** 
-0.016 
(-2.44)** 
Female headed Household -0.283 
(-8.03)*** 
-0.969 
(-3.86)*** 
-0.287 
(-8.38)*** 
Ratio of Children. Att. 
School 
0.085 
(2.48)** 
0.525 
(2.75)*** 
- 
Constant 6.44 
(13.03)*** 
220.701 
(7.07)*** 
7.013 
(13.61)*** 
R-Squared and No. of Obs. (0.71) 1589 1102 +  1589 = 2691 1589 
Rho - Z = 4.46 0.000 
Wald Chi Square Test - - 15.20(0.000) 
*** Significant at one percent; **   Significant at five percent 
 
The evidence emerging from Table 3.6, points to selection bias using ratio of sick 
children as the exclusion variable between the participation and outcome equations. 
However, we are hesitant in interpreting coefficients of the Heckman two-stage 
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estimation as the regression results with predicted financial self sufficiency (column 
1 of Table 3.6) offer consistent estimates.  
 
3.4 Conclusion 
In this chapter, the research revisits the traditional argument of mutuality or trade-off 
between microfinance institutional self-sufficiency and reaching poorer clients. Its 
contribution to the discourse is mainly empirical, emerging from sampling, indicator 
measurement and estimation procedures. The main finding of the study upholds the 
sceptic’s view of a trade-off and reveals the effect of source of funds and other 
institutional characteristics in targeting poor clients. The quantitative exposition 
clearly shows institutional inability to mutually operate competitively and reach 
poorer clients. It offers insights into the variation between the effect of formal 
microfinance institution and source of funds in targeting poorer clients. The 
interaction between own funds mobilized and formal institutions emerged as 
significant in reaching less poor clients. This research contributes to the 
microfinance literature in this area by categorizing institutional type from the 
perspective of sources of funds, that is (i) institutional own mobilized funds through 
owners’ equity, commercial lending or deposits; (ii) government subsidized credit; 
and (iii) donor grant or subsidized credit. Also striking is the relative significance of 
all institutional factors including performance, delivery strategies and characteristics. 
This suggests the relative/unmatched influence of supply-side factors in client 
targeting. 
 
The research also posits plausible data problems leading to endogeneity and sample 
selection bias. Similar to existing methodological literature on impact studies that 
extend the analysis to investigate data and estimation constraints, this chapter offers 
revealing potential problems likely to characterize the measurement of financial 
indicators. The likelihood of attenuation bias emerging from measurement error of 
FSS and OSS and plausible sample selection bias is evidenced in this study. The use 
of lending mechanism (group or individual) and number of microfinance institutions 
as instruments reveals the implicit endogeneity characterizing the use of FSS and 
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OSS. Also, the use of a detailed poverty measure (multiple indicator approach) 
offers a more accurate perspective of well-being in contrast to income and average 
loan size as a proportion of GNP. 
 
The theoretical relevance is consistent with the current thinking on the linkages 
between institutions, growth and poverty. Departing from state and/or market 
oriented development paradigms to a hybrid between these has imperatively raised a 
number of questions on the capability, economic efficiency and sustainability of 
institutions. Among the main criticisms is the lack of a clear path of transmission 
mechanism between institutions and development, due to the varied modes of 
evolution and operation. Heterogeneity of microfinance institutions due to varied 
prompts of evolution and existence confirms the major theoretical criticism of 
Institutional Economics. The connection between institutions, growth and poverty 
models remains vague due to the inability of institutions to clearly specify guidelines 
for achieving desired objectives. Among the numerous factors that prompt the 
evolution of microfinance institutions are source of funds, government policy and 
individual, community and development partner initiative. Characterizing the type of 
microfinance based on any of the possible institutional evolution prompters 
culminates in varied level of the relative importance attached to the dual objective. 
Unlike other traditional institutions that are predominantly profit oriented, the dual 
objective of microfinance provides a fertile ground for the ‘Jack-of-all-trades, 
master-of-none’ syndrome. It appears that, with the qualitative information of the 
mission and attaching scores to the relative importance for each of the two 
objectives, institutions seemed fairly unsure of their inclination. 
 
Although the intuition underpinning impact studies is upheld, other equally 
important primary and intermediate goals such as targeting, source of funding and 
financial self-sufficiency might be compromised under the assumption that all 
institutions are geared toward poverty reduction. Research into the process for 
achieving poverty impact has the potential for unraveling institutional orientation 
and differences to inform policy on relative market niches. This research shares the 
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philosophy of deepening the search for local sources of funds exclusive of 
government direct sourcing such as linking capable deposit taking institutions with   
informal microfinance institution.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
SENSITIVITY OF LOAN SIZE TO LENDING RATES:  
EVIDENCE FROM GHANA’S MICROFINANCE SECTOR 
 
4.0 Introduction 
One of the most provocative questions in the microfinance sector is related to its 
relatively high interest rates. Despite the commendation of MFIs intervention of 
mitigating wide interest rate variation (of about 50 percent between formal financial 
institutions and moneylenders), (Armendariz de Aghion, and Morduch, 2005), 
spatial differences within the sector nonetheless continue to incite concerns. 
Rosenberg et al. (2009) estimate an average interest rate yield of 30 percent and 
basing their argument on some benchmarking analyses, conclude that microfinance 
lending rates are not usurious. However, country specific high interest rates of 80 
percent per annum evidenced in Mexico and South Africa has engendered enormous 
concerns. Among these concerns is the perceived adverse effect of high interest rate 
on average returns from economic activity and sustainability of clients in a 
microfinance scheme. In a related argument, Paranjape (2008) questions the interest 
rate rigidity of microfinance institutions in an era of low and changing lending rates. 
This chapter proposes an approach to determining levels of lending rates based on an 
assessment of clients’ loan size sensitivity to interest rate changes. We argue that the 
client’s socio-economic status linearly combines with interest rates to determine loan 
amount. This chapter’s focus on how differences in clients’ poverty levels affect the 
expected relationship between loan size responsiveness and interest rate changes is 
broadly motivated by the discourse on what works for the poorest (Lawson et al. 
2010)28.  
  
 
 
                                                 
28
 In particular, Lawson et al. (2010) offer insights into the potential limitations of individual 
interventions such as microfinance in reaching the chronically poor. 
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The drift from subsidized credit to commercial borrowing, led by the famous 
Mckinnion and Shaw hypothesis29, ignites an assessment of the responsiveness of 
poor borrowers. While repayment rates in the microfinance sector provide an 
indication of the poor’s response to changes in interest rates, we call for an 
investigation into the impact of subsidy removal via average returns on economic 
activity. This offers a more accurate understanding of the poor’s coping strategy as 
repayment can either be influenced by the adverse consequences of default or 
financed from other sources including clients multiple affiliation with several 
microfinance institutions. In view of data constraints on returns from economic 
activity, we use borrowers’ socio-economic status as a proxy variable and argue that 
the relationship between interest rate and amount of loan take-up is moderated by 
client’s well being. This chapter hypothesizes that those clients at the margins of 
socio-economic spectrum are increasingly sensitive when compared to the majority 
in the middle band. This is partially premised on the positive externality of group 
mechanism in minimizing information asymmetry amongst the extreme poor. The 
policy thrust of the chapter is to explore the much-advocated need for market 
segmentation in microfinance with greater emphasis on clients’ socio-economic 
status. 
   
The pricing of loans, much like any other financial institution, theoretically depends 
on the cost of funds for on-lending, the transaction cost30, the investment income and 
the mark-up. However, there are two issues that are unique to the pricing of loans in 
microfinance. The first of these is the attempt to disentangle the role of subsidies 
that are very much present in microfinance operations. Microfinance practitioners 
who are aware of the effect of subsidies either discount subsidies at the outset or 
mitigate their effect through an exit approach over time. Neither of these approaches 
is a familiar practice in traditional banking and there is ample evidence of its adverse 
                                                 
29
  The fundamental tenet of the Mckinnon and Shaw hypothesis asserts that thorough liberalization of 
financial markets overcomes repression arising from interventions such as provision of cheap external 
finance and imposition of tariffs. Mckinnon (1973, pp. 15) assert that “artificially low-cost loans or 
subsidized credit programmes may be both unnecessary and unwise” (Mckinnon, 1973; pp. 15) 
30
 The term transaction cost in this context refers to cost incurred by the financial institution in 
processing loans. 
74 
 
consequences on the microfinance market (Morduch, 1999). Secondly, microfinance 
markets contend with high, volatile and differential transaction cost of the poor and 
operations. While volatile and high costs can be associated with the characteristics 
of the poor, differences in transaction costs emerge as a result of variations in 
operational strategies. The informal operations of microfinance have partially 
contributed to the occurrence of the latter. The strategies accounting for variations in 
transaction cost include: group31  vs. individual loans, voluntary and compulsory 
savings, technological intensity (electronic service devices and mobile phone), 
branchless (mobile) banking and product mix. These factors, unique to 
microfinance, place strain on the applicability of mainstream theoretical argument 
on interest rate and borrowing. 
 
Central to Stiglitz and Weiss’ (1981) argument on demand for credit is the thesis that 
rationing and outcomes are issues of information asymmetry, interest rate and 
collateral. The two outcomes of their work - attracting risky borrowers (adverse 
selection) and rationing -stumble in the case of microfinance clients. Three reasons 
can be identified for this: First, microfinance clients’ economic activities are mostly 
homogenous and the poor in general are risk averse. Secondly, assuming that the 
notion of client insensitivity is upheld, the theoretical relationship between interest 
rate and adverse selection is no more valid. Thirdly, non-use of financial and 
physical asset-based collateral limits the options of microfinance lenders when it 
comes to enforcing rationing. 
  
The implausible connection between credit market theory and microfinance practice 
has led to a mixed range of policies in attempt to offer alternatives in gauging 
interest rates in different economies. This includes interest rate caps, market 
segmentation based on economic activity, government direct involvement in retail 
financing and other examples. Most of these interventions in the past decade have 
either failed or remain at the experimental phase. The dilemma of the nature of the 
                                                 
31
 This is premised on the use of social collateral for screening, monitoring and enforcement of 
repayment in contrast to asset-based collateral 
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relationship and gradient between interest rate and loan size still ultimately remains 
unresolved. The obvious way forward is to revisit the validity of the assumptions 
characterizing the poor’s perceived insensitivity to interest rate charges. This 
motivation has inspired some empirical research on the subject matter in recent 
years. Among these include; Dymski, (2003); Dehejia et al., (2005); Karlan et al., 
(2007); Briones, 2007 and Karlan and Zinman, (2008). An emerging consensus from 
these studies points to a demystification of the notion of client insensitivity. Very 
commendable, most of these studies are characterized by rigorous econometric 
approaches. Econometric tools such as randomized experiments, fixed and random 
effects, instrumental variable estimation and heckman two-stage estimation are used 
to resolve potential problems caused by unobserved heterogeneity (more broadly,  
endogeneity) and sample selection. However, conspicuously missing is any 
consideration for the socio-economic characteristics of the client and the variation in 
sensitivity across different categories of poor borrowers. 
 
In this chapter, we use quantile approach to observe potential skewness (outliers) of 
loan amount, effect of loan amount at varied thresholds and to partially justify the 
application of interaction procedure in least squares to estimate the poor’s sensitivity 
to loan price. Empirical analysis relies on data from Ghana which consists of a 
sample of both clients and non-clients. We further explore the robustness of our 
estimates by addressing potential problems of endogeneity and sample selection 
using traditional second stage methods of instrumental variable and heckman 
estimations. The distinguishing contribution of our argument is that we advocate the 
use of the entire sample to verify the poor’s sensitivity, rather than using sub-
samples, as is the case in some of the recent papers cited above. The estimation 
procedure is done as follows: in the first stage we estimate a quantile regression of a 
basic loan size equation at different percentiles to assess variations in responsiveness 
for all covariates especially interest rate; the second stage employs the interaction 
procedure for household poverty scores and lending rates at varied statistic to 
identify differences in clients’ responsiveness; finally we compare our results with 
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sub-sample approach, test and correct for problems of endogeneity and sample 
selection. 
 
In contrast to least squares estimation showing a less than unitary downward change 
in loan size for a small change in interest rate, we observe a pronounced gentle 
downward slope between the 20th and 40th quantiles. Coupled with this observation 
are the respective positive and relatively flat curves at the tails and between the 40th 
and 65th quantiles. Karlan and Zinman’s (2008) inclination of the potential effect of 
poorer clients on the relationship between interest rate and loan size is empirically 
verified with a multiplicative interactive procedure. Subsequently, we show that the 
semi-elasticity of loan amount responsiveness to a unit change in interest rate is 
more than proportionate (≈ 1.96 percent) and significant with a statistic explaining 
the distribution of the poorest 20 percent. In sharp contrast, the coefficient of interest 
rate using the 50th percentile is price inelastic and insignificant. 
  
The next section of the study discusses the theoretical debates and recent empirical 
findings on the determinants and levels of interest rate and client sensitivity. It draws 
on some of the main issues indebted to interest rate fixing and relates those to 
arguments for and against a market-driven competitive microfinance industry. 
Macro level factors such as prime rate and general macroeconomic environment are 
perceived as exogenous to the focus of this chapter and therefore are not discussed. 
This section will be followed by a brief description of the microfinance industry in 
Ghana. Sections four and five discuss the methods of study and results respectively. 
The final section concludes and identifies two core policy issues emerging from the 
discussion and analysis.  
  
4.1 Debates 
The analysis of Mckinnon and Shaw’s hypothesis sets the tone for financial sector 
deregulation in most countries. Since then, interest rate determination in formal 
financial institutions has experienced a transition from various forms of direct 
regulation to a system deregulation. The latter permits the market through the 
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demand and supply of loans to determine rates. The principal justification for the 
turnaround is the plausibility of financial repression in a regulated regime. Black et 
al. (1997) posits that denying financial service providers the opportunity to charge 
interest rates at the market equilibrium leads to spiral shortages, as potential lenders 
are sidelined due to government direct involvement in retail financing. Thus, 
regulating interest rates through diverse means such as caps, high bank reserve and 
liquidity ratio requirements discourage innovation and diversification of loan 
products. 
 
Although this viewpoint is usually accepted, Levine et al. (2000) identify broad 
financial functional roles of the state32 to mitigate some lapses that emerge as a 
result of market determination of interest rate. Credit markets interest rate 
determination through the economic forces of demand and supply of loans causes 
rationing as a result of imperfect information (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). Stiglitz and 
Weiss (1981) argue from the perspective of a pool of borrowers that react to interest 
rate and collateral set by banks. Riskiness of projects and attitude of borrowers 
constrains banks to continuously increase interest rates and collateral requirements 
even in the case of excess demand for loan. The obvious consequences of adverse 
selection and moral hazard stare in the face of banks. Overtime banks have 
developed other mechanisms to mitigate these potential problems. For instance, 
during all three33  principal phases of a loan life non-asset based strategies34  are 
employed to minimize loan default, fungibility and to stimulate and redirect 
investment to prioritized sectors of an economy. 
 
This backdrop of information on the state of play in traditional banking systems 
shows that there remains an open question of whether or not this theory and practice 
is applicable to the microfinance market. The starting point for any discussion is to 
acknowledge that the market for microfinance is a residual of the traditional banking 
                                                 
32
 This includes legal frameworks for contract enforcement and broad accounting and reporting 
standards. 
33
 Screening, Monitoring and Enforcement. 
34
 Among the non-asset based strategies include credit history, submission and assessment of business 
plans and their viability and other demographic and communal records. 
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market. The philosophy underpinning the emergence of microfinance was to serve 
the neglected market niche of the traditional banking system. This market niche is 
hard to define and in practice has been given different names. These include the 
‘unbankable’, poor, brave poor, economically active poor and others. A plausible 
reason for the different labelling is the on-going identification of a group of clients 
capable of responding favourably to banking needs and services. Operational 
strategies of making loans to the poor adds to the difficulty of finding an ‘ideal’ 
group of clients that hitherto had been neglected by traditional banks but viewed as 
‘bankable’ clients in microfinance. Practices such as group lending, joint liability, 
receipt of subsidies, grants and government direct intervention, small and frequent 
loan repayments, forced savings, maintenance of a minimum balance of savings 
throughout the loan life and incorporating other non-financial services complicates 
the adaptation of banking theory to suit microfinance. These issues directly or 
indirectly affect the core factors of determining interest rate (cost of funds for on-
lending, loan loss, transaction cost and mark-up). We discuss briefly in the following 
sub-sections issues mainly surrounding transaction cost as it is the main perceived 
driver of interest rate. 
 
Efficiency and Interest Rate 
Proponents of microfinance paradigm argue strongly in favour of the capability of 
the method to drive down interest rate by achieving efficiency via economies of 
scale. While this notion is consistent with basic economic literature, Rosenberg et al. 
(2009) asserts that this is plausible only after reaching a clientele base of 2000 active 
borrowers. In their viewpoint, economies of scale cannot do much to offset the 
added expense emerging from the dispensation of small loans and frequent 
servicing.  Added to this, other factors such as competition, lower transaction costs 
and subsidies are indispensable in trying to achieve efficiency. Porteous (2006) rely 
on the market development continuum framework 35  to assess price competition 
                                                 
35
 The market development continuum framework identifies four stages of development. Stages one 
and two describe the pioneering and take-off phases which is supply driven in terms of price 
determination. While stages three and four asserts the consolidation and maturity phases which offers 
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within the microfinance industry in three countries (Bolivia, Bangladesh and 
Uganda). An intriguing finding of Porteous’ assessment is the possibility that 
microfinance markets can delay unduly price competition as observed in the 
Bangladeshi microfinance market. In contrast, the Bolivian microfinance market 
drove down interest rates through price competition at a very early stage of their 
market development, while the Ugandan market was observed to be entering the 
consolidation phase. 
 
The aforementioned observations offer a significant number of caveats that worth 
considering in ascertaining the plausibility of driving down interest rates through 
competition, lower transaction cost, subsidy, efficiency and scale. We assert in this 
chapter that the success of these supply-side factors depends on the socio-economic 
characteristics of clients. Thus, average return on economic activity is an important 
determinant of the client’s influence on the relationship between interest rate and 
loan take-up. 
 
Transaction Cost 
The pricing of microfinance services, like any other good or service, is a function of 
transaction cost36. Transaction cost in the delivery of financial services has three 
basic components; the cost of funds for on-lending, the cost of risk (loan loss) and 
the administrative cost (processing loan applications, educating or training of clients 
and monitoring for loan repayment)37. The above makes it imperative to reach the 
conclusion that absolute transaction cost per head of the poor is more expensive than 
a client of a formal financial institution. Received wisdom has long held that lending 
to poor households is not worthwhile due to high costs, great risks, low saving 
propensities and too few households capable of putting up collateral (Morduch, 
1999). The likely consequences of these adverse characteristics have been dealt with 
                                                                                                                                          
price competition and other lower cost driving factors such as efficiency and technological 
innovation. This stage is primarily driven by consumers (demand). 
36
 Here transaction cost is used in a broader context. 
37
 It is important to underscore the need non-quantifiable component of transactional cost normally 
emerging from the perspective of the borrower. This includes waiting time with or at bank premises, 
transportation cost and cost of delay in receiving loans.   
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through alternative mechanisms such as group lending and joint liability, forced 
savings and small and regular loans and repayment. These mechanisms seem to 
prove that microfinance can be sustainable. In spite of the ingenuity of delegated 
screening, monitoring and enforcement, transaction costs are high and it is used as 
the main argument for charging high interest rates. 
 
In addition to the characteristics of poor clients (risky and remote settlement) 
contributing to high transaction cost, delivery strategies such as; small amounts of 
loans, and forced savings, and the provision of non-financial services have further 
increased cost of accessing financial service. For instance, Rosenberg et al. (2009) 
asserts that the effect of compulsory savings increases the effective cost of the loan 
to the borrower. In microfinance, cost components of animating groups, purchase of 
forms, implications of ‘forced-savings’ and frequent repayment rate constitutes the 
difference between real and effective interest rate. The precise magnitude of the 
difference is unknown but anecdotal evidence points to a gap of more than 100 
percent. Less obvious, but added to this cost component is time spent and 
opportunity cost in servicing the loan. In the case of poor clients this is high due to 
the inclusion of non-financial services because loan beneficiaries spend more time 
with bank staff. Finally, non-use of high technological devices such as computerized 
operations increases the cost per unit. 
 
Subsidies 
Poverty reduction through subsidized credit was the centrepiece of the development 
strategies of many countries from the early 1950s through to the 1980s. Available 
evidence suggests that the strategy failed for a number of reasons. This includes low 
loan repayment rates which dropped to below 50 percent in some cases, increased 
costs to donor and worsening government fiscal deficit and diversion of credit from 
intended recipients to political favourites (Adams, Graham and Von Pischke, 1984). 
The justification for its re-emergence is the balance between social and economic 
objectives of microfinance. For instance, the Income Generation for Vulnerable 
Group Development (IGVGD), run by the Bangladesh Rural Advancement 
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Committee (BRAC), targets the destitute and as such has a strong inclination for its 
social mission. The compelling advocacy of financial systems approach provides a 
counterargument on the impact of subsidies. 
  
The strategy, abandoned some years ago, has re-emerged in microfinance with 
further questions on the extent, nature and time of subsidy utilization as opposed to 
the either/or argument of subsidy. The current debate departs from the extremes and 
asserts the need on some form of subsidy, packaged in an ‘ideal’ manner and 
delivered to the ‘right’ beneficiary at the ‘right’ time. Open fields will always remain 
in an attempt to provide responses to these questions. For instance, amount and time 
of subsidy depends on peculiar characteristics of both institutions and its clients and 
the extent of competition and/or influence of the immediate environment. 
Armendariz de Aghion and Morduch, (2005) posit that the amount of subsidy 
depends on factors including sensitivity of credit demand to interest rates, 
adjustment time between increases in income and well-being, returns to investment 
by poorer households and negative externality of subsidized credit programmes to 
other lenders. 
  
The debate is further stretched to the use of the subsidy. For instance, directing 
subsidies to institutional strengthening (implying that clients at the outset will pay 
full recovery rates)  such as instituting credit bureaus that smoothens the delivery of 
financial services will only have a long term and broader impact. From a more 
pragmatic perspective, some institutions have rolled out client sourcing of subsidies 
over time and product. This allows institutions to offer some non-financial services 
such as food aid, health and education at subsidized rates and either later or 
concurrently roll-out commercial lending rate schemes. Though applauded for its 
integrated and collaborative approach the IGVGD programme of BRAC experienced 
a massive drop-out with clients who benefited from this intervention. Also closely 
related to this type of intervention is the emergence of cross-subsidy that segments 
the markets and discriminates in the pricing of loan. Segmentation has principally 
depended on the economic activity, repeated loans, and repayment and sometimes 
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the perceived average returns of the economic activity. These have been conceived 
from a theoretical perspective but most microfinance institutions grapple with its 
practical implementation. The main problem is attributable to lack of a thorough 
understanding of client responsiveness to pricing of loan. 
 
Non-sensitivity of Interest rate 
Theoretically positing a perfect inelastic demand for credit will lead to market 
failure, at least in the frame of neo-classical economics. Paradoxically, in the 
microfinance setting this stand-point has dominated for more than two decades. The 
perception that microfinance is designed for the poor who live on the fringes of 
survival partially justifies the non-responsive to loan amount. That is, due to the dire 
need for money to survive and other market constraints such as non-competitive 
market environment and information asymmetry, the cost of borrowing does not 
inform the decision to access a loan. Morduch, (2000) prioritizes this view point for 
the ‘win-win’ rhetoric. The perception that raising costs of financial service does not 
diminish demand triggers off a fertile ground for possible consumer abuse. The 
likely consequence of this in a market-determined system is shifting the total 
transaction cost, in addition to its inefficiency, onto the client. The existence of 
information asymmetry in the market as a result of non-disclosure of loan costs and 
entire portfolio by micro lenders also limits the options for the borrower. 
 
Generally, ability to repay has been used as the benchmark for the success of 
microfinance programmes. What is not discussed are the strategies used for 
repayment and whether these translate positively into increased consumption and 
income and ultimately, into general well-being. Anecdotal evidence points to a 
situation where at the time of repayment, some household assets are sold out of 
distress. The adverse effect of this phenomenon is the creation of a vicious cycle of 
poverty. Karlan and Zinman (2008) assert that clients scout around and borrow from 
other sources to repay loans. 
 
Recent empirical studies on client sensitivity (Dehejia et al, 2005, Briones, (2007) 
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and Karlan and Zinman, 2008) offer a contrasting outcome to the perceived 
borrowers insensitivity to changes in interest rate. The most recent study, Karlan and 
Zinman (2008) use randomized experiment to show that loan size is sensitive at the 
extensive margin of interest rate changes. This is observed in a hypothetical case of 
a 100 percent increase in monthly interest rate. However, they observe that loan 
maturity is more responsive of loan size than interest rate changes. In line with our 
main hypothesis, Karlan and Zinman (2008) estimate the effects of targeting females 
and low income category of clients on a reduced. They observe that these groups 
show much stronger effects of loan size sensitivity to interest changes. 
  
The emerging consensus from recent studies is the sensitivity of microfinance 
clients. Dehejia et al. (2005) and Karlan and Zinman (2008) categorically show that 
the poor has a much stronger sensitivity. A unifying characteristic of these recent 
empirical studies is that their hypothesis is tested on a reduced sample. Though 
robustness is implied in most of the estimation techniques of the previous studies, 
compromising reliability as a result of using a reduced sample is inevitable. We are 
motivated by this to explore the same hypothesis using an alternative empirical 
method. Instead of estimating the effect of the poor’s influence on a reduced sample 
we integrate poverty characteristics as a variable into the basic model. Quantile 
regression and interaction procedure in a least squares regression set-up are used to 
investigate the extent to which average returns (proxied by poverty status) moderates 
the relationship between loan size take-up and interest rate. Also, as demonstrated by 
Porteous (2006), the need for a country specific study that explores institutional 
differences based on character type and source of funds is imperative. 
 
4.2 Microfinance Industry in Ghana 
In Ghana, the practice of sourcing funds from non-formal financial institutions dates 
back to 1955, when the Canadian Catholic Missionaries established the first credit 
union in Northern Ghana. The concept was expanded at the beginning of the 1970s 
with the establishment of the first rural bank at Nyakrom. Since the activities of such 
institutions were not considered as part of mainstream financial sector, their 
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contribution to financial deepening was neither documented nor recognized until the 
latter part of the 1990s, when issues of poverty reduction became part of 
developmental agenda. The shift from growth-led strategies to poverty reduction 
strategies provided an avenue for pro-poor policies and programmes. Recognizing 
access to credit as a major constraint to the promotion of pro-poor activities, a 
number of institutions (governmental and non-governmental) emerged to provide 
financial services to the poor. 
 
In 1996, a number of groups involved in implementing micro-financing projects 
came together to form the Micro Finance Action Research Network (MFARN). The 
aim of the network was to play an active role in policy discussion, formulation and 
implementation of programmes related to micro financing across the country. In 
1998, the group changed its name to the Ghana Micro-finance Institutions Network 
(GHAMFIN). Among its objectives are: to strengthen the capacity of MFIs through 
training; to sensitize government and stakeholders; to contribute to the creation of 
employment opportunities; and provision of support and empowerment to the poor 
and excluded. 
  
At governmental level a number of ministries, departments and agencies (MDA) 
have established desks or units for microfinance activities. Among the MDA with 
microfinance programmes are Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, Office 
of the Senior Minister, Ministry for Women and Children Affairs, Bank of Ghana, 
Ministry of Local Government, Rural Development and Environment. In order to 
co-ordinate and streamline activities of the industry, a central body, known as the 
Microfinance and Small Loans Centre (MASLOC) was established in 2006. Its 
mandate is to co-ordinate all microfinance activities in the country especially 
government programmes and complement the activities of other microfinance apex 
bodies. 
 
The number of microfinance implementing institutions cuts across both formal and 
informal organizations. Five broad categories of institutions provide financial and 
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technical services in the industry. These institutions are Rural and Community 
Banks (RCBS), Savings and Loans Companies (S & Ls), Financial Non-
governmental Organizations (FNGOs), Credit Unions and Susu Collectors 
Association of Ghana. All these institutions have created their apex bodies and are 
spread in all the 10 regions of the country.  
 
In addition, some formal banks and insurance companies have either linked up with 
existing microfinance institutions or created a microfinance department. The 
heightened interest and concerns of microfinance activities in Ghana drives the 
exploration of complementary services and signals the need for market growth 
towards competition. Stakeholders’ sustained interest and concerns are partly 
explained by the perceived availability of effective demand for financial services. 
 
 
4.3 Methods of Study 
Data Sources  
Data for the study is based on a survey of client and non-client households in 
Ghana38. For the survey, the country was divided into a northern zone, consisting of 
the Upper West, Upper East and Northern Regions, a middle zone made up of the 
Brong Ahafo, Ashanti and Eastern Regions and a coastal zone covering the Volta, 
Greater Accra, Central and Western Regions. Based on assessment of microfinance 
institutions by ARB Apex Bank, Credit Union Association (CUA) and GHAMFIN 
on the activities and the performance of their members, 16 institutions were selected 
from the three zones. In addition, an institution using Susu methodology to mobilize 
funds was selected, giving a total of 17 microfinance institutions. Clients of selected 
microfinance institutions were randomly selected and their households were 
randomly identified for the study. 
                                                 
38
 Data for the study was merged from two Bank of Ghana/World Bank sponsored projects under the 
broad theme - ‘Poverty Assessment and a Comparative Study of Rural Microfinance Institutions and 
Government Credit Programmes in Ghana. The Poverty Assessment was carried out by the 
University of Cape Coast in which the author was a member of the core team. The Financial 
Performance was executed by Mawuko and Co. Consulting Services. 
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Clients of four rural banks, one Credit Union and two Financial Non-Governmental 
Organisations (FNGOs), were selected from the coastal zone; in the middle zone, 
two rural banks, one credit union, and one FNGO were selected. Finally, clients of 
three rural banks and one FNGO were selected in the northern zone. The 17 
institutions provided funds from their own resources, or the government channelled 
through either the district assembly or a Ministry and donor sources such as 
International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), the World Bank and other 
bilateral agencies. 
 
To facilitate the test for sample selection effect, data on non-client households was 
assessed from the same study. A national representative data on 1102 non-clients 
households were randomly interviewed based on the framework of Ghana 
population census.  
  
Collected data included socio-demographic and economic profile of clients’ 
household, economic activities, employment history and institutional level indicators 
such as sources of finance and interest rates paid. Selected respondents were clients 
who had received loans for the first time within the last six months prior to the 
survey, or had been processed for loan. 
  
The total sample size for the study is 2691 units consisting of 1589 clients and 1102 
non-clients. The sample varied at different stages of the analysis. For instance, based 
on institutional mandatory limitations on the loans mobilization clients of one of the 
five main categories were excluded in the final analysis. The mandate of susu39, like 
FNGOs are restricted in receiving deposits. But in the case of FNGOs some linkages 
with other financial institutions have permitted them to engage in receipt and 
dispensation of financial services. Steel and Aryeteey (1994) caution on the 
                                                 
39
 Quite recently, Barclays Bank, one of the biggest commercial banks in Ghana, has initiated a 
product that fosters collaboration with susu companies. Among the principal objectives is to increase 
scale of operation, which implies exploration of deposit taking opportunities. Anecdotal evidence 
suggests that this has led to increased cost of operation and subsequently interest rates. 
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exclusivity of susu operations. Also Steel and Andah (2003) categorize individual 
susu collectors as informal. The final dataset for the analysis was based on 
respondents from rural banks, credit unions, savings and loan companies and 
financial non-governmental organizations. The analysis was restricted to clients of 
institutions that had received loan amount within the six months period prior to data 
collection. A potential demise of this approach is sample selection bias which has 
been addressed in this chapter. A total of 698 client households were analyzed. 
However, an exploratory and robustness check required additional dataset. The 
quantile regression estimation is based on a larger sample of 720 clients, which 
includes respondents paying back only the principal amount. Also, the robustness 
check for sample selection problems required the inclusion of a non-client sample 
making the total sample 2650 (698 +1102). 
 
Poverty Score 
This chapter relies on the same poverty score used as an independent variable in the 
preceding chapter. Also, Appendix III provides some more detail discussion on the 
Microfinance Poverty Assessment Tool used in generating the poverty score. To 
enable the investigation of responsiveness of loan size in the context of changes in 
interest rate given the poverty level of the client, we categorize poverty scores into 
quintiles. Figure 4.1 below offers a description of the cut-offs.  
 
Figure 4.1 - Definition of Quintiles 
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The choice of quintile classifications over other cluster options is informed by the 
recent outcome of the category of extreme poor households in Ghana. Ghana 
Statistical Service 2007 shows a national extreme head count poverty of one out 
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every five persons. This benchmark is important for validation and consistent policy 
direction. 
 
Specification of Econometric Models 
The model specification is consistent with standard demand for loan amount theory. 
The a priori expectation of an inverse relationship is explained by the following two 
plausible transmission mechanisms. The first argument, typical to microfinance 
operations, asserts that a relatively high cost in administering smaller loans 
underpins the inverse relationship. In other words, as the loan amount increases per 
unit, the cost of administering reduces. The second reason subscribes to models of 
consumer inter-temporal choice, predicting a downward sloping demand curve with 
respect to price. 
 
Parametric Quantile Regression and Least Squares Estimation 
Inspired by the restrictions of Gaussian assumptions of linearity and zero conditional 
mean, Koenker and Basset (1978) proove that for any distribution, the median is a 
better measure of location, the regression median40 is more efficient. In contrast to 
least squares, assuming that the expected value of the error term conditional on the 
covariates is zero, quantile regression sorts the data and identifies a threshold (τ) to 
estimate the coefficient (β) that minimizes the sum of absolute residuals. The general 
set-up of quantile regression, Equation 3.1 below is solved from an optimization 
perspective using linear programming. 
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where estimated β(τ) called ‘tauth’ (τth) regression quantile estimates the coefficient 
at a specified threshold (τ). τ is the sample quantile and takes on any value that 
between 0 and 1. The expression ( )βρ τ ii xy '− , the absolute value function, weights 
                                                 
40
 The proof of the median regression can is easily replicated for other to other percentiles (quantiles). 
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the absolute difference between iy and βix ' with τ and by (1 – τ) for all observations 
below the estimated hyperplane. Koenker and Basset (1978) estimates conditional 
quantiles using the minimization procedure synonymous to least squares. 
 
Interaction Procedure 
The observation of varying interest rate at different percentiles of loan size pre-
empts an investigation of the factors likely to affect the relationship between interest 
rate and loan size. Karlan and Zinman (2008) identify the external factors of 
targeting females and low income category of clients as potential influences on the 
relationship between interest rate and loan size. Based on this, we apply the 
interaction method to least squares and compare our results with the subsamples 
used in other approaches. The study’s hypothesis informs the specification of a 
functional relationship positing that the effect of interest rate on loan size is 
moderated by the socio-economic well being of the client. This translates into the 
specification of Equation 3.2.  
 
Jaccard and Turrisi (2003) suggest that there is a need for an initial null hypothesis 
test in order to verify the presence of an interaction term in a model. The null 
hypothesis asserts that the regression coefficient for the product term is zero. Also, 
assessing the strength and nature of the interaction term further justifies the choice 
statistic to be estimated based on the theoretical and intuitive propositions. The 
exploratory test uses the basic multiplicative approach to interact the two continuous 
terms of poverty scores and interest rate in our model. The test for the two equations 
(with and without the interaction term) indicates an F-value of 30, implying the 
presence of a statistical interaction between poverty score and interest rate in the 
loan size equation. In this chapter, we assume linear41 dependence between poverty 
score and interest rate. We therefore reject the null hypothesis and confirm the 
assertion of Dehejia et al. (2005) and Karlan and Zinman (2008) that the poor 
moderates the relationship between interest rate and loan size. The strength of the 
                                                 
41
 We are cognizant of the other dimensions of dependence such as varying relationship along the 
slope and shape culminating into a non-linear relationship between poverty score and interest rate. 
But for brevity we limit the discussion to a theoretical bilinear relationship. 
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relationship from the multiplicative perspective shows that the interaction effect 
accounts for 2 percent of the variance in loan size. Interpreting coefficients in a 
model with an interactive term, especially in the case of multiplicative interacted 
variables, is always received with a pinch of salt. Aiken and West (1990) and 
Jaccard and Turrissi (2003) both suggest potential problems, notably 
multicollinearity in interpreting Equation 3.3 given product terms added to the right-
hand side variables. 
 
2.4.*. 43210 iiiii erIntPovrIntPovLS X +++−+= βββββ  
 
where LS42 is the loan amount, Pov is the household poverty score; Int.r is the 
interest rate Pov*Int.r is the interaction for the centred variables of household 
poverty score and interest rate and X is the vector of other household factors that 
influence demand for loan amount. Specifying the equation in this form, implies that 
loan size responsiveness to a marginal change in interest rate for the ith borrower is 
dependent on β2 and β3 and a ‘value’ of poverty rate, normally the mean or any other 
measure that describes poverty levels in some intuitive manner. Equation 4.3 
specifies the derivation of loan size responsiveness in the case of an interaction term. 
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As the choice of the ‘value’ is discretionary, interpreting models with interaction 
terms require caution. Aiken and West (1990) compare uncentred and centred 
variables in estimated equations and conclude that centred analysis be employed as it 
facilitates a more intuitive interpretation for interacted variables. With this 
background of evidence we explore the interaction effect in more detail using 
specific statistic (mean and different percentiles) of the moderating variable, poverty 
scores. 
 
                                                 
42
 The estimation takes the logarithmic form of loan size to calculate semi-elasticity. 
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Second Stage Estimations 
We undertake Instrumental Variable (IV) and Heckman second stage estimations to 
correct for plausible endogeneity and selection bias respectively. Although the likely 
incidence of reverse causality is minimised with a restricted sample of new clients 
and current amount of loan take-up, endogeneity is still plausible. Multiple sources 
of endogeneity, including omitted variables, are likely to bias our estimates. Specific 
to this chapter, institutional features that complement the effect of interest rate on 
loan size are likely to affect our equation via an omitted variable perspective. 
Typically, one can argue that institutional performance can cause interest rate 
endogeneity. Identifying operational self sufficiency43 as an instrument for interest 
rate and measure of institutional performance, we address the two pronged 
requirements for the use of IV. The initial testable requirement shows that the 
correlation between interest rate and operational self-sufficiency is 0.40. The second 
pre-requisite that requires intuition and theory points to a minimal association 
between operational self-sufficiency and the error term of the loan size equation. We 
argue that, due to institution’s risk perception of first and repeated loans,44 restricting 
the sample to new clients nullifies the plausible effect of institutional performance 
on amount of loan disbursed. In view of the above, we propose that the interest rate 
coefficient is biased downwards as a result of the inverse relationship between the 
instrument and loan size on one hand and the positive relationship between interest 
rate and operational self-sufficiency on the other 
 
In the case of sample effect, Armendariz de Aghion, and Morduch (2005) points out 
that impact studies in microfinance are decidedly mixed as a result of 
methodological issues including selection bias. We attempt to correct for sample 
selection problems that emerge on the premise of; (a) probability of an individual 
participating in a microfinance programme and (b) likelihood of being a member and 
accessing a loan. Identifying an exclusive variable for the participation equation is 
                                                 
43
 Operational Self Sufficiency is measured as financial revenue/ (financial expense + net loan loss 
provision expense + operating expense). The unadjusted subsidy effect explains the effect of donors 
and government in amount of loan disbursed. 
44
 Anecdote suggests that microfinance institutions use donor and government grants mostly for first 
time loans and as such are not very particular about its effect on the sustainability of their operations. 
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always daunting given the demise of a trade-off in the efficiency of our results. The 
potential of huge standard errors in second stage estimation is verified by comparing 
our results with least squares. Occupational category of respondent that is either self 
employed or otherwise is used as the exclusive variable. The choice of this variable 
is rationalized by the preponderance of self-employed entrepreneurs in microfinance. 
 
We therefore estimate an outcome equation as; 
 iiiiiii zClxLS X ηγτσα ++== )(1;| 4'4
^^
1211                  4.4 
 
where σ12 denotes the error term emerging from the participation and outcome 
equations; )( 4'4
^
γiz  is the variable representing Inverse Mills Ratio (IMR) for each 
of the observed households computed from a participation equation; τ is the
 
coefficient of the IMR and ηi is the normal stochastic term for an OLS and X is the 
vector of covariates in our outcome equation.  
 
Finally, to compare our approach to that of previous studies, we estimate interest 
rate effect on two sub-samples. Equations 4.5 and 4.6 specify the estimation of two 
sub-samples {poorest sample (bottom 20 percent) and non-poor sample (upper 80 
percent)}. Categorization of the sample into quintiles and the exploratory outcome 
of the box and whisker plot informed the specification of the two broad regressions. 
As observed, the variability between the poorest 20 percent and the other group is 
both economically and statistically significant 45  Equation 4.7 estimates an 
unrestricted model that includes a dummy to capture the effect of poverty. 
 
5.4. 4210 iiii erIntPovLS X ++−+= ββββ                                                  
(Poorest Sample) 
 
 
                                                 
45
 Calculated  t-value for the difference in average interest rate between the bottom 20 percent and the 
upper 80 percent is 4.5 denoting statistical significance of the variation for the two groups. 
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6.4. 4210 iiii erIntPovLS X ++−+= ββββ    
 (Otherwise Sample) 
 
7.454.210 ieipoorNonirIntiPoviLS X +−++−+= βββββ                                      
(Unrestricted Model) 
 
We apply the traditional Chow Test46 to examine consistency in slope coefficients 
between the restricted (equations 4.5 and 4.6) and the unrestricted (Equation 4.7) 
models. Equations 4.5 and 4.6 are tested concurrently against the unrestricted model 
of Equation 4.7. Though robust estimation has been meticulously considered 
throughout this study, we are humble in asserting a definite uni-causality from 
interest rate to loan size due to the cross sectional nature of our dataset. 
 
 4.4 Results and Discussion 
The central hypothesis posits that loan size sensitivity will have varying slopes as a 
result of the different socio-economic characteristics of clients. Karlan and Zinman 
(2008) observe a kinked demand curve, confirming stronger sensitivity effect at the 
extensive margins of interest rates. Though informative, we suspect that limiting the 
empirical investigation to a subsample blurs a possible higher frequent and deeper 
variation in loan size responsiveness among microfinance clients. Table 4.2b 
presents the mean and different percentiles of interest rates for each of the quintiles. 
The mean underpins regression analysis (maximum likelihood and least squares) 
used in previous studies and the potential percentile variations justify our choice of 
quantile regression and application of interaction procedures. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
46
  The Chow Test like any other F-test, tests the hypothesis of equal slopes in the different 
subsamples (See Wooldridge 2006). 
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Table 4.2a - Loan Amount by Poverty Quintiles 
Poverty Groups  N  Mean  Max  Min  Median  
Extreme Poor  120  ¢45,628 
US$5.06  
> ¢2,000,000 
US$221.78 
¢30,000 
US$3.33 
¢335,000 
US$37.15 
Very Poor  153  ¢1,284,999 
US$142.49 
> ¢10,000,000 
US$1,108.89 
¢50,000 
US$5.54 
¢1,000,000 
US$110.89 
Poor  155  ¢1,511,087 
US$167.56  
> ¢10,000,000 
US$1,108.89 
¢100,000 
US$11.09 
¢1,000,000 
US$110.89 
Moderately Poor  124  ¢2,271,049 
US$251.84 
> ¢40,000,000  
US$4,435.57 
¢100,000 
US$11.09 
¢1,000,000 
US$110.89 
Non-Poor  146  ¢5,805,849 
US$643.81 
> ¢80,000,000  
US$8,875.17 
¢100,000 
US$11.09 
¢2,000,000 
US$221.78 
Total 698  ¢2,313,587  
US$256.55 
>  ¢80,000,000 
US$8,871.15 
¢30,000  
US$3.33 
¢1,000,000 
US$110.89 
 
 
 
Table 4.2b - Interest Rate by Poverty Quintiles 
Poverty Quintiles N Mean P5 P25 P50 P75 P95 Coefficient of Variation 
Extreme Poor  317 30.49 20 20 28 35 48 0.324 
Very Poor 320 30.68 0 25 35 36 42              0.213 
Poor 318 32.52 20 30 35 37 42             0.183 
Moderately Poor 317 33.06 20 30 35 37 42             0.188 
Non-Poor 317 33.60 20 30 35 37 42             0.162 
Total 1589 32.07 20 28 35 37 48             0.220 
 
Univariate Analysis 
Tables 4.2a and 4.2b clearly evidence the extent to which use of mean suppresses 
variations at different percentiles. The box and whisker plot of Figure 4.3 shows that 
the minimum and maximum interest rates are not restricted to a particular category 
of clients. Table 4.2a describes the loan amount received by different poverty 
quintiles. We observe different levels of variance between the groups based on the 
choice of statistic. While the mean shows a difference of about 30 times between the 
extreme and very poor the median accounts for a 3 times difference.  Comparing 
Figure 4.3 and Table 4.2, heterogeneity in interest rate is observed at the lower end 
of the socio-economic distribution. For instance, the fifth percentile shows 0 percent 
interest rate for the very poor category compared to 20 percent for the other groups. 
Also, at the extensive margin it is observed that the 95th percentile is 48 percent for 
the extreme poor category compared to 42 percent for the other groups.  
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Additionally, interest rates tend to vary in an inconsistent fashion for the different 
categories of extreme and very poor clients, and changes in interest rates across the 
quantiles tend to show consistent variations for the poor to non-poor category. This 
observation makes the use of least squares susceptible to a blurred response as it is 
premised on the mean, which shows an increase in average interest rate from 
extreme poor to non-poor. The difference between groups based on choice of 
statistic has implications in drawing inferences and predictions using higher level 
estimation techniques precedent on either the mean or the median. 
 
FIGURE 4.3 - Interest rate for Different Socio-economic Groups of Borrowers 
 
 
In Table 4.2 we show the distribution of interest rates across the five socio-economic 
categories of microfinance clients at the mean and different percentiles. Noticing 
with much alacrity is the twist at 5th percentile which shows 0 percent lending rate 
for the very poor category compared to 20 percent for all the other groups including 
the extreme poor. This observation suggests a platform of plausible market distortion 
detrimental to the long term sustainability of microfinance. The uni-variate statistics 
of Table 4.3A offer a comparison between interest rate charged and the simple 
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average of poverty score for various programmes47 of the respective microfinance 
institutions. The annualized48 nominal49 interest rates ranged from 0 percent to 48 
percent with a respective mean and median of 32 percent and 35 percent for all the 
programmes of the institutions. The wide range of 48 percent characterizing 
microfinance evokes concerns on why and who benefits and of who pays what. The 
observed mean lending rate of 32 percent (Table 4.2) is more than twice the prime 
rate of 14.5 percent and about 11 percent more than the borrowing rate of traditional 
banking institutions to the public. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
47
 Programme in this study is defined as the source of funds. That is either institutional own mobilized 
funds, sourced from donor or government. For the purposes of analysis we generate dummy for own 
programme interpreted as institutional mobilized funds and otherwise. The rationale is that funds 
sourced from donor and government are external to the institution. 
48
 Worth mentioning is the use of adjustment factors. Due to the varied approaches of handling 
interest rate overtime including ‘reducing balance’ and ‘flat’ method, we annualize all the rates and 
adjust all methods of calculation to the ‘flat method’. The ‘reducing balance’ method calculates 
interest rate based on the balance while the ‘flat’ method is based on the principal. 
49
 A logical argument will be to apply either real or effective interest as the unit of analysis is the 
household.  However due to respondent’s lack of ability to quantify other transaction cost and 
variations in personal inflation rate we use the nominal interest rate. 
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Table 4.3A - Poverty Scores and Interest Rate Charged by type of Institution 
and Programme 
MFI Source of funds Interest rate per annum Poverty Score 
CU1  Deposits 25% 1.057 
RB2 Deposits 28% -1.513 
Donor 25% -1.515 
RB3 Deposits 35% -0.722 
FNGO1 Donor 48% -1.187 
FNGO2 Donor 35% 0.924 
Deposits 35% 0.924 
S & L Deposits 7% 1.204 
RB4 Deposits 36% 0.503 
Government 36% 0.274 
FNGO2 Deposit 25% 0.238 
RB5 Deposits 35% 0.023 
Government 0% 0.665 
RB6 Deposits 42% 0.767 
RB7 Government 20% -1.374 
Donor 20% -1.097 
RB8 Government 20% 0.797 
Deposit 34% 0.561 
RB9 Deposit 30% 0.709 
Deposit 30% 0.974 
Government 20% 0.555 
Government 20% 0.365 
CU2 Deposit 36% 1.167 
 
FNGO3 
Ashanti Deposit 37% 0.483 
Volta Deposit 37% 1.057 
Eastern Deposit 37% 0.957 
Brong 
Ahafo 
Deposit 37% 0.642 
SUSU Deposit - 1.226 
 
 
In an earlier empirical paper, Amonoo et al. (2003) observed that the mean nominal 
lending rate to the poor in the Central Region of Ghana is about 45 percent per 
annum. In Table 4.2, the average lending rate shows a rate some 13 percent points 
lower. A potential cause of the variation is the different scope of the two studies. 
Since the current study is nationally representative, characteristics of the respondents 
in peri-urban and urban areas are likely to influence interest rates. The notion that 
transaction costs are higher in dealing with poor clients might be a potential 
justification for the high interest rate of 45 percent in the previous study, as it was 
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conducted in one of the four poorest regions of Ghana. On the contrary, we observe 
from the study that whilst the mean shows higher lending rates for less poor clients, 
the evidence is mixed at different percentiles. This signals other influences on 
lending rate such as source of funds. From Table 4.3A we observe that the cost of 
accessing a loan funded by the Government was on average a third lower than 
programmes dispensed with own funds. This augments contemporary knowledge 
that institutional funds mobilized through owner’s equity, savings and shares are 
geared-up for commercialization as opposed to external funds (Rhyne, 1998).  
 
The last column of Table 4.3A shows the poverty scores of client’s households. The 
results indicate that RB2 with scores of -1.1513 and -1.515 for its two programmes 
and FNGO1 with a score of -1.1187 report reaching very poor clients. The principal 
reason accounting for this is the location of the institutions. These institutions are 
located in the northern part of the country where poverty is most endemic. Annim et 
al. (2008) assesses the spatial dimension and implication of microfinance institutions 
in Ghana. 
 
 
The econometric estimations are preceded by a presentation of the summary 
statistics and correlation matrix (Tables 4.3B and 4.3C) of all variables used. The 
rationale is to facilitate a better understanding of the choice of variables and 
preliminary idea of the direction and extent of relationship between the variables. 
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Table 4.3b Summary Statistics 
Variables Definition/Unit of Measurement N Mean SD MIN MAX 
Current Loan 
Amount Local Currency Unit (Ghana) 1589 1032291 4044590 0 80000000 
Interest Rate Percent 1589 32.06734 8.842656 0 48 
Client Status 
=1 if client receives multiple financial 
service 1589 0.254248 0.435575 0 1 
Previous Loan 
Amount Local Currency Unit (Ghana) 1589 773851.5 3088975 0 70000000 
Sex of Client =1 if client is female 1589 0.246067 0.430854 0 1 
Poverty Score Continuous Variable 1589 0.216987 1.002145 -2.5 2.40 
Number of 
Savings Account Discrete Variable 1589 0.826935 0.757584 0 6 
Source of Funds 
= if MFI relies on own funds for 
operations 1589 0.877281 0.328217 0 1 
Household Size Discrete Variable 1589 5.334802 2.316827 1 17 
Location = 1 if client is resident in either Greater 
Accra or Ashanti Region 1589 0.050346 0.218727 0 1 
 
 
Table 4.3c Correlation Matrix 
Variable 
Amount 
Borrowed 
Interest 
rate 
Client 
Status 
Previous 
Loan 
Amount 
Sex 
of 
Client 
Poverty 
Index 
Number 
of 
Savings 
Accounts 
Source 
of 
Funds 
Household 
Size Location 
Amount 
Borrowed 1 -0.01 0.17 -0.04 0.08 0.17 0.13 0.06 -0.01 0.29 
Interest rate -0.01 1 0.04 -0.01 -0.03 0.02 0.09 0.17 0.02 -0.08 
Client 
Status 0.17 0.04 1 -0.05 0.18 0.15 0.29 0.31 -0.03 -0.17 
Previous 
Loan 
Amount -0.04 -0.01 -0.05 1 -0.08 0.11 0.09 0.13 0.05 0.1 
Sex of 
Client 0.08 -0.03 0.18 -0.08 1 0.05 -0.02 0.01 -0.17 0.04 
Poverty 
Index 0.17 0.02 0.15 0.11 0.05 1 0.48 0.16 -0.15 0.22 
Number of 
Savings 
Accounts 0.13 0.09 0.29 0.09 -0.02 0.48 1 0.24 0.07 -0.01 
Source of 
Funds 0.06 0.17 0.31 0.13 0.01 0.16 0.24 1 -0.01 -0.34 
Household 
Size -0.01 0.02 -0.03 0.05 -0.17 -0.15 0.07 -0.01 1 -0.07 
Location 0.29 -0.08 -0.17 0.1 0.04 0.22 -0.01 -0.34 -0.07 1 
Operational 
Self 
Sufficiency -0.12 0.4 -0.11 -0.05 -0.14 -0.51 -0.28 0.08 0.11 -0.15 
Self 
employed 0.03 -0.01 0.12 -0.1 0.12 -0.37 -0.18 0.02 0.04 -0.17 
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Multivariate Analysis 
Figure 4.4, demonstrates concisely the quantile responsiveness of loan size for each 
of the covariates. For brevity, we restrict our discussion to the main covariate 
interest rate and factors most likely to influence targeting (poverty and sex of client). 
The thick dashed line plots the respective least squares coefficient and the light point 
dots are the confidence intervals. The quantile regression coefficients are 
represented for the various percentiles with the curved lines and respective 
confidence intervals are shown with the dim background. At a glance, we observe 
broadly that interest rates show inconsistent responsiveness of loan size at different 
quantiles. The least squares shows that marginal upward variation in interest rate 
results in a 0.7 (less than unitary – Table 4.4) downward change in loan size. But the 
question remains as to whether this is consistent across all the segments of the 
distribution. The quantile regression shows that the change is much higher for the 
lower quantile (up to about 40th), fairly stable for the middle quantile (between 40th 
and 65th) and falls further for the higher quantiles.  
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Table 4.4 - Least Squares and Quantile Regression Estimates 
Dependent Variable: Log of Current Loan Size Amount 
Explanatory 
Variables 
Ordinary 
Least Squares 
Quantile regression thresholds 
10th 25th 50th 75th 90th 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Interest Rate -0.007 -0.000 -0.002 -0.011 -0.012 -0.018 
 [-2.09]* [-0.11] [-0.50] [-2.79]** [-1.39] [-2.10]* 
Client Status 0.327 0.308 0.414 0.380 0.302 0.200 
 [4.30]** [3.09]** [5.17]** [3.59]** [2.56]* [1.11] 
Amount of 
Previous Loan 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
[1.15] [1.88]+ [1.12] [0.99] [0.63] [0.16] 
Sex of Client -0.170 -0.018 -0.141 -0.148 -0.208 -0.127 
 [-2.55]* [-0.19] [-1.72]+ [-1.75]+ [-2.30]* [-1.13] 
Poverty Score 0.538 0.598 0.491 0.572 0.499 0.448 
 [14.38]** [8.54]** [10.69]** [12.77]** [7.42]** [5.50]** 
Number of 
Savings 
Account 
0.145 0.016 0.020 0.035 0.188 0.492 
[1.93]+ [0.16] [0.29] [0.29] [2.09]* [3.25]** 
Source of 
Funds 
0.074 -0.042 -0.311 -0.030 0.281 0.571 
 [0.85] [-0.24] [-2.36]* [-0.33] [2.61]** [3.10]** 
Household 
Size 
0.031 -0.001 0.003 0.029 0.048 0.078 
 [2.11]* [-0.06] [0.19] [1.97]* [2.38]* [3.21]** 
Location 1.643 1.085 1.151 1.703 2.178 2.041 
 [7.61]** [6.86]** [4.42]** [4.81]** [5.89]** [5.19]** 
Constant 13.377 12.486 13.222 13.620 13.740 13.870 
 [85.14]** [61.37]** [54.22]** [89.73]** [53.50]** [48.09]** 
N 720 720 720 720 720 720 
Adj. R2 0.468 - - - - - 
Wald test 
comparing 
with 50th 
Percentile 
- 
F=5.53(0.0
2) F=5.10(0.02) - F=0.00(0.95) F=0.68(0.41) 
t statistics in brackets  -  + p<.10 (significant at 10 per cent), * p<.05 (significant at 5 per cent), ** 
p<.01(significant at 1 per cent) 
 
On the other hand, sex of client demonstrates fairly consistent results across both 
least squares and quantile regression. The only observable variation is at the lower 
quantile. The least squares estimation shows that loan amount received by female 
clients is 17 percent less than their male counterparts. The 5 percent significance 
level observed from the least squares, is not consistent across the quantiles (Table 
4.4). The inconsistency incites probes into the resilience and reliability of the least 
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squares estimates. We address these probes by exploring the interaction effect and 
checking for robustness using second stage estimation techniques. 
                                                       
Figure 4.4 - Least Squares and Quantile Regressions’ Coefficients 
 
 
Based on the observation from the quantile regression and the empirical verification 
of the presence of an interaction term in section 4.3, we hypothesise that client well-
being moderates the effect of the relationship between loan size and interest rate.  
 
Table 4.5 compares the effect of a model including interaction terms (specifically 
poverty scores interacted with interest rate) for the full sample with either reduced 
sample or restricted models. Using a basic specification test, Ramsey’s test supports 
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the use of the full sample with interaction terms and rejects the null hypothesis of 
‘no omitted variables’ in all the other four cases.The first column of Table 4.5 
presents the model with the interactive term at the centred predictor, moderator and 
their interaction. We opt for centred of the variables as explained in section 4.3 of 
the chapter. We estimate this relationship bearing in mind the effect of other 
covariates including; number of savings account held by the borrower, location, sex 
of client, household size and others (see Table 4.5). The interpretation of the sign 
and coefficient of the predictor with an interaction generates much complexity 
depending on the statistic of the moderating variable (Wooldridge 2006). Our initial 
result at the centred value is to provide an intuitive interpretation of Equation 4.2 at 
the mean poverty rate. Thus, the semi-elasticity of interest rate to loan size is quite 
marginal (0.2 50  percent, relatively inelastic) and is therefore insignificant. This 
provides insufficient evidence to reject the null hypothesis of microfinance client 
insensitivity. This initial result runs parallel to recent studies (Dehejia et al., 2005; 
Briones, 2007 and Karlan and Zinman, 2008) of an elasticity coefficient close to 
unitary. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
50
 The net effect based on equation 4.3 would have been used in case the coefficient was significant. 
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Table 4.5 - Interaction Effect and Reduced Samples 
Explanatory 
Variables 
Interaction 
Term 
Poorest 
Sample 
Non-Poor 
Sample 
Impose 
Restrictions 
Without Interaction 
term and Dummies 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Interest Rate -0.023 -0.044 0.011 -0.012 -0.012 
 [-6.06]** [-4.82]** [1.92]+ [-2.80]** [-2.80]** 
Client Status 0.268 0.462 0.215 0.355 0.364 
 [3.51]** [2.38]* [2.53]* [4.71]** [4.83]** 
Previous Loan 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 [1.86]+ [0.06] [2.23]* [2.64]** [2.61]** 
Sex of Client -0.150 0.249 -0.219 -0.166 -0.151 
 [-2.29]* [1.36] [-3.01]** [-2.44]* [-2.26]* 
Poverty Score -0.243 0.707 0.427 0.456 0.499 
 [-1.79]+ [4.22]** [6.53]** [7.18]** [13.86]** 
Number of Savings 
Accounts 
0.142 0.137 0.153 0.146 0.149 
[1.97]* [0.86] [2.04]* [1.97]* [2.01]* 
Source of Funds 0.349 0.428 0.345 0.093 0.111 
[3.88]** [1.70]+ [3.37]** [1.07] [1.32] 
Household Size 0.033 0.106 0.011 0.029 0.029 
[2.30]* [4.26]** [0.64] [1.94]+ [1.95]+ 
Location 0.553 Dropped 0.482 0.623 0.653 
[2.50]* Dropped [2.24]* [2.87]** [3.03]** 
Interaction between 
Poverty and Interest 
rate 
0.022 - - - - 
[5.87]** - - - - 
Interaction between 
the Poverty and 
Location 
1.268 Dropped 1.294 1.229 1.192 
[6.11]** Dropped [6.18]** [5.85]** [5.85]** 
Dummy for the 
poorest group 
- - - -0.148 - 
- - - [-0.91] - 
Constant 13.090 14.023 12.813 13.562 13.496 
 [68.45]** [29.43]** [54.39]** [78.94]** [80.00]** 
N 698 120 578 698 698 
Adj. R2 0.514 0.490 0.361 0.491 0.491 
F-Statistic 67.536 31.132 27.249 54.381 58.613 
Log Likelihood -818.918 -113.975 -688.867 -834.587 -835.063 
Ramsey’s 
Specification Test 
F  = 1.18 
(0.316) 
F  = 2.41 
(0.0710) + 
F  = 3.16  
(0.0243) * 
F  = 7.67 
(0.000) ** 
F  = 8.38 
(0.000) ** 
Chow Test 6.14(0.00) 
t statistics in brackets  -  + p<.10 (significant at 10 per cent), * p<.05 (significant at 5 per cent), ** 
p<.01(significant at 1 per cent) 
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Table 4.6 - Coefficient of Key Covariates and Interaction at Varied Statistic 
Key Covariates 
Coefficients at Varied Statistics [t-values in parenthesis] 
Mean 20th Percentile 50th Percentile 80th Percentile 
Interest Rate -0.004 -0.023 0.007 0.018 
 [-0.98] [-6.06]** [1.26] [2.58]* 
Poverty Score -0.243 -0.243 -0.243 -0.243 
 [-1.79]+ [-1.79]+ [-1.79]+ [-1.79]+ 
Interaction 0.022 0.022 0.022 0.022 
 [5.87]** [5.87]** [5.87]** [5.87]** 
Net Effect - -.018 - .023 
 
 
Table 4.6 compares interest rate at varied statistic and offers a deeper insight into 
which category of clients is sensitive. Each percentile of the interaction variable 
describes a segment of clients’ socio-economic characteristics. The choice for the 
20th percentile is informed by the extreme poverty statistics in Ghana and also the 
evidence of a high coefficient of variation for this group (Table 4.2). The 50th and 
75th were selected due to the basic standardization of these percentiles. Column 3, 
Table 4.6 shows that estimating Equation 4.2 at a value that describes the 
characteristics of the very poor (20th quantile), the responsiveness of loan size to 
interest rate changes is more than unitary (2.4 percent), downward sloping and 
significant at less than one percent. The net effect based on Equation 4.3 yields [-
0.0228431 + (0. 0223369 *(.222469551)) = -0.01787382 (≈ (1.78 percent)]. That is 
taking into consideration the moderating effect of clients’ wellbeing of the poorest 
group, loan size will fall by 1.8% when interest rate increases by 1%. This shows 
strong responsiveness by the extreme poor and offers consistent finding with earlier 
studies. However, in each of the other statistics either the coefficient is not 
significant (mean and 50th percentile) or it shows a positive sign (50th and 75th 
percentiles). 
 
The significant inverse response of loan size to a unit change in interest rate literally 
implies that poorer clients drop-out with higher interest rates. This finding might 
suggest some reasons for the failure of the IGVGD programme in Bangladesh. We 
                                                 
51
 This value represents the mean poverty score for the entire sample. 
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are tempted to support the preposition that microfinance is ideal for a particular 
segment of poor clients normally tagged as ‘brave poor’. The labelling of 
microfinance clients as ‘brave’ can be interpreted from the perspective of the upper 
80 percent that are non-responsive to interest rate changes. Assuming non-
responsiveness implies repayment it is utterly important to identify channels of 
repayment. Among the unconventional means adopted by clients to repay are 
multiple borrowing from different institutions and sale of assets. Some anecdotal 
evidence suggests clients exhibit suicidal tendencies in the long-run when both 
conventional and unconventional modes for repayment are exhausted. 
 
Columns 2-5, Table 4.5 offers a comparison both within and between the current 
study’s approach and the use of subsamples. Comparing the coefficient of interest 
rate for the subsample of the bottom 20 percent with the interaction term of the 20th 
percentile we observe a consistent sign and significance level. Though in both 
estimates we observe more than unitary loan size responsiveness the difference of 
about 2 percent is worth considering. Worth observing from all five columns is a 
downward sloping demand curve for all estimates except the non-poor sample. The 
outcome of positive coefficient is supported by the 50th and 75th percentiles in 
Table 4.6.  
 
We estimate equations 4.5 to 4.7 to empirically test differences in regression slopes 
across groups. In our context, it is the bottom 20 percent (column 2, Table 4.5) vis-à-
vis the non-poor sample (column 3, Table 4.5) compared with the restricted model 
(column 4, Table 4.5). The significant chow test value of 14.47(0.000) implies the 
rejection of the null hypothesis that the slopes do not change if the subsamples used. 
This finding upholds the need to formally include a variable capturing the socio-
economic characteristics of the poor into the estimation model instead of estimating 
subsamples as offered in previous studies.  
 
Table 4.7 offers second stage estimation results that seek to correct for endogeneity 
and sample selection problems. Correcting for endogeneity, we observe that the 
107 
 
interest rate coefficient increase by a margin of 0.06.  The use of operational self-
sufficiency which is positively correlated to nominal interest rate and inversely 
related to loan size resolves the plausible underestimation. This suggests that using 
an effective interest rate is likely to show greater responsiveness relative to nominal 
interest rate. The Hausman test shows that the IV coefficients are better (statistical 
different from the OLS estimates) in spite of the huge standard errors.  
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Table 4.7 - Second Stage Instrumental Variable and Heckman Estimations 
Dependent Variable:  
Amount of Current Loan  
Coefficients & Robust Standard Errors 
(1) (2)  (3) (4a) (4b) 
 
Explanatory Variables 
Least 
Squares 
Instrumental 
Variable 
Hausman Heckman 1. 
 
Heckman 2. 
 
Interest rate 
-0.014 
(0.004)*** 
-0.074 
(0.010)*** 
- 0.060 
 
- 0.016 
(0.005)*** 
- 0.013 
(0.005)*** 
 
Client Status 
0.314 
(0.078)*** 
0.206 
(0.088)** 
0.009 
 
0.044 
(0.124) 
- 0.014 
(0.163) 
Number of Savings 
Account 
0.146 
(0.076)** 
0.205 
(0.066)*** 
0.059 
 
0.171 
(0.59)*** 
0.139 
(0.58)** 
Amount of Previous 
Loan 
0.000 
(0.000)** 
-0.000 
(0.000)** 
0.000 
 
0.000 
(0.000)*** 
0.000 
(0.000)*** 
 
Poverty Score 
0.530 
(0.036)*** 
0.499 
(0.043)*** 
- 0.031 
 
0.526 
(0.038)*** 
0.537 
(0.039)*** 
 
Location 
1.624 
(0.205)*** 
1.540 
(0.165)*** 
- 0.083 
 
1.534 
(0.150)*** 
1.692 
(0.150)*** 
 
Source of Funds 
0.136 
(0.086) 
  0.555 
(0.015)*** 
0.419 
 
0.235 
(0.105)** 
0.019 
(0.110) 
 
Household size 
0.029 
(0.014)** 
0.031 
(0.024)*** 
  0.002 
 
0.027 
(0.014)** 
0.030 
(0.014)** 
 
Sex  of  Client  
-0.1880 
(0.067)*** 
- 0.259 
(0.076)*** 
-0.079 
 
- 0.297 
(0.079)*** 
- 0.268 
(0.078)*** 
 
Constant 
13.581 
(0.170)*** 
15.252 
(0.319)*** 
- 
 
13.867 
(0.202)*** 
14.047 
(0.270)*** 
R-Squared 0.48 0.34 - - - 
 
Number of Obs. 698 698 
 
Censored     -  850 
Uncensored -  698 
Censored  - 1952 
Uncensored – 698 
Operational Self 
Sufficiency [Instrument] 
Correlation between  
Operational Self Sufficiency  
and Interest Rate – [ 0.40]                          
 
Hausman Test Chi-Square 40.58 (0.00)  
Self   Employed 
[Exclusion Variable]  
0.002 
(0.096) 
 - - 
Heckman - Sigma 
 - 6.49 (0.000) - 5.74 (0.000) 
Heckman – Rho 
  - 2.68 (0.007) - 2.20 (0.028) 
Heckman – Test of Independence 5.95 (0.014) 3.18 (0.074) 
   *** Significant at one percent; **   Significant at five percent * Significant at ten percent 
 
Columns 4a and 4b address the problem of sample selection from two perspectives. 
The first perspective (column 4a) compares the effect of restricting the sample to 
only those who accessed loans vis-à-vis other microfinance clients and the second 
stage compares the former with both clients and non-clients. We propose that self 
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selection into microfinance programmes and ability to assess a loan is determined by 
whether the respondent is self employed or otherwise. The general belief is that 
more self employed people self select themselves into microfinance programmes 
because non-self employed respondents are likely to have access to traditional 
financial institutions and other sources of funds. The sample selection indicator 
(sigma) shows a much higher effect between those whose assessed loans and other 
microfinance clients. The test of independence between the participation and the 
outcome equations also shows significant results. Although the variation in interest 
rate is not huge, it is worth commenting that correcting for selection problems leads 
to significant changes in other covariates such as client status and source of funds. 
 
4.5 Conclusion 
Achieving financial sustainability and reaching poor clients concurrently has been 
the prime discourse of microfinance paradigm. The expectation is to provide 
services to the poor at low effective interest rates. Through this an institution 
achieves the dual purpose of reaching the poor and providing services on a 
commercial scale. Behavioural patterns of clients of MFI seem to vary in view of 
their differing socio-economic well-being. The major conclusion of this study 
supports recent findings of microfinance client sensitivity to interest rates changes 
but with a strong caveat. We assert the variability of borrower’s responsiveness to 
interest rate as opposed to ascribing generic sensitivity for all microfinance clients. 
Poorest clients show significant and more than unitary responsiveness to loan 
amount for a marginal increase in lending rate. Among the main plausible reasons 
for this observation is the theoretical knowledge of the poor’s aversion. Secondly, 
the dominance of group lending mechanism among the poorest group when 
compared to the non-poor potentially reduces information asymmetry leading to 
rationale economic behaviour of reducing loan amount as interest rate increases. 
Thirdly, poorer clients are likely to have less resilience to shocks and as such have a 
higher probability to decline loan offers as it price increases. The non-
responsiveness of less poor clients may be associated with their enthusiastic desire to 
make a living (‘brave poor’) making them at least risk neutral if not risk lovers. 
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While one could surmise other reasons, including limited supply of loan market 
alternatives this is one area that needs further empirical exploration as part of the 
process of deepening the outreach of institutions. 
 
The observed upward responsiveness between the second-stage instrumental 
variable and the first-stage estimations suggests the need to analyse clients’ 
responsiveness from the perspective of their cost rather than institutional nominal 
interest rates. Cost from the perspective of clients reveals the difference between 
nominal and effective interest rates. Estimating the responsiveness from these two 
perspectives suggests the ineffectiveness of   intervention strategies such as interest 
rate capping, since institutions are able to pass on cost to clients through channels 
other than phase value (nominal) interest rates. 
 
Microfinance proponents have argued with the arsenal that the poor are capable of 
paying back loans with minimal consideration to hurdles encountered during 
repayment. Although some category of clients may be insensitive to interest rate as 
observed from the study, theoretical prepositions of adverse implications such as 
moral hazard and adverse selection threaten the long-term success of reducing 
poverty and augmenting mainstream financial sector. We subscribe to recent market 
segmentation advocacy but propose the use of borrower’s responsiveness to 
complement traditional client differentiation methods including type of economic 
activity and community level indicators. This will enhance the achievement of client 
specific needs to complement location specific and type of economic activity driven 
needs. Secondly, a broader interventionist approach should be employed in the case 
of subsidy use. In this light, sensitivity thresholds will always pre-determine a likely 
drop-out. In a comprehensive sense, to prevent drop-out of poor clients as 
experienced from the IGVGD programme in Bangladesh, synergies between 
financial products, institutional structures and client socio-economic characteristics 
should be timely and concurrently administered. 
 
Results from the quantile regression clearly suggest the use of either non-linear or 
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non-parametric estimation as an extension to existing analyses. Other areas for 
further work point to the use of extensive datasets to explore bi-causality between 
loan amount and its price in the case of repeated loans. Also, issues of effective 
interest rate and higher-order interactive terms that includes repayment rate, loan 
schedules and economic activity will offer in- depth policy direction for practitioners 
of clients responsiveness to a blend of strategies.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE AND MICROFINANCE 
INSTITUTIONS’ FUNCTIONALITY 
 
5.0 Introduction 
Until recently, microfinance institutions have been identified with the dual 
objectives of poverty reduction and financial sustainability. The inclusion of 
environmental sustainability as a third objective of MFIs (Yunus and Weber 
2007) has further compounded the search for factors that drive the success of 
MFIs’ operations. In essence, the multiple objectives engender MFIs to achieve a 
balance between profit maximization and non-profit maximization 
(minimization) objectives. The non-profit maximization (minimization) 
objectives of MFIs, have led to at least two issues worth considering. Firstly, the 
non-profit maximization (minimization) dimension of microfinance has led to 
several stakeholders (other than managers and firm owners) in the microfinance 
industry. With each stakeholder advancing the attainment of a different objective 
function compared to others, defining successful indicators both in terms of 
impact and operational issues is daunting. Among the stakeholders are 
government and development partners. Secondly, unlike profit maximization, 
non-profit objectives (either minimization or maximization) contend with 
measurement issues, typically poverty.  
 
The multiple goals of microfinance paradigm have led to varied channels of 
evolution, regulation, and institutional characterization based on delivery 
strategies. It is therefore not surprising that most MFIs operate in the informal 
sector of an economy. The choice of any given pathway of evolution, regulation 
and delivery strategy is primarily dependent on the MFIs’ corporate governance 
and the external business/economic governance environment. As a result, some 
studies (Hartaska and Nadolnyak, 2007; Mersland and Strom, 2009; and Cull et 
al., 2009) have attempted to identify which of these governance factors 
determine either of the dual objectives of MFIs. This chapter identifies two 
limitations in the previous studies. Firstly, the choice and scope of external 
business/economic governance indicators and secondly, type of estimation 
technique used to address the effect of slowing changing explanatory variables 
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(economic governance indicators). Consistent with the theory underpinning 
economic governance (Dixit 2009), we examine the effect of proxies for security 
of property rights; enforcement of contracts and collective action on the dual 
objectives of microfinance using the fixed effects vector decomposition. 
 
This chapter subscribes to the notion that the complexity (multiple objectives), 
heterogeneity (varied operational strategies) and regulatory and licensing 
variations (formal and informal) can be resolved by identifying internal and 
‘external’ governance structures and functional roles that provide systems of 
checks and balances. The overall hypothesis asserts that functional governance 
systems cause microfinance institutions to achieve their dual objectives of 
poverty reduction and financial viability.  
 
The discourse on poverty-lending 52  vis-à-vis financial systems 53  approach to 
microfinance reached a consensus that, it is not an either/or argument, but the 
extent to which an institution pursues either of the goals and the potential 
consequences (Rhyne, 1998). A little over a decade thereafter, Cull et al (2009) 
asserted that the heterogeneity of microfinance institutions suggests that the 
future of microfinance is unlikely to follow a single path. The need to identify 
the extent of trade-off and the multiplicity of pathways of evolution, regulation 
and delivery strategy, imperatively calls for systems of checks and balances for 
the operations of microfinance institutions. In view of this, some earlier studies 
(Labie, 2001; Hartaska, 2005; Coleman and Osei, 2007 and Mersland and StrØm 
2009) have explored the hypothesis of a directional causation from governance to 
microfinance objectives of outreach and profitability.  In these papers, emphasis 
has been placed on the internal (corporate) governance indicators such as 
institutional board and management characteristics, disclosure, ownership 
structure and transparency. From this perspective, some insightful findings such 
as statistical significant effect of differences in board composition on firm 
performance have been observed to inform the management of MFIs. Beyond 
investigating the corporate governance effect on the objectives of microfinance 
                                                 
52
 This approach argues that poverty reduction is the only goal of MFIs and as such financial 
sustainability facilitates its achievement.  
53
 Contrary to poverty reduction, the financial systems approach argues that the over-arching goal 
of any financial institution, including MFIs is profit maximization. 
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institutions, a couple of studies have examined the impact of some ‘external’ 
governance structures such as regulation, auditing and market competition 
(Hartaska 2005 and Mersland and StrØm 2009).   
 
While we build on the initiative of exploring external governance effect on 
microfinance objectives, we argue that conceptualization and measurement of 
‘external’ governance is crucial for any inference. We offer three reasons for the 
need of a careful conceptualization and estimation of ‘external’ governance. 
Firstly, from a conceptual perspective, we contextualize ‘external governance’ 
based on the functioning of institutions. The role of institutions in setting legal 
rules, enforcing contracts and inciting collective action both within and outside 
markets underpins the concept of economic governance popularized by the 2009 
Economics Alfred Nobel Prize winners, (Elinor Ostrom and Oliver Williamson). 
Conceptualizing ‘external governance’ from the perspective of economic 
governance shifts the focus from a structure of systems to processes and 
adaptation of rules, enforcement and monitoring. This leads to the second point 
on measurement of external governance. We argue that time invariant factors 
(structure of systems) fail to capture the effect of governance on the functioning 
of imperfect markets such as microfinance. For instance, using traditional 
governance indicators such as a dummy to capture a democratic state or the 
presence press freedom constrains the ability to investigate causality using short 
panels. Thirdly, restricting governance to rules within the market such as 
regulation and auditing relies entirely on the microfinance institution. That is, the 
decision to become a formal institution thereby being regulated, in retrospect, 
will be positively correlated with the performance and future direction of the 
microfinance institution. This conjecture is likely to generate a bi-causal 
relationship between MFIs performance and decision for regulation and auditing. 
The foregoing inclines to a drift in both conceptualization and measurement of 
‘external governance’ in the microfinance literature. 
 
In this chapter, we identify ‘external’ governance indicators that are exogenous 
to the evolution, operation, regulation and sustainability of microfinance 
institutions to assess causality between governance and microfinance multiple 
objectives. Country level variables such as; contract enforcement procedures, 
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time required to secure property, credit information and voice and accountability 
are expected to have varying impact on the outreach and financial performance 
objectives of microfinance institutions. We hypothesize that ‘external’ 
governance causes microfinance institutions to reach poorer clients while internal 
operation is sufficient for financial sustainability. Our hypothesis is underpinned 
with a strong intuition that, MFIs will pursue the goal of profit maximization at 
least as an initial step when left alone.  
 
We use ratio of average loan size to gross national product per capita and return 
on assets as proxies for microfinance outreach and profitability. The main finding 
of the study suggests that credit information availability and lesser time in 
securing property maximizes the objective of poverty lending focus of 
microfinance institutions. Product diversification leading to economies of scope 
also emerges to enable institutions to reach poorer clients. In the case of MFIs’ 
financial performance, while ‘external’ governance systems appear to be of no 
need, good internal operational systems are sufficient.  
 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows; section 5.1 offers insights into the 
conceptual framework of governance and contextualizes it to the objectives of 
microfinance institutions. Sections 5.2 and 5.3 respectively discuss the 
econometric analysis and provide a description of the data and variables. The 
final two sections place the chapter’s hypothesis in the context of the observed 
results and offer conclusions and recommendations. 
 
5.1 Conceptual Framework 
This section is underpinned by both a theoretical and an empirical argument. The 
theoretical framework situates the scope of governance in a microfinance setting.  
The empirical argument reviews the existing justification for a system of checks 
and balances in view of current debate on commercialization of microfinance 
institutions. While the latter has been addressed lately, we use the theoretical 
argument as a cradle for an extension of the scope of relationship between 
governance and microfinance dual objectives of reaching poorer clients and 
being profitable. 
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Williamson (1973) identified two types of opportunism that are likely to occur in 
an economic transaction. The less obvious type of opportunism emerges during 
execution of contract due to the lack of self enforcing mechanisms required to 
perpetuate transactional relations based on earlier promises. The role of 
monitoring to subvert the adverse effect of breach of contractual agreement 
demands a clear identification all stakeholders and their respective stakes. In 
contrast to the neoclassical profit maximization model, the social goals of 
microfinance institutions brings on board the behavioural theory of a firm. Simon 
(1959) argue that disparate objectives between internal stakeholders (managers, 
owners and workers) on one hand and other stakeholders such as the government 
leads to a drift away from profit maximization to satisficing. Satisficing require 
managers to identify minimum acceptable levels which is determined and 
evaluated by the most prominent stakeholder at any point in time. In this regard, 
setting and evaluating minimum standards for reaching poor clients and being 
profitable will require at least two conditions. First, reaching a consensus among 
microfinance stakeholders and secondly instituting a well functioning structure 
of checks and balances within a country to facilitate equal opportunities. In this 
chapter we concentrate on the latter.  
 
The foregoing, places the argument of governance beyond the objectives of funds 
providers to include the goals of stakeholders who are inclined to poverty levels 
clients as well as non-clients affected by the operations of an MFI. Dixit’s (2009) 
seminal paper provides both top-down and bottom-up approaches of governance 
that facilitates economic activity. In his paper, top-down strategies (securing 
property rights and contract enforcement) and a bottom-up (collective action) 
approach were identified as governance drivers. His central thesis was that for 
economic activities to perform well then the following should prevail.  
 
Firstly, economic agents should have confidence that the fruit of their efforts will 
remain secured to benefit their own condition. Without this assurance people lose 
the incentive to save and invest. The twist in the case of microfinance is the 
direct protectionist role required from government and development partners to 
secure the savings and investment of MFIs, but more especially the poor. 
Instituting a system to promote security of property in the microfinance industry 
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should have the pronged objectives of ensuring that MFIs loans are protected and 
at the same time their intervention targets the poorer segment of the population.  
 
Secondly, availability and functioning of contract enforcing institutions 
complement the process of securing properties. Dixit argues that economic 
agent’s knowledge of the presence of an external system that ensures 
participating parties liability to a contract, promotes trust and facilitates honest 
engagement. Thus, a system promising that both formal and informal 
transactions shall be mutually enforced by trusting counterparts ensures joint 
satisfaction. In the absence of trust and confidence in the other party, people 
remain stuck in a prisoner dilemma which freezes all transactions. In view of the 
several stakeholders in microfinance, in an event of a mutual trust among any 
given set of economic agent (say MFI and client) their goal should complement 
other sets (say development partner and MFI) contractual goals. The immense 
presence of multiple principal-agent relationship as a result of several 
stakeholders in microfinance convolutes contract enforcement in microfinance.  
 
Thirdly, proper functioning of institutions in ensuring security of property and 
facilitating contract enforcement can only be accomplished with well structured 
avenues for addressing common goals among people. Dixit (2009) argue that the 
outcome of most private transactions depends on sufficient provision of public 
goods and ability to minimize public “bads”. The elements required for collective 
action are the functioning of groups and local information on alternatives. For 
instance, well informed activities of unionized workers, associations and 
consumer groups act as catalysts for seeking respective interests.  Microfinance’ 
group lending mechanism offers clients a spring board to galvanize action for 
sufficient provision of public goods and weave-out public “bads”, however their 
impact has not been realized beyond the group’s activities. In contrast, MFIs 
through their network associations have mobilized effort in most countries to 
address constraints facing the supply-side of the industry. Collective action 
manifested through active consumer (microfinance clients) groups and MFIs 
network is expected to ensure a mutual achievement of the poverty reduction and 
financial sustainability objectives. 
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The functioning of institutions securing property rights and enforcing contracts 
and avenues for collective action are expected to initially demystify unfounded 
stereotypes about financial service providers’ rigidities, exclusivity, 
bureaucracies, high cost of service and barriers of entry. This will then open the 
frontiers of the primary stakeholders (MFIs) to both sides of the scale that is 
wholesale fund providers and clients. Subsequently, this will ensure that MFIs 
set minimum levels of objectives based on the consent of all stakeholders which 
will then lead to an all inclusive platform for the evaluation of performance 
through time. 
 
Empirically, anecdotal evidence of a breakdown of trust between owners54 and 
managers as a result of the multiple goals of reaching poorer clients and being 
profitable/sustainable has led to studies on the effect of corporate governance on 
microfinance performance. The motivation for these studies is the theoretical rift 
between managers and owners respective objectives of growth and profitability. 
In the context of microfinance institutions, this premise has reduced the scope of 
objectives to fund providers and managers. Subsequently, the current literature 
related to governance of micro-lending practices and microfinance institutions 
highlights the effects of specific internal governance patterns on outreach and 
profitability. A large majority of the literature focuses on internal control systems 
and management framework which are likely to affect either social or financial 
performance of MFIs (Labie, 2001; Hartaska, 2005; Coleman and Osei, 2007 and 
Mersland and StrØm 2009). Organizational and structural patterns of corporate 
governance such as size, composition, representativeness of the board and duality 
of Chief Executive Officer have been investigated (Hartaska, 2005 and Mersland 
and StrØm, 2009). 
 
In view of the theoretical overview discussed above and scope of empirical 
evidence, it is imperative to investigate the effect of ‘external’ governance 
structure and functioning on the outreach and profitability of microfinance 
institutions. Offering evidence on the effect of ‘external’ governance on either or 
                                                 
54
 This includes development partners and government who provide funds wholesale funds for 
on-lending. 
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both of the objectives of microfinance institutions will set the tone for defining 
the role of other stakeholders, in particular the government.  
 
 
5.2 Data 
The quest of exploring the effect of ‘external’ governance factors and internal 
operations on performance of MFI dictates the use multiple sources of data. We 
rely on three secondary data sources for the empirical part of this chapter. The 
main data source is the Microfinance Information Exchange (MIX) and the other 
sources are the ‘Doing Business’ and ‘Governance’ data sources both of the 
World Bank. The MIX website reports institutional performance and operational 
indicators annually. This report is generated based on self reporting by the 
institutions however verification and authentication mechanisms are built into the 
procedures to ensure reliability of reportage. The ‘Doing Business’ and 
‘Governance’ data of the World Bank offers us the opportunity to capture proxy 
variables for the three economic governance indicators, namely; security of 
property rights, enforcement of contracts and collective action.  
 
MFIs’ double bottom line objectives of reaching poorer clients and achieving 
financial sustainability makes it imperative to explore the effect of governance 
indicators from both perspectives. Depth of outreach and return on assets 
respectively, are used to measure the social and financial objectives of MFIs. 
Both measures are without flaws of measurement error, however comes in handy 
due their respective merits of standardization for reporting and comparison 
across different institutions and countries and easy, quick and less costly 
computation. These qualities of the measures have undermined known problems 
of interpretability. For instance, the measure for comparing institutions’ 
inclination towards targeting poorer clients that is average loan size divided by 
gross national income per capita invites the long standing philosophical criticism 
on the use of gross national income.  
 
The three main explanatory variables in the study are: number of procedures 
required for contract enforcement, time required for property registration and 
voice and accountability. Appendix 1 shows the measurement and interpretation 
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of these variables. In addition to these three ‘external’ governance indicators, we 
control for the effect of credit information index and regulation and other 
institutional characteristics.  The correlation matrix (Table 5.2c) signals a 
variation in the association of each of the three economic governance indicators 
and the dual objectives of microfinance. The correlation indicates that longer 
duration in enforcement of contract is associated with reaching poorer clients and 
MFIs’ achievement of higher profits. Both correlation signs are inconsistent with 
our expectations, as it is desirable to curtail bureaucracies. However, Ahlin et al. 
(2010) argues that the role of institutional factors on microfinance performance 
could be mixed in view of the informal characteristic of the sector.  In the case of 
association between duration for property registration and the dual objectives of 
microfinance expected a priori signs are observed. The interpretation of the 
association or effect of the economic governance indicators on the dual 
objectives of microfinance institutions require caution due to measurement 
constraints that are likely to inhibit consistency between a priori expectation and 
our empirical findings. For instance, such measures fail to recognise the role and 
differences of public sector accounting systems. 
 
Data for two hundred institutions is elicited from the MIX website based on 
regularity of reporting consecutively between 2004 and 2007. In view of the non-
availability data for some of the ‘Doing Business’ indicators for 2004 and the 
seemingly slow rate of changes over a year for most of the indicators we restrict 
the econometric analysis to 2005-2007.  
 
5.3 Econometric Analysis 
We estimate a hypothesized functional relationship between MFI objectives 
(social and financial) and ‘external’ governance using least squares. In view of 
the potential effect of lagged variables not observed, reverse causality and 
omitted unobservable regressors, we compare results of pooled, fixed and 
random effects and static instrumental variable panel estimates. The latter is the 
studies main estimation technique as it allows for contemporaneous investigation 
of both time invariant and endogenous regressors. The peculiarity of 
microfinance objectives which is influenced directly by the vision and mission 
underpinning the evolution of the institution, justifies the use of an estimation 
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technique that takes into consideration the effect of omitted unobservable 
regressors. Also, the potential of reverse causality is imperative in our 
hypothesized functional relationship, as some country-level experience 
demonstrate the joint dependence between better performing institutions and 
governance. Lastly, characteristics of governance indicators that is fairly constant 
over time leading to time invariant regressors makes it prudent to estimate 
coefficients using lags of exogenous variables in the panel setting. These 
characteristics of microfinance paradigm are likely to hamper results emerging 
from a cross sectional least squares regression. 
 
We run two separate regressions for each of the objectives of MFIs for the 
analysis. The general model is specified in Equation 5.1 below as; 
 
iltiltilttilt dTDO ετγβλξα ++++=                                         5.1 
 
where iltDO  represents either of the double bottom line objectives of the depth 
of outreach or return on assets for institution i in country l and time t. We include 
in the model, time dummy dT  , vector of ‘external’ governance indicators λ  and 
vector of institutional internal characteristics and credit information indexγ .  iltε  
is a vector of mean-zero random errors. In the general set-up, the error term in 
assumed to capture both idiosyncratic error - µ it (time varying) and unobserved 
institution and country heterogeneity - ai. The latter error is of prime concern in 
view of the reasons enumerated earlier. Bundling the two errors (ai and µ it) into 
one ( iltε ) as in the case of the general set-up causes correlation between the 
regressors and the error term leading to inconsistent and biased estimates.  
 
In view of the data at our disposal, the estimation criteria for resolving the 
unobserved vision, competence and mission effect depends on whether they are 
time varying or constant factors. The specification of Equation 5.2 below 
supports the argument that the unobserved variables are time constant. This is a 
possibility, as anecdotes show that MFIs generating own funds for on-lending 
always gear-up for financial sustainability. 
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iltililtilttilt adTDO µτγβλξ ++++=                                     5.2 
 
Equation 5.2 decomposes the mean-zero random errors of Equation 5.1, into a 
time constant and random components and then sweeps-away the unobserved 
effects using either first differencing or fixed effects transformation (Wooldridge, 
2006). The above specification suggests that in any time period there is an 
arbitrary correlation between the institution’s vision and characteristics or 
‘external’ governance. Practically the assumption of an arbitrary correlation 
between vision and institutional characteristics can be substantiated but caution is 
required in the case of a non-zero covariance between governance and MFIs 
vision.  
 
The above argument implies the need to explore random estimation which 
assumes that ai, iltλ , iltγ
 
and itµ  are  mutually uncorrelated. 
 
iltiltilttiilt dTDO ντγβλξα ++++=                                  5.3 
 
The above equation include the intercept term iα to ensure that the mean of the 
unobservable variables is zero [E (ai) = 0] and iltν  is the composite error. The 
choice of random effect to either ‘pooled’ or ‘between’ estimation is informed by 
the application of generalized least squares (GLS) since the errors will be 
positively correlated for the same individual across time (Wooldridge, 2006).  
 
While the Hausman test provides a decision criteria for the choice of either fixed 
or random effects, we proceed further to explore some potential caveats in using 
these techniques especially in the context of this chapter’s hypothesis. The first 
caveat relates to general post estimation examination of regression (panel) 
analysis including serial correlation and heteroskedasticity. Secondly, in the 
context of this chapter, we examine the effect of time invariant and endogenous 
variables. In the case of the first caution, parametric bootstrapped and the 
feasible generalized least squares (FGLS) are estimated to investigate amount of 
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bias in the estimated coefficients, its standard error, and other aspects of its 
distribution. 
 
The second caveat of general panel regression is of paramount interest due to the 
presence of time invariant explanatory variables that compounds the debate 
between the assumed strict exogeniety characterizing random effects and 
endogeneity associated with fixed effects estimation. In the presence of time 
invariant endogenous variables, the Hausman fixed/random effect selection is 
rendered redundant as the assumptions underlying each of the techniques are 
violated. Cameron and Trivedi (2009) posit that while fixed effects in most 
instances appear suitable for micro econometric analysis in providing consistent 
estimators, its use is hampered in an event where either one or more of the main 
covariate(s) is/are time invariant and endogenous. 
 
In the context of a short panel (small T and large N) the likelihood of governance 
indicators remaining constant over time is high. For instance, once a 
microfinance institution transforms into a formal institution (associated with 
regulation and licensing) it is likely to remain as such for a sufficiently longer 
period of time. The reverse is also true for a microfinance institution that starts 
off as an informal institution.  Also some institutional characteristics such as 
number of products offered remain constant over time. This is attributed to the 
risk associated with product innovation. The questionable homogeneity of the 
poor’s characteristics has restricted expansion of microfinance products beyond 
basic credit and savings. In this sense, product diversification representing an 
institution that offers services beyond basic credit is time invariant. Although 
product diversity offers flexibility in accessing financial services its impetus has 
been restricted to respective institutional ability, risk characteristics and goals.  
Claessens (2006) identifies flexibility in the delivery of financial services as one 
of the core criteria for increasing access to financial services.  
 
In addition to product diversification being time invariant it can be argued to be 
endogenous to the performance of the microfinance institution. Unlike other 
business enterprises that are driven by competition and for that matter consumer 
preferences influence product design, in the case of microfinance reaching a 
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competitive stage is yet to be realized in most countries (Porteous, 2006). In view 
of this the decision to launch a product is purely based on the discretion and 
competence of the microfinance institution. Finally, endogeneity of ‘external 
governance’ indicators is plausible due to; (i) measurement error (see Kaufmann 
and Kraay, 2008) and (ii) bi-causality between country level governance 
indicators and microfinance performance. In the case of the former ‘external 
governance’ might correlate with either itµ in Equation 5.2 or iltν  in Equation 5.3 
that is the idiosyncratic/composite error term in each of the estimations. The 
latter scenario is likely to generate correlation between the explanatory variables 
and microfinance specific fixed effects ( ila ). Thus, random effect and pooled 
ordinary least squares (OLS) estimations yield inconsistent and bias coefficients. 
While this chapter limits the focus of endogeneity to correlation between the 
explanatory variables and unit specific effects, caution in interpreting the 
estimated coefficients is sounded due to the pervasiveness of micro panel data 
exhibition of measurement error (Baltagi, 2005). Also, though we try to resolve 
the problem arising from estimating time invariant variables, we are aware of the 
difficulty in disentangling its effect from unobserved and correlated individual 
effects. 
 
The general fixed and random effects fail to deal with these problems due to their 
respective underlying assumptions as alluded to earlier. The forgoing presents 
three alternatives depending the type of problem (time invariant and/or 
endogeneity) and data availability. Traditional panel instrumental variable 
estimation emerges as a preferred choice in correcting endogeneity associated 
with potential measurement error of the governance indicators and either 
Hausman-Taylor estimator or the Fixed Effect Vector Decomposition estimator 
will be ideal depending on the correlation between time-variant and time-
invariant variables and microfinance specific effect. As mentioned earlier, we 
restrict the estimation to Hausman-Taylor [HT] and the Fixed Vector 
Decomposition [FEVD]. In addition, to the HT and FEVD we explore the 
potential effect of three-way error components model in view of the fact that the 
institutions are grouped into different countries.  
 
 Beginning with the HT estimator we can specify 
 
iltilt XDO ξ += 11
 
where ξ  represent vector of time varying regressors but distinguished by 
(subscripts 1 and 2) in terms of whether they are correlated with the 
unobservable (ai). In our context, all the explanatory variable
of product diversification and regulation are time
the two time-invariant regressors 
measured by a dummy variable. The subscripts 1 and 2 distinguish the 
endogenous time invariant variable (number of products offered by the 
microfinance institution) from the exogenous variable 
the regressors are assumed to be uncorrelated with the idiosyncratic error term
. 
Theoretically, HT is preferred to random effects as it tends to be less restrictive 
because at allows for some of the time varying explanatory variables to be 
correlated with the unit specific effects. While random effects estimation 
emerges as an obvious choice
variables it is restrictive due to the strict exogeneity assumption. The HT uses 
exogenous time-variant variables as instruments for endogenous time
variables and exogenous time
means of the exogenous time
time-invariant regressors. 
 
The estimation of HT follows the following procedure. In the first stage we 
estimate a standard fixed effects model. Th
Equation 5.4 above. We then generate the residual (includes both 
it) and take the average (over time, for each i) to minimize the effect of the term. 
Representing the estimated residuals from 
Equation 5.5 as; 
 
 iltilt OD
~
~ˆ ξµ −=
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Equation 5.4 below as; 
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itµ
-variant 
λs and ai in 
s and ai and 
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where sξ have been generated from the first stage fixed effects model and 
are the predicted values of the depende
5.5 is made up the time invariant variables (
in Equation 5.4 are ascertained by running a regression of the averaged residual 
on λs using the fixed effects. The HT estimator is based on a transformatio
the random effects (Cameron and Trivedi, 2009).  In sum, HT uses lags to 
estimate and correct endogeneity problem on assumption that some of the 
regressors are uncorrelated with the errors.
 
The transformed estimable form of Equation 5.4, can be speci
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 il2β λ
 
All other symbols consistent with earlier definition, the additional symbol, theta 
(θ) represents the adjusted covariance
structural form of Equation 
 
The empirical use of HT always requires an
endogenous variables as we attempted doing earlier in the 
two reasons are identified for the choice of exp
to be endogenous. First, according to Kaufman and Kraay, (2008) in spite of the 
breakthrough made with regards measurement of governance indicators, they call 
for caution in its use due to measurement error. This potentia
the slow changing characteristics of governance issues justifies the 
characterization of governance indicators as likely endogenous variables. 
Secondly, in view of the pervasive assumption of mutuality or trade
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financial viability and outreach in the microfinance literature, we subscribe to a 
potential bi-causality. Based on the a priori identification of potential 
endogenous variables, HT estimation technique selects the other variables into 
different time varying/invariant and endogenous/exogenous groups. For instance, 
with the depth of outreach equation, the explanatory variables are categorized 
into; Time varying exogenous [Portfolio at Risk, Gross Loan Portfolio, 
Operating Expense, Cost per Borrower, Yield on Gross Loan Portfolio 
(Nominal) and Age of Institution]; time-invariant exogenous variables – 
regulation and product diversity; and time-variant endogenous (Voice and 
accountability, Property rights, Enforcement of Contracts and Credit information 
index). 
 
While HT appears less restrictive relative to random effects estimations, the 
above suggests some discretionary and intuitive difficulty in the empirical world 
due to identification of exogenous explanatory variables that simultaneously 
correlate with the endogenous variables. Plümper and Troeger (2004) assert that 
researcher’s discretionary role of choosing variables that are either exogenous or 
endogenous largely influence the results. Again Plümper and Troeger  (2007) 
show that HT works well only when the instruments are uncorrelated errors and 
the unit effects are highly correlated with the endogenous regressors. In addition 
to these limitations, the other pre-requisite of a valid instrument which suggests 
correlation between the instrument and the endogenous variable is practically 
shelved. While this pre-requisite provides an intuitive underpin for employing 
instrumental variable estimation, HT solves endogeneity strictly of the functional 
form. In lieu of the forgoing, econometrically, the Hausman null hypothesis test 
of significant difference between coefficients (based on the strict exogeneity 
assumption) can be employed to determine whether estimates emerging from HT 
are significantly different from the fixed effects estimations (Baltagi, 2005).  
 
An alternative perspective of Hausman-Taylor is Fixed Effects Vector 
Decomposition. The FEVD estimation is being popularized much more in 
comparative politics literature and since the chapter leans on to governance 
issues it is imperative to align with the current state-of-art. Plümper and Troeger 
(2004) suggest an alternative procedure to HT in view of its limitations. In 
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contrast to estimating a fixed effects model including time varying and time 
invariant explanatory variables in HT, the first stage estimation in FEVD runs 
fixed effects estimation on only the time varying regressors. In the second stage, 
we generate residuals from the fixed effects estimation and regress it on the time 
invariant variables. The rationale for the second stage estimation is to decompose 
the vector of residuals from the fixed effect into a part explained by the time 
invariant variables and an error component. Finally, to control for 
multicollinearity and degrees of freedom a third stage pooled least squares 
regression including all explanatory time variant variables, time invariant 
variables and the unexplained part of the fixed effects residual vector is estimated. 
Theoretically, the overarching advantage of FEVD over HT is the non-
requirement of a priori knowledge of correlation between the explanatory 
variables and the unit specific effects. 
 
We modify Equation 5.2, our initial fixed effects estimation and specify the first 
stage of FEVD in the context of this chapter as; 
 
7.5iltililtilt aXDO µξζ +++=  
 
Equation 5.7 drops the time invariant component. It is prudent to note that unlike 
Equation 5.5 of HT the generated residuals from Equation 5.7 do not include the 
time invariant explanatory variables. Equation 5.8 specifies the second stage that 
decomposes the residuals into observed time invariant factors and an error 
component. 
 
8.5ˆ ililil ηβλγµ ++=
 
 
where gamma (γ) is the intercept and eta (η) is the unexplained part.  
 
With the same symbols as per the earlier equations, the third stage pooled least 
squares regression takes the forms; 
 
9.5iltilililtilt XDO εηβλξα ++++=  
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Finally, we compare our estimates from the above estimation with the nested 
error components models due to the multi-level characterization of our dataset. 
Our dataset is nested within three components; that is institutional, country and 
over time. From an error component perspective we can decompose the multi-
category potential effect as; 
 
  
 
10.5ittjiltitit XDO εµψηβλξα ++++++=  
 
Specification of Equation 5.10 above, suggests that estimating the functional 
relationship between governance indicators and microfinance objectives could 
potentially be affected by institutional (η), country (ψ) and time (µ) effects. 
Correlation between any of these errors and the vector of governance indicators 
(λ) will lead to endogeneity. In the previous estimation we concentrated on the 
institution effect hence we need to test the robustness of our estimates in the 
context of time and country level effects. The presence of ‘age microfinance of 
institution’ on the right-hand of the equation (estimable) subsumes the effect of 
time and this leads consistent coefficients whether or not time dummies are 
included in the model.  
 
Andrews, Schank and Upward (2006) suggests that since we are only controlling 
for the effect of the error and not trying to estimate jψ taking the time-demeaning 
within each unique microfinance institution-country (spell) generates consistent 
estimators of the time varying coefficients (ξ and β).  
 
5.4 Results and Discussion 
This chapter’s discussion focuses on the observed evidence of significant 
relationship between governance and microfinance dual objectives. We fail to 
narrow down on specific associations that will help identify possible 
transmission mechanisms between each of the different types of governance 
process and multiple objectives of microfinance institutions. This from our 
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perspective requires country specific analysis due to the heterogeneity of 
variations in country-level governance structures.  
 
Two specific hypotheses can be derived from the main hypothesis mentioned 
earlier. Firstly, we posit that external governance is better placed to enable 
microfinance institutions to achieve their poverty lending objective rather than 
internal governance systems. The second hypothesis asserts that internal 
governance systems coupled with better operational performance are sufficient 
for the financial viability objective of microfinance institutions. The primary 
governance variables used in this chapter are regulation (internal) and property 
rights, enforcement of contract and voice and accountability (external). We also 
control for the effect of internal practices and performance (outreach, efficiency, 
risk and financial viability).  
 
The analytical discussion draws a line of distinction between factors required for 
profitability and achievement of the social objectives of microfinance paradigm. 
We precede an in-depth discussion of the analytical part with a description of the 
operational and performance trends of the selected institutions and governance 
indicators of their respective countries.  Table 5.1 of the appendix describes the 
variables used in this study, a priori expectations and data sources.  
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Table 5.1 - Variables, Description and Hypotheses 
Variables Description Hypothesis 
  
Depth of 
Outreach 
Return on 
Assets 
Depth of Outreach a Measures of outreach (extent of reaching poorer client): 
Average loan bal. per borrower / Gross National Income 
Per Capita. 
* - 
Return on Assets a Measure of Overall financial performance: (Net operating 
income, less Taxes) / Assets, average. 
- * 
Portfolio at Risk 
(30days) a 
Measure of risk: The value of all loans that have one or 
more instalments of principal past due in excess of 30days 
/ loan portfolio, gross. 
- - 
Gross Loan Portfolio 
(GLP) a 
Measure of outreach: All outstanding principals for all 
client loans 
+ + 
Operating Expense/ 
GLP a 
Measure of efficiency: Operating expense/loan portfolio, 
gross, average. 
  
Cost  Per Borrower a Measure of efficiency: Operating expense / number of 
active borrowers, average 
- - 
Yield on GLP 
Nominal a 
Measure of revenue: Interest and fees on Loan Portfolio / 
Loan Portfolio, gross, average. 
- + 
Product a  Measure of diversity of products offered by institution; = 
1 if only loans and 0 otherwise. 
+ + 
Regulated a Measure of ‘internal’ governance: Institution is regulated 
either by the central bank, ministry or some apex body. 
+/- +/- 
Age of Institution a Number of years of operation + + 
Voice and 
Accountability b 
Measures political, civil and human rights. Scores range 
from -2.5 to 2.5 with a mean of zero and a standard 
deviation of 1. With higher values indicating respect for 
rights and opportunity to enhance denial and violation. 
+ * 
Time taken to 
Register a Property c 
Measure of ‘external’ governance: Captures the median 
duration that property lawyers, notaries or registry 
officials indicate as necessary to complete a procedure of 
registering a property. 
+/- - 
Procedures for 
Contract 
Enforcement c 
Measure of ‘external’ governance: Number of procedural 
steps necessary to enforce commercial disputes in relevant 
courts. 
+/- - 
Credit Information 
Index c 
This measures rules affecting the scope, accessibility and 
quality of credit information available at public and 
private credit registries. The index ranges from 0 to 6 with 
higher values indicating availability of more credit 
information that shapes lending decisions. 
+ +/- 
Sources: a – Mix Market; b – World Bank Governance Indicators and c – World Bank, Doing 
Business Indicators. 
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Table 5.2a - Descriptive Statistics – Yearly Data 
 
Variables 
2004 2005 2006 2007 
N Mean SD N Mean SD N Mean SD N Mean SD 
Depth of Out. 213 69.82    83.08       221 63.20 71.28 218 72.63 124.67 205 79.29 157.20 
Return on Assets 214   1.31    15.77    211 2.51  10.30   220 2.58 8.22 206 2.96 7.34 
Portfolio at Risk 194 5.69    9.50        202 6.01 9.14 204 5.96 11.18 196 5.37 10.09 
Log of gross loan portfolio 217 15.05    1.88    220 15.34 1.69 221 15.69 1.70 208 16.14 1.89 
Operating Expense/GLP 214 31.38    31.93          213 28.79 25.11 221 26.74 21.07 206 23.15 17.88 
Cost Per Borrower 214 127.53    124.24          214 127.41 119.68 220 141.58 168.77 204 153.34 172.26 
Yield on GLP Nominal 152 38.22    17.03       172 36.31 16.51 201 34.61 17.20 199 32.48 15.84 
Products 221 0.64 0.47 221 0.64 0.47 221 0.64 0.47 221 0.64 0.47 
Age of Institution 221 9.70    6.51          221 10.70 6.51 221 11.70 6.51 221 12.70 6.51 
Regulated 221 0.62    0.49          221 0.62 0.49 221 0.62 0.49 221 0.62 0.49 
Voice and Accountability 221 - 0.35 0.51 221 - 0.37 0.52 221 - 0.33 0.54 221 - 0.36 0.57 
Time for Property Registration - - - 219 104.82 136.35 219 105.01 136.45 221 95.97 111.02 
Procedures  for Contract Enforcement 208 39.22 3.65 219 39.01 3.62 219 39.00 3.62 221 38.88 3.68 
Credit Info. Index - - - 216 2.12 2.04 219 2.37 2.03 221 2.75 2.09 
No. of Active Borrowers 218 44613 254303 221 59102 348806 220 71019 428337 205 87714 475643 
Yield on GLP Real 152 31.023 14.601 172 27.772 15.028 201 26.495 15.890 199 34.477 145.56 
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Table 5.2b - Descriptive Statistics – Panel Data 
 
Variables 
Mean Standard Deviation Observations 
Depth of Out. 
                                
Overall         
Between 
Within  
71.094 113.480 
82.430 
77.766 
N = 857 
n = 221 
T-bar = 3.877 
Return on Assets Overall         
Between 
Within  
2.337 10.923 
9.350 
5.689 
N = 851 
n = 221 
T-bar = 3.851 
Portfolio at Risk Overall         
Between 
Within  
5.763 9.998 
8.554 
6.117 
N = 796 
n = 217 
T-bar = 3.668 
Log of gross loan 
portfolio 
Overall         
Between 
Within  
15.547 1.833 
1.734 
0.626 
N = 866 
n = 221 
T-bar = 3.919 
Operating 
Expense/GLP 
Overall         
Between 
Within  
27.548 24.730 
23.474 
9.435 
N = 854 
n = 221 
T-bar = 3.864 
Cost Per Borrower Overall         
Between 
Within  
137.305 148.230 
132.382 
65.567 
N = 852 
n = 221 
T-bar = 3.855 
Yield on GLP 
Nominal 
Overall         
Between 
Within  
35.189 16.729 
16.421 
5.807 
N = 724 
n = 208 
T-bar = 3.877 
Products Between 
Overall         
Within  
0.674 0.469 
0.470 
0 
N = 884 
n = 221 
T-bar = 4  
Age of Institution Overall         
Between 
Within  
11.201 6.598 
6.514 
1.119 
N = 884 
n = 221 
T-bar = 4 
Regulated Overall         
Between 
Within  
0.620 0.486 
0.487 
0 
N = 884 
n = 221 
T-bar = 4 
Voice and 
Accountability 
Overall         
Between 
Within  
- 0.354 0.536 
0.528 
0.981 
N = 884 
n = 221 
T-bar = 4 
Time – Property 
Registration 
Overall         
Between 
Within  
101.914 128.324 
125.255 
27.497 
N = 659 
n = 221 
T-bar = 2.982 
Procedures for 
Contract 
Enforcement 
Overall         
Between 
Within  
39.025 3.638 
3.614 
0.408 
N = 867 
n = 221 
T-bar = 3.923 
Credit Info. Index Overall         
Between 
Within  
2.415 2.069 
1.991 
0.569 
N = 656 
n = 221 
T-bar = 2.968 
Number of Active 
Borrowers 
Overall         
Between 
Within  
65269.25 384135.80 
370526.40 
87395.42 
N = 864 
n = 221 
T-bar = 3.910 
Yield on Gross 
Loan Portfolio Real 
Overall     
Between 
Within 
29.945 77.335 
48.981 
62.478 
N = 724 
n = 208 
T-bar = 3.481 
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Table 5.2c Correlation Matrix 
Variables 
Depth of 
Outreach 
Return 
on 
Assets 
Portfolio 
at Risk 
Gross 
Loan 
Portfolio 
Operating 
Expense 
Ratio 
Cost per 
Borrower 
Yield on 
Gross 
Loan 
Portfolio 
Regul
ated 
Age of 
MFI 
Voice and 
Accounta
bility 
Property 
registration 
Enforceme
nt of 
Contract 
Credit 
Informati
on Index 
Product 
Diversifica
tion 
Depth of Outreach 1.00 
Return on Assets -0.02 1.00 
Portfolio at Risk 0.09 -0.33 1.00 
Gross Loan 
Portfolio 0.08 0.29 -0.17 1.00 
Operating 
Expense Ratio 0.01 -0.65 0.16 -0.51 1.00 
Cost per Borrower 0.16 -0.08 0.07 0.03 0.00 1.00 
Yield on Gross 
Loan Portfolio 0.02 -0.08 -0.02 -0.38 0.75 0.02 1.00 
Regulated 0.17 0.10 0.00 0.22 -0.25 0.08 -0.27 1.00 
Age of MFI -0.02 0.10 0.06 0.32 -0.13 -0.08 -0.09 -0.15 1.00 
Voice and 
Accountability 0.05 -0.14 0.10 0.07 0.14 0.31 0.10 -0.12 0.18 1.00 
Property 
registration 0.17 -0.05 0.12 0.03 0.01 0.09 -0.03 0.02 0.00 0.08 1.00 
Enforcement of 
Contract -0.03 0.05 0.06 0.17 -0.17 -0.16 -0.23 0.26 0.05 -0.17 -0.04 1.00 
Credit Information 
Index -0.17 0.04 -0.15 0.21 -0.08 0.12 -0.04 -0.21 0.17 0.40 -0.07 -0.26 1.00 
Product 
Diversification 0.04 0.00 0.10 0.18 -0.15 -0.06 -0.20 0.05 0.16 -0.10 -0.06 0.12 -0.10 1.00 
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Tables 5.1 and 5.2 are important for the interpreting the estimated coefficients of 
Tables 5.3 to 5.5. For instance, an increase in depth of outreach is interpreted as 
reaching relatively non-poor clients since the loans size gets bigger than the gross 
national income per capita. Mutuality in this context is observed in an event 
where depth of outreach and return on assets move in opposite directions. While 
the mean of return assets on assets showed a consistent increasing trend over the 
four year-period, depth of outreach was mixed with a fall between 2004 and 2005 
and thereafter increasing. At the minimum, one is tempted to probe further as the 
expected opposite trends is not easily identifiable.  
 
In addition to the MFI outputs (targeting and profitability) showing indefinite 
results, some operational variables also incite further investigation.  For instance, 
the two efficiency56 factors (operating expense divided by gross loan portfolio 
and cost per borrower) exhibit parallel directional effects on depth of outreach 
and return on assets.  The difference between these two measures is the 
denominator. While both measures rely on operating expense as the numerator, 
cost per borrower unlike operating expense is divided by number of active 
borrowers. Observing the parallel trends, one can surmise two possibilities. 
Firstly the decrease in operating expense divided by gross loan portfolio 
(OEGLP) is caused by increases in gross loan portfolio as shown from the trend 
in the log of gross loan portfolio and secondly, increases in cost per borrower is 
caused by decreases in the number of active borrowers. The latter deduction is 
ruled out as over the period number of active borrowers increased. Based on the 
above, we allude to a simplistic assertion that over the period efficiency of 
microfinance institutions has fallen.  
 
Institutional efficiency and cost of microfinance services to beneficiaries remains 
one of the sensitive and much demanded areas begging for research. The two 
opposing views are that, microfinance institutions pass on their inefficiencies to 
microfinance clients through higher cost. The premise of this view point is 
supported by client’s price insensitivity. On the other hand practitioners argue 
that then high price of lending charged are the real operational cost of dealing 
                                                 
56
 Efficiency is measured in the context of MFI reporting standards and relies on simple averages. 
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with the poor. While this is not the direct objective of this study, our descriptive 
finding with respect to efficiency and cost of financial services provides an added 
spring board to the debate and need for research on the issue. Due to wide 
variability in the measure of interest rate, yield on gross loan portfolio, has been 
used as a proxy variable (Rosenberg et al., 2009). We observe that the average 
yield on gross loan portfolio (YGLP) of about 30 percent is consistent with the 
earlier finding by Rosenberg et al., (2009). However, overtime, while one 
observes a decreasing trend in the case of nominal YGLP, real YGLP show an 
increase between 2006 and 2007 in spite of earlier decreases between 2004 and 
2006. Arguing from the real perspective, one is tempted to subscribe to the 
notion that MFIs over time are passing on their inefficiencies in terms of higher 
cost to microfinance beneficiaries. This observation remains a conjecture due to 
lack of rigour estimation technique to substantiate this preliminary evidence. 
However it does stimulate the need for further studies into the relationship 
between efficiency and cost of microfinance operations.  
 
The within variation for all the ‘external’ governance indicators approaches zero 
with the exception of time taken to register properties that fell by almost 10 
percent points between 2006 and 2007. This finding of the country level 
governance variables is not surprising due to rigidity towards changing 
behavioural practices. 
 
The analytical discussion compares coefficients emerging from estimating five 
different econometric techniques namely: pooled; fixed; random; HT and FEVD. 
The estimations are done for both the financial and social objectives of 
microfinance institutions. As indicated earlier, discussion of the estimates is 
mindful of the time invariant and endogenous features of our variables. In 
addition to the five estimations discussed we quietly estimate spell fixed effects, 
feasible generalized least squares (FGLS) and bootstrapped fixed and random 
effects to verify the robustness of our estimates. 
 
We observe two broad patterns consistent with the hypothesis of the chapter. 
Firstly, external governance indicators significantly affect the proxy for depth of 
poverty in all five estimations. Secondly, with the exception of FEVD most of 
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the institution operational variables fail to explain MFIs reach of poorer clients. 
These two observations provide initial basis to argue that MFIs willingness to 
achieve the social mission of reaching poorer clients necessarily requires the role 
of an external institution.  
 
The pooled estimates represented in Column 2 of Table 5.3 with its merits of 
using a larger sample size, less restrictive and ability to investigate the effect of 
changes over time by including time dummies shows consistent results with the 
random effects estimation. However, the underlying assumption of homogenous 
microfinance institution and country level effects leads to bias estimates. This is 
likely to generate omitted variable bias leading to endogeneity. In the post 
estimation tests of Table 5.5, we observe that the test of Poolability fails using 
both F-test of fixed effects and Lagrange multiplier for random effects.  
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Table 5.3 - Regression Analysis – Dependent Variable: Average Loan 
Size/GNIpc 
Explanatory 
Variables 
Pool Fixed 
Effects 
Random 
Effects 
Hausman-
Taylor 
Fixed Effects 
Vector 
Decomposition 
Return on 
Assets 
  - 0.37 
 (1.54) 
- 5.88** 
(2.32) 
- 1.60 
(1.57) 
- 5.85** 
(2.30) 
- 5.88*** 
(1.18) 
Portfolio at 
Risk 
1.01 
(0.78) 
0.59 
(1.21) 
0.85 
(0.86) 
0.13 
(1.06) 
0.59 
(0.66) 
Gross Loan 
Portfolio (log) 
10.59* 
(5.67) 
10.56 
(21.67) 
10.72** 
(5.38) 
- 0.45 
(10.67) 
10.56*** 
(3.66) 
Operating 
Expense 
- 0.12 
(0.66) 
- 3.89*** 
(1.36) 
- 0.66 
(0.94) 
- 3.01** 
(1.32) 
- 3.89*** 
(0.73) 
Cost per 
Borrower 
0.10** 
(0.04) 
0.17 
(0.10) 
0.07* 
(0.04) 
0.02 
(0.07) 
0.17*** 
(0.03) 
Yield on Gross 
Loan Portfolio 
0.67 
(1.48) 
-1.11 
(1.37) 
0.95 
(0.91) 
1.04 
(1.26) 
- 1.11 
(0.70) 
Age of 
Institution 
0.01 
(0.80) 
7.17 
(10.63) 
0.14 
(1.20) 
2.48 
(2.20) 
7.17*** 
(0.83) 
Product 
Diversification 
6.64 
(12.65) 
- 4.28 
(15.30) 
12.61 
(26.48) 
- 30.55*** 
(9.76) 
Regulated 36.27*** 
(7.96) 
- 36.68** 
(16.10) 
74.02** 
(33.69) 
17.34* 
(10.13) 
Voice and 
Accountability 
15.20 
(11.50) 
- 13.47 
(52.95) 
15.26 
(14.60) 
- 38.19 
(43.62) 
15.62 
(9.68) 
Property 
Rights 
0.12 
(0.13) 
0.76*** 
(0.16) 
0.15*** 
(0.05) 
0.66*** 
(0.15) 
0.09*** 
(0.03) 
Enforcement 
of Contract 
   - 
3.69*** 
(0.89) 
- 1.21 
(26.25) 
- 3.96* 
(2.13) 
- 34.58** 
(14.76) 
- 7.24*** 
(1.38) 
Credit 
Information 
  - 
13.14*** 
(3.33) 
- 7.37 
(8.75) 
- 
12.77*** 
(3.71) 
- 14.84** 
 (6.50) 
- 20.63*** 
(2.53) 
Eta - - - - 1.00*** 
(0.05) 
Constant 8.18 
(85.15) 
268.260 
(1065.99) 
24.91 
(114.30) 
1354.35 
(574.35) 
621.49*** 
(79.82) 
N 531 531 531 531 531 
Adj. R2 0.104 -0.448 - - 0.397 
F-Statistic 10.54 4.46 - 3.16 40.32 
F-Statistic 
[MFIs’ Effect] 
2.26            
(0.00)*** 
- - - - 
Log-Likelihood -3294.97 -3058.07    
Robust Standards Errors (in parenthesis)      *** One percent ** five percent & * ten percent 
 
 
In estimating both fixed and random effects we initially consider one error 
correction model in spite of the potential effect of time and country level effect.  
We justify the restriction of the estimation to only microfinance specific effect 
error based on the following: Firstly, the inclusion of age of institution appeared 
to be correlated with time effect. Secondly, we explore the country level effect 
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only as a post estimation analysis because estimating the extent of effect is not 
central to the focus of the current chapter. The defining variation of exogeneity 
for random effects and some amount of correlation between unit specific effects 
and the explanatory variables of fixed effects led to the observation of marked 
difference in the coefficients of between the estimations. Worth mentioned 
initially, was the expected inability of fixed effects to estimate the time invariant 
variables that is regulation and product diversification. While the random effect 
offered results for all the governance indicators, the Hausman test of Table 5.5, 
showed random effects coefficients were not consistent and that had biases 
which can be attributed to endogeneity.  
 
This finding justifies the choice of a fixed effect related estimation technique 
such as HT or FEVD. Column 4 of Table 5.3 shows the ability of HT in 
estimating time invariant variables. This however was not without a cost on the 
efficiency of the coefficients. Inspecting all the estimations it is clearly evident 
that HT had the largest standard errors implying a compromise on the efficiency 
of our coefficients. Up to this point however, it is the HT taylor offers a more 
preferred results that are consistent with the hypothesis and findings from 
previous literature.  For instance, regulation shows a positive association with 
average loan size and has been justified with the argument that prudential 
regulation leads to higher loan sizes.  This finding is consistent with recent 
empirical studies including; Hartaska and Nadolnyak (2007), Mersland and 
Strom (2009) and Cull et al (2009). The FEVD hints on a possible reversal of 
this wave of emerging evidence as it shows that the positive association is 
significant only at 10 percent alpha level. The outcome can be associated with 
the capability of FEVD in capturing the time invariant specific effects at the 
second stage as shown in Equation 5.8.  
 
Albeit variations in GNIpc the coefficient of property rights in Table 5.3 points 
to a positive association between duration for property registration and larger 
loan amounts. In this context MFIs will argue that longer duration increases their 
operational cost making lending in smaller amounts more expensive for clients 
and as such unprofitable. Barring all the ifs associated with this potential 
transmission mechanism between property rights and reaching poorer clients, this 
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finding inclines to the need to reduce duration for registering a property to enable 
MFIs achieve the poverty reduction objective. In a reverse fashion the coefficient 
of contract enforcement depicts a negative association between number of 
procedures in enforcing a contract and average loan size. Arguing based on 
Williamson (2000), although hierarchy of institutions makes the contract 
enforcement cumbersome it facilitates targeting of poorer clients. While we 
acknowledge the multiplicity of reasons that can be offered for the respective 
signs associated with the effect of property rights and enforcement of contracts 
on reaching poorer clients, the significant coefficients provides enough 
justification for country specific studies. On the backdrop of Williamson’s 
assertion that “different kinds of transactions call for different governance 
structures” (cited on p.7, The Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences 2009) the 
country specific studies will explore the exact transmission mechanisms between 
these governance indicators and microfinance objective of reaching poorer 
clients. 
 
Since poorer clients are better reached in an environment with less information 
asymmetry between borrowers and MFIs the negative sign associated with credit 
information is consistent with our a priori expectation. Cull et al. (2009) based 
on economic theory suggests that asymmetry information related problems 
hinder MFIs quest of serving the under-served. 
 
The variable ‘Eta’ of Table 5.3, captures the unexplained term of Equation 5.8, 
and its significance suggests that errors associated with the time invariant and 
slow changing governance indicators are significant. This partially explains the 
relatively larger standard errors the other estimations especially the HT 
estimation. In this regard, the FEVD estimates offers much more efficient results 
compared with all other estimations as it tends to offer smaller standard errors.  
 
Table 5.4 examines the effect of the same set of explanatory variables as in Table 
5.3 on MFIs return on assets. In contrast to reaching poorer clients, we observe 
that most of the governance indicators are not significant for all the estimations. 
However, all the operational variables are significant in explaining the return on 
assets of MFIs. Observing the coefficient for the FEVD estimation of Table 5.4, 
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it is observed that regulation significantly affects MFIs performance. Again this 
finding with the FEVD is in contrast with earlier microfinance – governance 
empirical research including; Hartaska and Nadolnyak (2007); Mersland and 
Strom (2009) and Cull et al. (2009). The respective observations of significant 
relation between operational issues and regulation on MFIs performance uphold 
the second hypothesis. While voice and accountability and contract enforcement 
appear significant in the FEVD estimation, we hesitate in attributing a 
justification for the observation as it does not emerge consistently with the earlier 
estimations.  
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Table 5.4 - Regression Analysis – Dependent Variable: Return on Assets 
Explanatory 
Variables 
Pool Fixed 
Effects 
Random 
Effects 
Hausman-
Taylor 
Fixed Effects  
Vector 
Decomposition 
Average Loan 
Size/GNIpc 
- 0.00 
(0.00) 
- 0.00** 
(0.00) 
- 0.00* 
(0.00) 
- 0.00*** 
0.00 
- 0.00*** 
(0.00) 
Portfolio at 
Risk 
- 0.14*** 
(0.05) 
- 0.16*** 
(0.03) 
- 0.15*** 
(0.02) 
- 0.16*** 
(0.02) 
- 0.16*** 
(0.02) 
Gross Loan 
Portfolio (log) 
- 0.50*** 
(0.13) 
- 1.16** 
(0.52) 
- 0.55*** 
(0.17) 
- 0.71*** 
(0.26) 
- 1.16*** 
(0.09) 
Operating 
Expense 
- 0.54*** 
(0.03) 
- 0.48*** 
(0.02) 
- 0.51*** 
(0.01) 
- 0.51*** 
(0.01) 
- 0.48*** 
(0.01) 
Cost per 
Borrower 
-  0.00*** 
(0.00) 
- 0.00 
(0.00) 
- 0.00** 
(0.00) 
- 0.00 
(0.00) 
- 0.00 
(0.00) 
Yield on 
Gross Loan 
Portfolio 
0.48*** 
(0.03) 
0.39*** 
(0.02) 
0.44*** 
(0.12) 
0.41*** 
(0.02) 
0.39*** 
(0.01) 
Age of 
Institution 
0.07** 
(0.03) 
0.18 
(0.26) 
0.07* 
(0.04) 
0.11* 
(0.06) 
0.18*** 
(0.02) 
Product 
Diversification 
- 0.26 
(0.37) 
- - 0.14 
(0.51) 
0.43 
(0.96) 
- 0.20 
(0.23) 
Regulated 0.56 
(0.38) 
- 0.51 
(0.54) 
- 0.40 
(4.74) 
1.14*** 
(0.24) 
Voice and 
Accountability 
- 0.10 
(0.39) 
- 0.88 
(1.27) 
- 0.07 
(0.46) 
- 1.17 
(1.05) 
- 0.53** 
(0.23) 
Property 
Rights 
0.00 
(0.00) 
0.01 
(0.00) 
0.01 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
Enforcement 
of Contract 
0.10* 
(0.05) 
0.45 
(0.63) 
0.11 
(0.07) 
- 0.02 
(0.47) 
0.10** 
(0.03) 
Credit 
Information 
- 0.02 
(0.10) 
-0.23 
(0.21) 
- 0.11 
(0.11) 
- 0.33* 
(0.18) 
0.04 
(0.61) 
Eta - - - - 1.00*** 
(0.03) 
Constant 4.92 
(3.00) 
1.62 
(25.60) 
5.74 
(3.68) 
13.58 
(16.98) 
14.35*** 
(1.81) 
N 531 531 531 531 531 
Adj. R2 0.815 0.549 - - 0.927 
F- Statistic 43.86 77.94 - 125.41 496.26 
F-Statistic 
(MFIs’ Effect) 
4.94 
(0.00)*** 
- - - - 
Log-likelihood -1455.84 -1077.94 - - - 
 
     Robust Standards Errors (in parenthesis)         *** One percent ** five percent & * ten percent 
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Table 5.5 - Post Estimation Results 
 
 
Test 
Pool Fixed 
Effects 
Random 
Effects 
Hausman-
Taylor 
Fixed Effects  
Vector 
Decomposition 
Poolability X √ √ - - 
Hausman (FE and RE) - √ X - - 
Hausman (FE and XTHT) - X - √ - 
Serial Correlation - X - - - 
Joint Significance of Gov. Ind. - √ - - - 
Country Level Effect - √ - - - 
Over Identification of Ins. - - - √ - 
 
The robustness of our estimates is summarized in Table 5.5. It is worth 
commenting on MFI specific effect shown by ‘F-Statistic (MFIs’ Effect)’ in both 
Tables 5.3 and 5.4. The probability values show statistical significance of MFI 
specific effect, [F- values of 2.26 and 4.94 for Tables 5.3 and 5.4 respectively]. 
Hence any estimation that ignores this institution specific effect will generate 
bias coefficients. The next concern is the nature of the MFI-specific effects that 
is whether they are fixed overtime and/or correlate with the other observed 
explanatory variables in the model. Table 5.5 examines the implications for the 
different estimations. The joint significance of the governance indicators is 
empirically verified and they emerge significant at five percent. Although serial 
correlation is observed, we quietly estimate the differenced data and signs and 
significant coefficients remain unchanged for our main explanatory variable. 
Column three of Table 5.5 shows that after controlling for institution-country 
effect using the spell fixed estimation our main covariates remain resolute in 
terms of both significance and direction. 
 
 
5.5 Conclusion 
The relationship between microfinance institutions’ objectives and governance 
roles performed by other bodies such as the judiciary, executive arm of 
government in-charge of securing property and collective action.  In lieu of the 
inconclusive empirical evidence in support of MFIs’ ability to achieve the win-
win objective of poverty reduction and financial sustainability we fail to 
understate the role of MFIs for two reasons. Firstly, MFIs mitigating role in 
bridging interest rates between moneylenders/loan sharks and traditional bank 
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and secondly it’s wider effect through non-financial services and community 
engagement. Evidence of microfinance mitigating the potential adverse effect of 
usurious interest rates of moneylenders and contributing to the overall paradigm 
shift of subsidy intervention makes it imperative to identify best operational 
strategies and enabling business environment and governance structures requisite 
for achieving their multiple objectives.  
 
In this chapter, we investigate the effect of ‘external’ governance on the poverty 
and financial objectives of microfinance institutions. The study rationalizes a 
case for ‘external’ governance in achieving poverty reduction and other social 
objectives of microfinance. Two broad conclusions emerge from the study. First, 
unlike operational outcomes such as interest rate and operating expenses, 
‘external’ governance indicators fail to cause changes in the profitability of 
microfinance institutions. Secondly, and in an opposite fashion, ‘external’ 
governance indicators emerge as significant variables for the poverty reduction 
objective of microfinance institutions. Specifically, shorter duration in 
completing a registering a property has the potential of procedure of reducing 
transactional cost which in turn is expected enable institutions target poorer 
clients. Availability of credit information also leads to the reach of poorer clients. 
The study offers three policy recommendations specifically for microfinance 
objective of reaching poorer clients. The above finding suggests a redefinition of 
the role of government and development partners. Both empirical and anecdotal 
evidence suggests that governments’ and development partners’ involvement in 
microfinance operational issues including retail financial and interest rates 
capping have failed. We prescribe the following roles for government and 
development partners. Firstly, reduce bureaucracies to expedite process of 
securing property; conduct institutional ratings and expand credit information 
bureaus and lastly establish confidence of the poor in institutions. While the 
latter is not a direct outcome of the current study, we deem it a necessary 
condition for tapping the benefits likely to be generated from a well structured 
set of institutions in any economy. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
 
MICROFINANCE EFFICIENCY TRADE-OFFS AND 
COMPLEMENTARITIES 
 
 
6.0 Introduction 
Recent evidence of diminishing loan portfolio quality has heightened the drive to 
investigate the efficiency of microfinance institutions. Anecdotally, this has been 
attributed to the adverse effects of the global financial turmoil. Chen et al. (2010) 
show that in the latter part of 2008 and early 2009 credit quality and growth of 
microfinance institutions (MFIs) dropped in comparison to the period between 
2005 and 2007. In addition, growing and unflinching interest from commercial 
banks and private capital investors in microfinance, coupled with high cost of 
service delivery, generates concern regarding the efficiency and financial 
sustainability of MFIs. The conceptual variation between efficiency and financial 
sustainability is imperative. 
 
While empirical research on MFIs sustainability dominates microfinance 
literature, rigour efficiency assessment has been shelved.  From an 
accounting/management perspective, the ratio of operating expense to gross loan 
portfolio has been the overriding index (Kneiding and Mas, (2009) and Blaine, 
(2009)) in measuring MFIs efficiency. Using data from the Microfinance 
Information Exchange (MIX) market, Figure 6.1 below, compares the median 
trend of operating expense ratio with gross loan portfolio (GLP). Consistent with 
findings from Blaine (2009), we observe that operating cost ratio dropped from 
2004 to 2007 but stagnated thereafter showing a relatively flat curve between 
2007 and 2008. This engenders two main reactions as to whether the level 
reached in 2007 is the farthest MFIs can reduce operating cost or the stagnation 
can be attributed to an external influence such as the financial crisis as being 
purported. While this measure reveals the trend of efficiency over the period, it is 
criticised for its’ a narrow view point due to the use of a single input and output. 
Also such efficiency ratios merely scratch the surface of the problem rather than 
identifying reasons for a particular shape of the trend.  
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Based on the financial and poverty reduction goals (dual objectives) of MFIs, 
this study measures efficiency based on a multiple input/output framework and 
assesses estimates in the context of both pure technical57  and scale58  efficiency. 
We argue that: (1) patterns and trends of MFIs efficiency vary depending on the 
assumption underlying returns to scale (pure technical and scale); and (2) MFIs’ 
inclination to either of the dual objectives (financial sustainability or poverty 
reduction), operational strategies and the external environment affects their 
efficiency. Specifically, hypotheses tested in this chapter are: (1) operational 
sustainability complements efficiency (financial and social); (2) MFIs targeting 
women trade-off their financial efficiency with social efficiency; and (3) external 
environment (credit information, property rights and financial development) has 
a significant positive effect on MFIs’ social efficiency, while financial 
development impacts only upon financial efficiency.  
 
In spite of the evidence of falling operating expense until 2007 (Kneiding and 
Mas, 2009), operating cost still accounts for about 50 percent of interest yields of 
microfinance’ operations (Rosenberg et al., 2009). While questions on the depth 
and scope of the fall in operating expenses is imperative a more important 
concern is – what proportion of the cost borne by poor clients? This in our view 
crucially depends on the efficiency of MFIs. While we are cautious of 
subscribing fully to the notion that MFIs with lower interest yields (rates) as a 
result of declining operating expense are efficient, the reverse argument from 
efficiency to cost of borrowing is intuitive and as such must be pursued as a 
necessary condition. Thus, driving MFIs towards an efficiency frontier by 
identifying best performing institutions based on input-output relationship is 
imperative.  MFIs’ characterization of multiple objectives (financial and social) 
and sources of funds (commercial, subsidized and grants) generates some 
complexities identifying outputs for informed inputs. 
 
Gonzalez (2008) and Kneiding and Mas (2009) among others identify MFIs’ 
operational channels for reducing operating expense (efficiency) to include; age, 
                                                 
57
 Pure technical efficiency is based on the MFIs’ managerial ability to implement production 
plans and processes accurately. 
58
 Scale efficiency focuses on the overall growth and planning of the MFI. The board and/or 
owner of the MFI are responsible for improving scale efficiency. 
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loan size, product diversification, competition and scale (clientele base – 
precisely, number of active borrowers). In spite of the relevance of these factors 
in achieving efficiency, their relative and joint effects remain unknown. For 
instance, it is intuitive that product diversification and competition are relatively 
slow and more demanding compared to reaching more clients. That is, on the 
backdrop information that a huge unreached market exist, the only condition for 
increasing size of operation is sourcing for more funds for on-lending.  By 
contrast, product diversification and competition requires technical skills and 
external competition on product basis. Age of institution has proven to lower per 
unit cost of operation but in most instances it is correlated with size of the 
operation (Gonzalez, 2008 and Kneiding and Mas, 2009).  
 
The apparent option of increasing size of operation has recently attracted 
concerns in view of the intricacies surrounding the perceived huge market 
requiring access to financial services (Beck et al, 2009 and CGAP 2009). Among 
the concerns is whether the poor really need microloans. The debate on access 
and use of financial services (Claessens, 2006) offers a justifiable platform to 
question the global and national estimates of demand for microloans.  Anand and 
Rosenberg (2008) calls for caution in relying on reported estimates on the 
demand for microfinance services. Their initial assessment points to a potential 
overestimation of the demand for microloans. Despite these concerns, size of 
MFI remains the widely used tool in reducing operating cost (achieving 
efficiency). 
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Figure 6.1 - Trend of Gross Loan Portfolio and Operating Expense 
 
 
 
In this chapter, we explore variants of efficiency measures (pure technical and 
scale efficiencies) in the context of narrow and broad perspectives of financial 
performance and breadth of outreach (targeting women). We therefore examine 
patterns and trends of efficiency from six perspectives. The motivation is 
premised on the different components of financial sustainability and outreach 
(Appendix IV). For the sake of brevity, we restrict the investigation of efficiency 
drivers to pure technical efficiency. As a result three perspectives of pure 
technical efficiency (narrow and broad financial performance, and breadth of 
outreach) are examined for the hypotheses. 
 
This chapter’s significance is dual. In addition to the above trend related issues, a 
probe into the conceptual difference between efficiency and sustainability adds to 
the rationale for this study. A casual definition of efficiency – deriving the best 
from available resources – maintaining focus into the future, clearly points to a 
‘necessary’ and ‘sufficient’ perspectives.  First from a management policy 
perspective, the calculation of relative efficiency scores will provide a 
benchmarking analysis to stimulate efficiency of MFIs towards the direction of 
best performing institutions. Secondly, estimating drivers of efficiency will 
generate public policy discourse. This in our opinion is a crucial step in 
determining microfinance resilience to shocks.  
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Based on reviewed microfinance economic efficiency empirical studies (Hermes 
et al. (2009); Haq et al. (2009); Gutierrez-Neito et al. (2009); Bassem (2008); 
Hermes et al. (2008); Gutierrez-Neito et al. (2007); Qayyum and Ahmad (2006); 
and Nghiem et al. (2006)), this chapter’s contribution to the literature, is three-
fold. Firstly, we use balanced panel data in the context of Data Envelopment 
Analysis (DEA) to examine patterns and trends of MFIs’ efficiency and to 
investigate the effect of MFI characteristics and the external environment. This 
brings to the fore some empirical newness since we are able to disaggregate the 
efficiency of the same set of microfinance institutions into pure technical and 
scale efficiencies over time. Secondly, bootstrapping the efficiency scores to 
enhance statistical inference leads to comparability of DEA with parametric 
stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) including Gonzalez (2008) and Hermes et al. 
(2009). Finally, spinning off from Nghiem et al. (2006)59  and Hermes et al. 
(2009), which respectively use DEA and SFA our second stage estimation will 
provide a platform to compare microfinance efficiency studies.  With the 
backdrop that DEA efficiency scores are data specific, comparing results from 
different datasets is a ‘pill hard to swallow’. However, recent developments in 
particular Simar and Wilson (2007) make comparison plausible even in the 
context of different datasets. This study uses both DEA and SFA. The use of 
parametric stochastic cost frontier analysis as a robustness test offers a two 
pronged support for this study. Firstly, we are able to validate our DEA estimates 
and observe potential differences given the limitations of each of the estimation 
techniques. Secondly, we are able to benchmark the social efficiency estimates of 
the DEA with the financial efficiency of SFA. 
 
Amidst a plethora of efficiency methods, we use Data Envelopment Analysis 
(DEA) as our main estimation technique but support our findings with parametric 
stochastic frontier estimation. While the decision to use DEA was not based on 
its superiority over other parametric estimation techniques, the nature of 
available data, complexity of MFI multiple goals and the study’s objective of 
disaggregating efficiency scores without forcing any  a priori restrictions on the 
data contributed to its predominant (both descriptive and estimation) use. DEA’s 
                                                 
59
 In this paper, Nghiem et al. (2006) using dataset from Vietnam shows that efficiency scores 
between parametric and non-parametric estimates are comparable in the context of MFIs. 
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plausibility of investigating second stage determinants of efficiency with a more 
robust technique (double bootstrapping) downsizes the scale of its criticisms. 
While the application of either least squares or tobit estimation is lamentable, 
Simar and Wilson (2007) provides a bootstrapping for the second estimation. 
The double bootstrapping and truncated regression respectively ensures the 
correction of biased and inconsistent estimates from the first stage and potential 
serial correlation between the estimators in the second stage.  
 
The rest of the study is organized as follows. The next two sections respectively 
address broad issues related to the conceptualization and measurement of 
efficiency. The need for this exploration into the conceptual and measurement 
issues transcends mandatory and mundane academic paper requirements to 
address the growing concern of efficiency becoming a buzzword in the arena of 
development paradigm. The fourth section narrows down on efficiency in the 
microfinance sector with the aim of reviewing the complexity associated with 
multiple objectives and the attendant varying inputs and outputs. In the fifth part, 
we look at methods of study. Finally, the penultimate and final sections discuss 
the results and extract the main findings for policy recommendations both at the 
managerial and public policy levels. 
 
6.1 Conceptualizing Efficiency 
Efficiency discourse and measurement dates back to Pareto (1909) and Koopman 
(1951).  In the context of the firms’ (Decision Making Units) efficiency, Cooper 
et al. (2007) provide a Pareto-Koopman efficiency definition as “…. fully 
efficient if and only if it is not possible to improve any input or output without 
worsening some other input or output” (p. 45). The wide scoping implication of 
this definition has partially contributed to the varied measurement of efficiency 
that can be identified with different disciplines. 
 
The inter-disciplinary approach to understanding and explaining developmental 
issues and phenomenon (efficiency of decision making units) engenders the need 
for operational conceptualization prior to measurement. Two strands of 
approaches, namely financial ratios (accounting perspective – single input and 
single output) and economic perspective (multiple inputs and outputs) have 
emerged in the assessing performance (efficiency), of decision making units. The 
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variation in accounting and economics conceptualization of efficiency is 
apparent from the perspective of scope. Cooper et al. (2007) indicate that drifting 
away from partial (use of financial ratios) to total (multiple inputs and outputs) 
factor productivity minimizes the error of attributing gains to a single factor as 
against several sources of contributing factors. Albeit the true reflection 
generated from the use of multiple inputs/outputs the cost complexity is worth 
considering. The aim of the next two sections is to provide an overview of 
efficiency conceptualization and measurement. 
 
Accounting measures (financial ratios) of efficiency in microfinance include; 
operating expenses as a ratio of gross loan portfolio (operating expense); 
personnel expense divided by gross loan portfolio; operating expenses as a 
fraction of number of active borrowers (cost per borrower); personnel expense as 
a ratio gross national income (GNI) capita (average salary/GNI per capita); 
operating expense as a fraction of number of loans (cost per loan); number of 
active borrowers/number of loan officers (borrowers per loan officer) and 
number of active clients as a ratio of total number of personnel (active clients per 
staff member). Two main derivatives can be summarized from the multiple ratios 
used to capture accounting efficiency in microfinance. One being production 
(number of loans, staff and active borrowers) and the other cost (operating and 
personnel expense). Implicit in both is firm’s profitability. As a result, efficiency 
has primarily been conceptualized from two perspectives namely; production and 
cost. For brevity, the ensuing discussion on economic perspective emphasises the 
production dimension of efficiency.  
 
Literally, economists define an efficient firm as one capable of maximizing its 
output from a given set of inputs. In discussing economists’ perspective of 
efficiency (economic efficiency) the following factors are worth mentioning; (1) 
orientation (input or output); (2) nature of the returns (constant, increasing and 
decreasing) and substitutability between inputs; (3) role of technological progress 
and (4) type of measurement. Farrell (1957) decomposes economic efficiency 
(EE) into technical and allocative efficiencies. From the perspective of the literal 
definition of efficiency cited above, technical efficiency (TE) measures the input-
output relationship from a ‘number’ perspective while allocative efficiency (AE) 
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examines the input-output transformation from a ‘price’ (cost) perspective.  
While such decomposition is important the use of TE in referring to overall 
efficiency (TE + AE) has gained wide acceptance. 
 
Based on the objective of a production unit (Decision making unit), its 
orientation (either input or output focus) is crucial to efficiency 
conceptualization. The decision making unit (DMU) in terms of efficiency could 
either have input or an output focus. A DMU with a focus on reducing number or 
cost of inputs is described as having an input orientation, while those focusing on 
changes in output with fixed input levels are said to be output-oriented. DMUs’ 
strict adherence to either input or output orientation leads to specific efficiency 
outcomes. 
 
The output returns generated from additional inputs underpins the second 
imperative for understanding economic efficiency. Elementary economics 
identifies three types of returns to output namely; economies of scale, 
diseconomies of scale and constant returns to scale. While the latter is easier to 
assimilate, in terms of the input-output ratio, economies and diseconomies of 
scale pose some complications in the context of multiple inputs and outputs60.  
Closely related to the nature of returns (scale efficiency) is the combination and 
substitutability among inputs (scale elasticity).  Arrow et al. (1961) pioneered the 
discourse on the implications of assumptions underpinning capital-labour 
substitution and economic efficiency for empirical findings. The variation 
between scale efficiency and elasticity 61  and orientation of the DMU either 
independently or jointly determines the outcome of an index for measuring 
efficiency. The relationship between inputs and outputs has been described using 
several functional forms. Among the most popularly used models include; Cobb-
Douglas, Translog and Zellner-Revankar production functions.   
 
Solow (1957) among others pioneered discussion on the share of technical 
progress on different inputs and in turn how this impacts on production process, 
output and economic growth in general. Following these pioneering discussions, 
                                                 
60
 See Farrell (1957) and Fare and Lovell (1978)  
61
 See Ray (1998) 
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production estimates have found it inevitable to include technical progress 
(technology) in efficiency estimates. Shades of including technical progress in a 
model have contributed to the existence of different efficiency techniques. 
 
While we do not intend to showcase strengths and weaknesses of different 
estimation techniques62, the next section briefly discusses some of the mostly 
used approaches in measuring efficiency of DMUs. This standpoint is informed 
by the primary focus of the study, nuance of data complexity and peculiarity of 
DMUs in the microfinance industry.  
 
 
6.2 Measurement of Efficiency 
Since Farrell (1957), a plethora of efficiency measures have evolved. Two broad 
measures of economic efficiency can be identified: (1) parametric63 (econometric 
methods) and (2) Non-parametric 64 (Data envelopment analysis and related 
extensions including bootstrapping and stochastic approaches). Farrell (1957) 
path-breaking production frontier argument of overall efficiency underlies both 
parametric and non-parametric measures.  
 
Parametric Estimation 
As mentioned earlier, in addition to estimating efficiency via an a priori 
functional form it is imperative to  clearly  define issues related to 
conceptualization, that is type (production or cost); orientation (input or output); 
returns (constant, increasing and decreasing) and substitutability.  
 
According to the specification of the error term deterministic and stochastic 
frontier techniques have emerged within the sphere of econometric methods. 
Deterministic frontier techniques 65  rely on least squares 66  and maximum 
                                                 
62
 Among the papers that attempts a comparative assessment of different efficiency measures 
includes;  FØrsund, (1992); Coelli and Perelman (1999) and Murillo-Zamorano, (2004) 
63
 Functional form of the efficient frontier is imposed or pre-defined. 
64
 Functional form is calculated from the sample of observations without any pre-defined 
relationship. 
65
 Earlier deterministic frontier methods used goal programming techniques to estimate technical 
efficiency (See Aigner and Chu, (1968) and Timmer, (1971)) 
66
 See Richmond (1974) for Modified Ordinary Least Squares and Gabrielsen (1975) for 
Corrected Ordinary Least Squares. 
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likelihood 67  methods to estimate variations in output via the error term. 
Explicitly including a variable in a parametric deterministic frontier estimation 
model to capture technical efficiency flaws the reliability of the estimate in view 
of the assumption that all inefficiencies can be attributed to the DMU. This is 
because the estimation procedure does not allow for random shocks (Murillo-
Zamorano, 2004). Barring the implication of other efficiency conceptualization 
platforms yielding different models, the deterministic econometric frontier 
technique, like other parametric techniques predominantly assumes an output 
orientation. Despite the criticism, the intuition and estimation procedure of 
deterministic frontier technique is widely acceptable among economists and 
provides a platform for later robust estimations of efficiency.  
 
The econometric stochastic frontier model (SFM68) emerged as a result of the 
above criticisms.  Timmer (1971) instigated the action of resolving potential 
statistical noise by dropping some data points that were suspicious of errors. The 
thrust of SFM69 was the introduction of a random term in the estimation model to 
capture inefficiencies beyond the control of the DMU. Thus two error terms as 
per Equation 6.1 below, were incorporated in the econometric frontier technique. 
 
iinini uXY −++= νββ 0                6.1 
 
Equation 6.1 is of the form of a single-output SFM where, Y represents output; X 
being a vector of multiple inputs; iν  random (statistical noise) and iu  is the 
technical inefficiency. 
  
The distributional70 properties of technical inefficiency ( iu ) and its relationship 
with the statistical noise ( iν ) and inputs (X) have led to different estimations 
either in the form of least squares or maximum likelihood estimation. Albeit 
SFM’s marked improvement in efficiency estimates, mundane econometric 
problems especially from a cross sectional data point of view need to be 
                                                 
67
 See Greene (1980) 
68
 Kirkpatrick et al. (2008) compare two parametric techniques (SFM and Distribution Free 
Model) in their study on efficiency of commercial banks in sub-Saharan Africa. 
69
 Aigner, Lovell and Schmidt (1977) and Meeusen and van den Broeck (1997) formally 
introduced the incorporation of the statistical noise into the econometric estimation.  
70
 Mostly used are half-normal, exponential and truncated from below at zero. 
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resolved. Typical of these include; exogeneity of covariates, independence 
between covariates (input variables) and technical inefficiency and distributional 
assumptions of the latter. To deal with the above, fixed and random panel 
estimations have proved capable. Cognizant of the daunting task in ascertaining a 
panel data, Schmidt and Sickles (1984) provides both a theoretical overview and 
an empirical use of Hausman-Taylor (HT) to attest the reliability of panel 
stochastic frontier estimation of efficiency. The use of (HT) implies the 
assumption of efficiency being time invariant. However latter developments have 
relaxed this assumption especially in the context of large T explored the use of 
panel estimation with consideration to time varying efficiency71. An improved 
variant of the application of SFM is the duality approach which allows for the 
estimation of a cost function instead of production. The availability of panel data 
and the duality representation72  have facilitated the estimation of the various 
facets of efficiency conceptualization mentioned earlier. Thus using parametric 
techniques, multiple outputs, quasi-fixed inputs 73  and different behavioural 
objectives can be estimated either from a technical or allocative efficiency point 
of view. 
 
Until very recently, panel SFM has muddied individual heterogeneity with 
technical inefficiency. The fixed effects estimation assumes that ‘sweeping-
away’ individual heterogeneity takes care of technical inefficiencies. Greene, 
(2005) and Wang and Ho, (2010) propose alternative methods in distinguishing 
the technical inefficiency component from DMU specific heterogeneity.  In 
search for both an intuitive and less cumbersome approach to distinguish 
between individual heterogeneity and DMUs inefficiency in a panel SFM 
context, Bayesian models have been explored. Bayesian analysis allows for the 
relaxation of the pre-defined distributional assumption characterising SFM. 
While this point to a significant resolution to the problems of SFM, Bayesian 
analysis is as yet in its incubatory phase of exploring various efficiency 
                                                 
71
 See Kumbhakar, (1990) and Battese and Coelli, (1992) 
72
 The duality representation enables the estimation of other indirect functions such as  revenue 
and profit. 
73
 Quasi-fixed inputs adjust to their optimal level even in the very long-run. The inhibition inter 
alia could be as a result of cost and/or regulation. 
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conceptualization facets. Murillo-Zamorano, (2004) provides a review of recent 
empirical literature applying the Bayesian model. 
 
While parametric estimation techniques are robust and reliable, its treatment of 
external environmental factors (quasi fixed inputs) in a single estimation model 
lacks intuition. Secondly, with the exception of the new development using 
Bayesian analysis, outcomes of parametric estimations heavily depend on data 
type (physical inputs or costs). This inadvertently constraints its applicability 
especially in an industry like microfinance in which good data structure in terms 
of comparability and availability is now gaining momentum. 
 
Non-parametric Estimation 
In the context of non-parametric, DMUs’ efficiency are calculated and not 
estimated as in the case of parametric estimation. The application of 
mathematical linear programming (MLP) techniques and related recent 
techniques discounts a priori definition of a functional relationship and pre-
definition of weights to different inputs. This accounts for the name - non-
parametric estimation. In addition, by virtue of the calculation technique, 
concerns on sample size and units of measuring inputs and outputs (MLP) are 
non-existent.  
 
Following Farrell’s (1957) single input-output consideration, two main non-
parametric efficiency analyses have emerged. Charnes et al (1978) and Deprin et 
al (1984) have respectively developed the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) 
and the Free Disposal Hull (FDH). In contrast to DEA, FDH assumes non-
convexity of the production possibility frontier and relies on less stringent 
assumptions (Park et al 2000).  
 
DEA calculates 74  efficiency scores in a multiple input-output framework by 
constructing a piecewise empirical production function based entirely on 
available data. The central idea underlying DEA is the computation of relative 
inefficiencies based on distance between observed performance points and a 
frontier of best practices. Best practicing DMUs lie on the frontier and as such 
                                                 
74
 Unlike parametric approach, since DEA calculates efficiency there is no room for noise. 
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any deviation thereof is attributed to inefficiency. Thus contrasting regression 
efficiency estimates that reflect ‘average’ behaviour based on error minimization. 
DEA identifies best performing DMU among homogenous firms and evaluates 
deviations from the frontier. The frontier is a convex hull of all institutions and 
this is premised on the intuition of an isoquant. The computation of efficiency 
scores requires adherence to inequality constraints to facilitate an increase 
(decrease) in certain outputs (inputs) without worsening other inputs (outputs) 
[Murillo-Zaorano, 2004].  
 
Cooper et al. (2007) offers a step by step approach to understanding the intuition, 
mathematics and graphical perspectives of DEA. Prior to setting up the basic 
DEA as in Equation 6.2 below, it is imperative to mention some ‘entry points’, 
theorems and caveats. As an entry point, DEA calculates weights derived from 
the data available using fractional programming that maximizes the ratio between 
outputs and inputs. Secondly, similar to deterministic and stochastic frontier 
parametric estimations, the scope (number of inputs and outputs) and 
conceptualization of efficiency have yielded different entry points in DEA 
computation. In addition to formulation (primal or dual75); orientation (input 
minimization or output maximization) and nature of returns [Charnes-Cooper-
Rhodes (CCR - constant) and Banker-Charnes-Cooper (BCC- variable)], DEA 
offers additional variants. Two of these variants are based on the following: (1) 
characterization of inputs (radial and non-radial) 76 and (2) specification of the 
MLP objective function that is treatment of input excesses and output shortfalls 
(‘Additive’; ‘Slack-based’; ‘Hybrid’ and ‘Multiplicative’ measures). 
 
In solving a basic DEA optimization set-up, two theorems underpinned by some 
assumptions are worth mentioning. The first theorem that shows equivalence 
between fractional and linear programming is based on the assumptions of (1) 
non-zero weights of both inputs and outputs (2) sum of the product of calculated 
weights and inputs is equal to 1 and (3) outputs are at least less than or equal to 
inputs. The second and third theorems are based on an output orientation and will 
                                                 
75
 The duality approach facilitates the computation of both technical and allocative efficiency. 
76
 Radial and non-radial respectively relies on the assumption underlying the proportional 
changes for each of the inputs and outputs.  Proportional changes in output are reflected by the 
assumptions underlying the CCR and BCC models. 
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vary in the case of input and duality orientation. Second is the unit invariant 
theorem that allows for the computation of efficiency scores irrespective of the 
scale of input and output measurements. 
 
On the premise of identified homogeneous and independent DMUs with non-
negative and same data on inputs and outputs, a basic DEA assuming CRS (CCR 
model ) can be specified as follows;          
                                  
 !"#$:&  max*, ∑ ./ 0/ 1/2                                                             6. 2 
 
    3. 4 ∑ 56 76  1862                              6.3 
 
          
∑ . 0/91/2 ≤ ∑ ;6 769 862             6.4 
     
          ;6 , ./ ≥ 0                                      6.5 
 
Using MLP Equations 6.2 – 6.5 sets out to calculate the maximum technical 
efficiency of firm ‘k’ (TEk) with a set of pre-calculated weights (ρ, ω) 
respectively for inputs  (x) and outputs (y).  Equation 6.2 purports to calculate 
technical efficiency based on an output orientation. Variants of this could either 
be the specification of a minimization objective function that is in terms of inputs 
or based on the duality approach using the ratio of weighted outputs to weighted 
inputs. The choice of specification should always be guided by the appropriate 
constraint which posits that for inefficient DMUs to move towards the frontier 
inputs (outputs) cannot be increased (decreased).   The number of inputs and 
outputs suggesting the applicability to a multiple input/output framework is 
respectively symbolized with ‘m’ and ‘n’. The specification of the first two 
constraints (Equations 6.3 and 6.4) suggests that the efficiency measure must be 
less than or equal to one. Coelli et al. (2005) argue that simply specifying the 
constraint such as weighted output over weighted input should be less than or 
equal to one, leads to multiple solutions hence the need to split it into two. This 
makes it imperative that when estimating DEA efficiency scores, the number of 
inputs across all the firms should be at least greater than the number of output. 
The last constraint imposes a non-zero restriction on the calculated weights 
therefore the pre-requisite of non-negative inputs and outputs for DEA 
computation. 
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Until recently, the decision to use DEA has come with two main criticisms; (1) 
inability to make statistical inference and (2) calculated efficiency scores tend to 
be heavily affected in an event of measurement error and noisy data including 
outliers. In an attempt to generate unbiased and consistent efficiency estimates 
that possess statistical properties required for inference, asymptotic analysis and 
stochastic methods (bootstrapping or alternative methods77) have been employed.  
While this area of research (statistical properties of non-parametric deterministic 
linear programming frontier analysis) is currently vibrant (Becker, 2008), its’ 
antecedent can be identified with the work of Grosskopf (1996) and Ferrier and 
Hirschman (1997).  
 
The quest of ascribing statistical properties to calculated DEA scores 
inadvertently leads to the need for at least a second stage analysis. In addition to 
known complexities of second stage analysis, some theoretical statistical and 
econometric analyses have been considered to stimulate research vibrancy in this 
area.  
 
Among the plausible sources of biased and inconsistent estimates for the second 
stage estimation are; sample size (asymptotic properties), data generating process 
(DGP), serial correlation and curse of dimensionality. In view of the bounded 
outcome of calculated efficiency scores, earlier studies involving second stage 
estimations have either scaled up the scores for the application of ordinary least 
squares (OLS) or used ‘tobit’ regression. The latter is premised on the data being 
censored. In contrast, Simar and Wilson (2007) propose the application of single 
and double bootstrapping and truncated regression techniques. Two reasons 
underpin their choice of estimation techniques. First, the application of ‘tobit’ is 
criticized due to censored regression’s inability to account for lost data from both 
ends of a scale, hence truncated regression. Secondly, in view of the bounded 
nature of data generation process, re-sampling based on traditional bootstrapping 
method yields inconsistent data, hence single78 and double79 bootstrapping. The 
                                                 
77
 Murillo-Zamorano (2004) identifies some of the recent alternative methods. 
78
 The first stage bootstrapping generates consistent estimators. 
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robustness of their proposition is verified with Monte Carlo experiments that 
examine the statistical performance of the estimators. 
 
 
6.3 Efficiency in Microfinance   
In this chapter, we provide a working definition for efficiency in microfinance 
as: using an optimal combination of inputs (staff time, staff number and cost of 
operation) to respectively disburse and reach the maximum number of loans and 
clients, especially the deprived, while delivering a range of valued services. This 
definition clearly points to a ‘necessary’ and ‘sufficient’ distinction between 
efficiency and sustainability.  The former is the necessary condition for financial 
sustainability. While the relationship between financial sustainability and 
targeting poor clients maintains its importance in microfinance literature, 
institutional efficiency has recently come into the spotlight (see Blaine, 2009; 
Kneiding and Mas, 2009; Hermes et al., 2008; and Gutierrez-Neito et al., 2007). 
Two main reasons can be identified for the increasing drift of focus to MFIs’ 
efficiency. First is the conceptual difference between sustainability and 
efficiency and secondly, the changing trend of operational expense in the 
industryAs a result some questions have become apparent. These include: (1) 
does profitability/commercialization correlate with efficiency?; (2) does reliance 
on subsidies beyond the 1995 donor consensus of a seven to ten year transitional 
growth period of MFI imply inefficiency? And (3) what are the reasons for the 
sudden reversal of the falling operating expense/gross loan portfolio ratio? While 
this chapter does not attempt to provide responses to these questions, it offers a 
platform for understanding different dimensions of the changing patterns and 
trends and determines the drivers of efficiency. 
 
In spite of the commonality in MFIs inputs and outputs as in the working 
definition above, production functions in the industry differ markedly both over 
time and space. Among the reasons accounting for the differences are: MFIs’ 
inclination to either of the dual objectives (financial systems or poverty 
reduction); source of funds; regulation; external environment (information, 
competition and the macro economy); and delivery strategies. With the exception 
                                                                                                                                    
79
 The second stage allows for inference about the estimated coefficient. 
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of delivery strategies, most of these factors are beyond managerial control. 
Examples of microfinance delivery strategies are: group vs. individual loans; 
voluntary and compulsory savings; technological intensity (electronic service 
devices and mobile phone); branchless (mobile) banking; and product mix. These 
different delivery strategies yield diverse production functions. Balkenhol (2007) 
asserts that collateral requirements and the extent to which cost is passed on to 
clients determine variations in MFIs’ production functions. It is therefore 
imperative that empirical studies aimed at investigating MFIs’ efficiency should 
take account of strategy heterogeneity, institutions’ inclination to either of the 
dual objectives (financial and social), external environment and scope of 
sustainability measure.  
 
The scope of financial sustainability measures MFIs’ accounting/financial short 
and long term performance. Balkenhol (2007) articulates the distinction between 
financial/operational self sufficiency (measure of MFIs’ sustainability) and 
efficiency. From a sustainability point of view, the thrust of the argument 
revolves around the source and nature of financing and default. The former 
suggests that institutions relying on grants (subsidies) are less likely to be 
sustainable. Also improper account of portfolio at risk both as an accounting 
report and monitoring threatens the long term operations of an MFI. To this end, 
Gutierrez-Neito et al. (2007) asserts that in the context of financial efficiency, 
broad and narrow perspectives should be considered based on the scope of 
financial sustainability. For instance, failure to make provision for loan losses 
yields a narrow view point.  
 
Closely related to contextualizing the scope of MFI efficiency is the issue of 
intermediation and production approaches of measuring efficiency of financial 
institutions. As a financial institution, its functional role should be viewed either 
from an intermediation 80  or production 81  approach perspective (Berger and 
Humprey, 2007). The distinction is primarily linked with identification of inputs 
and outputs and has policy implications depending on how a country views 
                                                 
80
 As an intermediary, MFIs transfer funds from savers to borrowers. 
81
 MFIs are viewed as production units that employ traditional factors of production (capital and 
labour) to produce output.  
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microfinance. In this paper, we argue that this distinction is masked by the dual 
(financial and outreach) objectives of MFIs. Table 6.1 catalogues some of the 
few microfinance economic efficiency empirical studies based on scope, 
methodology and orientation. While Table 6.1 identifies some conceptual 
inconsistencies in these studies - for instance, choice of variables for production 
approach between Haq et al. (2009) and Nghiem et al. (2006) - its aim is far from 
comparing the respective strengths and weaknesses of these studies. This is in 
view of the contrasting motivation between them. For instance, while some 
studies aim at comparing MFIs either within the same geographical area (Bassem 
(2008); Qayyum and Ahmad (2006)) or across different regions (Haq et al. 
(2009)), others attempt to explain determinants of an MFI’s efficiency either 
based on a declassification of goals - financial and social (Gutierrez-Neito et al. 
(2009) - or assume homogeneity in the objective of all MFIs (Hermes et al 
(2008); Gutierrez-Neito et al. (2007)). 
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Table 6.1 - Orientation and Scope of some published Empirical Microfinance’ Economic Efficiency Studies 
Studies Goal MFIs’ Dual 
Objective 
Orient
ation 
Estimation 
Technique 
Production 
function 
Approach External Inputs Outputs Study Area 
Hermes et 
al. (2009) 
Compare MFIs and 
investigate 
determinants of 
efficiency 
Sustainability Cost 
(Input) 
SFA and 
second 
stage 
regression 
analysis 
Translog Intermediation Type of MFI, trend, 
age, domestic credit, 
location, delivery 
strategy and average 
loan and savings 
balance 
 Operating Expense (Salary) 
Financial Expense (Interest 
on deposits) 
Total Expenses 
Gross Loan Portfolio 
 
Global  
Haq et al. 
(2009) 
Compare MFIs Sustainability Duality
+
 
DEAθ CRSκ and 
VRSλ 
Intermediation 
and Production 
Type of MFI  Number of personnel 
 Cost per borrower 
 Cost per saver 
 Operating expense 
 Number of borrowers per 
staff member I 
 Number of savers per staff 
member I 
 Gross Loan Portfolio P 
 Total Savings P 
Africa, Asia and 
Latin America 
Gutierrez-
Neito et 
al. (2009) 
Compare MFIs Financial and 
Social 
Efficiency 
 DEAθ CRS – 
(CCR) 
Microfinance 
objective 
Type of MFI and 
Country effect 
 Assets 
 Operating cost 
 Number of employees 
 Gross Loan Portfolio F 
 Revenue F 
 Number of Women S 
Borrowers 
 Poverty Index S 
Africa, Asia  
Eastern Europe 
and Latin 
America 
Bassem 
(2008); 
Compare MFIs Sustainability 
and outreach 
Output DEAθ CRSκ and 
VRSλ 
Production Type and Size of 
MFI 
 Number of personnel 
 Total Assets 
 Return on Assets 
 Number of Women 
borrowers 
Mediterranean 
(MENA) 
Hermes et 
al. (2008) 
Determine trade-off 
between efficiency 
and outreach 
Efficiency and 
Outreach 
Cost 
(Input) 
SFA Translog Intermediation Type of MFI, trend, 
age, type of lending, 
women borrowers, 
average loan 
balance and loan 
loss reserve 
 Operating Expense (Salary) 
Financial Expense (Interest 
on deposits) 
 Total Expenses 
Gross Loan Portfolio 
 
Global 
Gutierrez-
Neito et 
al. (2007) 
Compare MFIs and 
explore variations 
between financial and 
social efficiency 
Sustainability  DEAθ CRS – 
(CCR) 
Microfinance 
objective 
Type of MFI and 
Country effect 
 Credit Officers 
 Operating Expense 
 Gross Loan Portfolio 
 Number of Loan 
Outstanding 
 Interest and fee income 
Latin America 
Nghiem et 
al. (2006) 
Compare MFIs and 
investigate 
determinants of 
efficiency 
Sustainability 
and outreach 
Input DEAθ, γ and 
Tobit 
regression 
CRSκ and 
VRSλ 
Production Type, Age and 
Location of MFI 
 Labour cost  
 Administrative expense 
 Number of savers 
 Number of borrowers and 
 Number of groups 
Vietnam 
+ - The study examines both the input and output orientation of achieving efficiency; θ - Data Envelopment Analysis; κ - Constant returns to scale; λ – Variable returns to scale; I – Intermediation model; P – Production model; γ – DEA is compared 
with parametric linear programming (PLP) and Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA); S – Social Efficiency Index; F – Financial Efficiency Index.
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Both parametric SFA and DEA have been employed in either calculating or 
estimating economic efficiency in microfinance. To the best of our knowledge, 
only one study (Nghiem et al., 2006) in the context of microfinance has 
compared efficiency scores from both parametric and non-parametric estimates. 
In their paper, they observe similar estimates/scores of MFIs’ efficiency. This 
potentially suggests the comparability of both estimation techniques as asserted 
in the broader efficiency literature (FØrsund, 1992; Coelli and Perelman, 1999). 
As alluded to earlier, we remain silent on the superiority of either of these 
techniques; however, in the context of microfinance and the objectives of this 
study, DEA, in our opinion, facilitates detailed assessment of the various facets 
of efficiency, notably pure technical and scale efficiency variants. Decomposing 
efficiency into pure technical and scale yields an invaluable policy prescription 
for MFI management. Typically, they are able to identify phases of either 
increasing, constant and decreasing returns to scale. Also due to the multiple 
objectives of microfinance and data restrictions on input prices and output 
quantities, DEA intuitively seems more suitable than SFA. Following on from 
Berger and Humphrey (2007), one can argue that since the microfinance 
paradigm has multiple objectives, it blurs the conventional cost and profit 
functions at least from an operational view point, making the application of 
parametric SFA somewhat problematic. Thus, in spite of the ingenuity evoked by 
Hermes et al. (2008) and Hermes et al. (2009) in arriving at input prices, it is 
practically difficult to disentangle social and financial efficiency since total cost 
and inputs are assumed for the entire operation (financial and social) of the MFI.  
 
In the context of macroeconomic drivers of MFIs’ efficiency including financial 
development (depth), contrasting results currently exist. While Gonzalez (2008) 
fails to find any significant relationship, Hermes et al. (2009) show that financial 
development irrespective of the measure82 improves MFIs’ efficiency.  However, 
an oversight remains since the MFIs’ inclination to either financial or social 
objectives might yield varying relationships. This study subscribes to a positive 
and significant effect between financial development and financial efficiency. 
                                                 
82
 Four different measures of financial development were used in their study. These were: total 
liquid liabilities (measured as M3 to GDP ratio); lending minus borrowing interest rate; total 
domestic credit provided by the banks to GDP ratio; and total domestic credit to private sector to 
GDP ratio (Hermes et al. (2009)).  
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This is premised on the notion that financial development comes along with 
competition for the entire financial sector industry and therefore all things 
remaining the same, efficiency will be enhanced. However, the relationship 
between financial development and social efficiency is hypothesized to be 
negative since prudential regulation is likely to come along with financial 
development. That is, should enforcement of prudential regulation accompany 
financial development, MFIs are likely to divert their attention to financial 
efficiency to the neglect of social efficiency. Variants of this finding from a 
financial sustainability view point have been observed by Hartaska and 
Nadolnyak (2007), Mersland and Strom (2009) and Cull et al. (2009). Though 
we assert an association between financial development and efficiency (financial 
and social) the direction of causality needs careful and rigorous investigation.   
 
Other external environment factors such as bureaucracy in property registration, 
contract enforcement delays, costs and complexities, and lack of information on 
credit availability are hypothesized to affect social efficiency negatively. In a 
previous study, Gonzalez (2008) finds that the credit information index, which 
measures the degree of credit information availability in an economy, improves 
MFIs’ efficiency. Table 6.2 tabulates the a priori signs for all the explanatory 
variables. 
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Table 6.2 - Variable Definition, Measure and a priori Expectation 
Variables Description Efficiency Hypothesise 
  Financial Operational  Outreach 
     
Financial Expense a  This includes interest and fee expense on deposits and 
borrowings plus other financial expense. 
 
Operating Expense 
(x1) a  
Personnel and Administrative (depreciation , utilities, 
office supplies, transport, etc)d 
Total Expenses (x2) a Financial plus operating expense plus impairment 
losses83  
Personnel a (x3) Total Number of staff members 
Financial Revenue a 
(y1) 
Interest, fees and commissions on loan portfolio and 
other financial assets 
 
Gross Loan Portfolio a 
(y3) 
Measure of outreach: All outstanding principals for all 
client loans 
Cost per staff (CPS) Operating expenses to total assets ratio times total 
assets in US dollars, divided by total number of 
employees 
Cost per loan (CPL) Financial Expense divided by number of active 
borrowers. 
Number of Women 
Borrowers a  (y2) 
Number of active women 
- - + 
Not-for-profit NGO a MFI classification but doubles as a proxy for 
regulation  - + + 
Age of Institution a Number of years of operation + + + 
Domestic Credit as a 
Proportion of GDP b 
Domestic credit provided by the banking sector 
including institutions that do not accept transferable 
deposits but do incur such liabilities as time and 
savings deposits. This figure excludes credit by the 
central bank. 
+ + + 
Credit Information 
Index c 
This measures rules affecting the scope, accessibility 
and quality of credit information available at public 
and private credit registries. The index ranges from 0 
to 6 with higher values indicating availability of more 
credit information that shapes lending decisions. 
+ + + 
Duration for Property 
registration c 
Measure of ‘external’ governance: Captures the 
median duration that property lawyers, notaries or 
registry officials indicate as necessary to complete a 
procedure of registering a property. 
_ _ _ 
Duration for Contract 
Enforcement c 
Measure of ‘external’ governance: Number of 
procedural steps necessary to enforce commercial 
disputes in relevant courts. 
_ _ _ 
Operational Self 
Sufficiency 
Financial revenue/(Financial expense + Impairment 
Loss + Operating expense) + + + 
Loan Dummy = 1 if MFI relies on loans for on-lending and 
zero otherwise + + _ 
Grant Dummy = 1 if MFI relies on grant for on-lending and 
zero otherwise _ + + 
Sources: a – Mix Market; b – World Development Indicators; c – World Bank, Doing Business Indicators; 
and d - (CGAP/World Bank, 2009); e – Signs are based on the Simar and Wilson (2007) statistical 
inference. 
 
                                                 
83
 This is a non-cash expense that estimates risk of default based on value of gross loan portfolio. 
167 
 
6.4 Method of Study 
On the backdrop of the two preceding sections, the empirical exposition 
underpinning the study’s aim of investigating patterns and trends in MFIs’ 
efficiency, and identifying efficiency drivers, is described in this section. The 
section is sub-divided into four headings with the aim of explaining: choice of 
variables; datasets; production function; and estimation techniques. 
 
Selection of Inputs and Outputs, Orientation and Environmental Factors 
In contrast to reliance on either an intermediation or production approach for the 
selection of inputs and outputs, we are guided by the dual objectives of the 
microfinance paradigm. Gutierrez-Neito et al. (2007) and Gutierrez-Neito et al. 
(2009) argue that choice of either production or intermediation could be daunting 
and therefore they respectively use microfinance scope (financial and 
operational) and objective (sustainability and outreach) for the selection of inputs 
and outputs. This study combines their respective approaches and asserts that in 
the context of microfinance it is reasonable to view sustainability and outreach in 
the light of intermediation and production respectively. Thus as an intermediary, 
an MFI’s main objective is to provide financial services with a poverty reduction 
oriented goal. While potential overlaps are indispensable, this approach offers a 
policy undertone based on the orientation of the MFI.  
 
In addition to the complexity surrounding the conceptualization and 
measurement of efficiency, Appendix IV shows that premised on MFIs’ financial 
sustainability and outreach framework, five different perspectives can be 
examined. This chapter concentrates on three of the five perspectives identified 
(see Figure 6.2 below). As an extended version of Gutierrez-Neito et al. (2009), 
we exhaust both dimensions of financial sustainability (narrow and broad) and 
use number of women clients as an outreach (breadth) indicator. In effect, we 
calculate efficiency from three perspectives narrow and broad perspectives of 
financial sustainability; and breadth of outreach. Variation between the narrow 
and broader perspective is based on the scope of expenses with revenue 
remaining the same for both. From a narrow view point, MFIs’ efficiency is 
calculated based on financial expense, while in the broader context, total expense 
is used (see Table 6.2 for definition and measurement of variables). In the latter 
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instance, we take into consideration provision for loan losses which implies that 
the MFI is accounting for all possible credit risk (default). 
 
Figure 6.2: Scope of Efficiency Measure based on Microfinance Objectives 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The forgoing emphasis on expenses offers an inclination for an input-oriented 
calculation of MFIs efficiency scores. Although the suitability of a duality 
approach in view of the concern that different categories of MFIs possess varying 
levels of command over either inputs or outputs, we focus on an input-
orientation. The choice of an input orientation to that of an output is twofold. 
First, the notion of a huge segment of the population lacking access to financial 
services yields an output argument superfluous. Secondly, the approach to 
measuring MFIs sustainable efficiency as described above makes it imperative to 
use an input-orientation.  
 
Unlike examining financial efficiency from both dimensions of sustainability 
(broad and narrow), outreach is restricted to breadth of outreach for the sake of 
Sustainable 
Efficiency 
Social 
Efficiency 
Operational (1) 
Financial (2) 
Breadth of 
Outreach   (3) 
Microfinance Dual Objective 
Inputs 
Inputs 
Inputs 
Outputs 
Outputs 
Outputs 
Total Expense 
Personnel 
Financial Revenue 
Total Expense 
Financial Expense 
Personnel 
Financial Revenue 
Gross Loan Portfolio 
Personnel 
Gross Loan Portfolio 
Financial Revenue 
Gross Loan Portfolio 
Number of women 
Borrowers 
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brevity. Despite this restriction, it is possible to measure the number of women 
reached from both depth and scale of outreach perspectives. Thus based on the 
notion that women are the vulnerable sex and the strong evidence of a positive 
association between vulnerability and poverty (Gaiha and Imai, 2004), a link can 
be deduced between breadth and depth of outreach. The use of number of women 
clients, invariably offers information on MFIs’ efficiency based on scale of 
outreach. To this end, there are three inputs used, namely: financial expense, 
operating expense and number of personnel for different models. On the flipside, 
four outputs were employed, including financial revenue, net operating income, 
gross loan portfolio (GLP) and number of women clients also for different 
models. 
 
Dixit (2009) and previous microfinance-efficiency related studies (Gonzalez, 
2008; Hermes et al., 2009) respectively provide a theoretical and empirical 
justification for the choice of country level variables to represent the external 
environment. The second stage estimation regresses age of MFI (age), dummy on 
whether MFI is regulated or not (regulation), domestic credit as a proportion of 
gross domestic product (domcred), credit information index (credinfo), property 
rights (proright) and enforcement of contract (enfcont) on double bootstrap 
calculated efficiency from the first stage. The choice of variables is restricted to 
factors that are exogenous to the MFI production function as identified in the 
literature. This notwithstanding, we acknowledge a couple of caveats. Firstly, the 
inclusion of MFI type as a control variable and for purposes of comparison with 
previous studies such as Hermes et al. (2008) and Hermes et al. (2009) requires 
careful interpretation. This is because our experience in the industry and data 
cleaning process revealed that use of different category of MFIs (bank, not-for-
profit financial non-governmental organization, etc) is country specific and not 
always informed by the classification of formal, semi-formal and informal 
financial institutions. Secondly regulation can prove endogenous, but the use of 
truncated regression in the second stage inhibits our ability to mitigate the effect 
of endogeneity through known techniques such as instrumental variable, HT and 
fixed effects vector decomposition. We are, however, optimistic that the 
estimation technique as described below to a considerable extent yields 
admissible results. 
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Data 
Table 6.2 shows that multi-source data is employed in this study.  While the 
calculation of efficiency scores relies solely on institutional level (MFI) data, the 
second stage estimation includes country level variables. The MFI data is 
sourced from the MIX market which is the most comprehensive and up to date 
global web based information on MFIs. We generate a balanced panel data and 
restrict data to only observations with non-missing values since in a DEA context 
missing values are detested. Appendix V describes the number of countries and 
MFIs used for the analysis. The rationale for despising an unbalanced panel data 
is to minimize the noise in the data mainly due to outliers. As mentioned earlier, 
DEA fails to take account of errors associated with the data. Although Simar 
(2003) and Tran et al. (2008) provide strategies for detecting outliers, and Simar 
and Wilson (2007) suggest estimation techniques that partially reduce the bias 
associated with noise from the data, we remain resolute on the need to institute a 
balanced data restriction for the same purpose. To this end, we engage 164 MFIs 
over a period of five years (2004 – 2008). Country level data for the second stage 
were sourced from World Development Indicators (domcred), the World Banks’ 
Doing Business84 data (credinfo) and the World Bank’s Governance Indicators85 
(proright and enfcont). 
 
Choice of production functional form 
In view of CRS’ implicit assumption that DMUs operate at their most efficient 
scale, we use VRS to help disentangle efficiency into pure technical and scale. 
The heterogeneity of MFIs delivery strategies and varying inclination to the dual 
objectives undermines the relevance of the presumption that all institutions are 
operating at their optimal efficiency scale. Disaggregating efficiency into pure 
and scale facilitates attribution of inefficiency to either implementers (credit 
officers and ‘second tier’ managers) or planners (Board, owners). 
 
Estimation 
This study follows a three-step approach. Firstly, using DEA’s CCR(CRS) and 
BCC(VRS) models, we calculate MFIs’ efficiency scores based on both scope of 
                                                 
84
 http://www.doingbusiness.org/MethodologySurveys/ 
85
 http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp 
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financial sustainability measure (narrow and broad) and objectives of the MFI 
(financial and outreach). Using data for the period 2004 to 2008, we are able to 
examine patterns and trends of MFIs’ efficiency. Secondly, we estimate Simar 
and Wilson (2007) bias corrected efficiency scores and run a regression on 
internal and external explanatory variables of MFIs’ efficiency. Thirdly, results 
emerging from the second estimation are benchmarked with a Translog cost 
frontier parametric analysis. 
 
 
CRS and VRS Input Oriented Efficiency Computation 
The input-oriented technical efficiency is calculated by solving the following 
linear programming for each of the 164 MFIs in a particular year. Computing an 
input oriented technical efficiency literally, points to investigating the extent to 
which MFIs’ inputs can be reduced relative to others with output remaining 
unchanged. DEA’s computation of technical efficiency accounts for slacks in 
which case an MFI is efficient only if it is not possible to reduce input without 
worsening another input or output (Pareto-Koopmans definition of efficiency). 
 
In Equation 6.6 below, we aim at minimizing input θ subject to the inequality 
constraint that offers two possibilities of either increasing output or decreasing 
inputs. In the case of VRS, the third constraint representing convexity restricts 
the sum of the weights to unity and that allows for the computation of only pure 
technical efficiency.  
 
min@,A θ                                  6. 6 
 
C τEYGE ≥ YE
E
E2
                 6. 7 
 
C τEXJE ≤ θXE
E
E2
              6.8 
For all n=1,…., N, m=1,…,M and θ and τ ≥ 0. 
 
C τE  1
E
E2
                         6.9  
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where θ measures efficiency (extent to which inputs should be minimized in 
order for each MFI to operate on the frontier); τ represents weights computed 
from a fractional linear programming and represents intensity required to 
generate relative efficiency scores for each MFI; Y and X are respectively the 
amount of output (financial revenue and gross loan portfolio) and input 
(operating expense and personnel) produced by MFI j; and M and N symbolize 
number of outputs and inputs respectively. 
 
With the estimation of both CCR (CRS) and BCC (VRS), we are able to 
decompose technical efficiency into pure technical and scale. Thus, by dividing 
CCR by VRS as in Equation 6.10 below, we arrive at scale efficiency values. 
 
MNOP QQ.9  9  RSM 9TSMU                   6.10 
 
 
 
Bias Corrected Efficiency Scores and Second Stage Estimation 
In view of DEA’s lack of statistical properties, especially given the non-inclusion 
of data noise, Simar and Wilson (2007) suggest a coherent data generation 
process (DGP) via bootstrap method to enhance an approximation of the 
asymptotic distribution and to correct the biases of estimated coefficient. The aim 
of their paper was to provide a technique to resolve: (1) the bounded error nature 
of efficiency scores; and (2) some statistical problems, notably serial correlation. 
Simar and Wilson (2007, p. 19) argue that serial correlation is complicated in 
unknown ways given the following: (1) the error from the first stage efficiency 
frontier estimation is unquestionably correlated with the set of environmental 
factors; (2) parametric convergence rates of the maximum likelihood estimates of 
the coefficients will be slow; and (3) the expected zero mean of the bias 
associated with the estimated efficiency score from the first stage is not 
guaranteed. Following Simar and Wilson’s (2007) Algorithm #2, we generate 
bias-corrected estimates in the first stage using parametric bootstrap and 
determine effect of efficiency drivers in the second stage using truncated 
regression.  
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Translog Cost Frontier Parametric Estimation 
Following on from Battese and Coelli (1995) and as applied in Hermes et al. 
(2009), a Translog stochastic cost frontier function for MFIs requires information 
on total cost, output quantities, amd vector of input prices. Based on Hicks’ 
assumption which implies that technical-technological progress is neutral, a 
simplified Translog production function can be specified in Equation 6.11 below 
as follows: 
 
VR  WX + WVRYM + WVRYZ + W[V\ZY
+ W]VRYM+ W^VRYZ + W_V\ZY
+ W`VRYM ∗ VRYZ$ +  WbVRYM ∗ V\ZY$
+  WcV\ZY ∗ VRYZ$ + T + d            6.11 
 
where TC represents total expenses of the MFI; CPS corresponds to the unit 
price of a staff member; CPL symbolizes the unit price of handling loan 
portfolio; GLP stands for Gross Loan Portfolio (quantity of output); T is the 
traditional error term which is assumed to be independent and identically 
distributed (iid) with a mean of zero and a variance of ef and d denotes non-
negative random variables also iid but with truncated normal distribution with 
mean gh  and variance , e.  Furthermore, g  represents a (1 x m) vector of 
explanatory variables associated with technical inefficiency and h is an (m x 1) 
vector of unknown coefficients (Battese and Coelli, 1995). Predicted values 
generated from the above equation represent technical inefficiency of institutions 
and as such  negative(positive) coefficients naturally signify that the explanatory 
variable in question improves(reduces) efficiency. Table 6.2 provides definition 
for variables used in Equations 6.11 and 6.12.
 
 
Following a one step maximum likelihood estimation of Battese and Coelli 
(1995), the external environment and MFI specific drivers of estimated 
inefficiency can be specified in Equation 6.12 as follows: 
 
g  W X + WYiS + WVQR + W[RijVQ + W]MM + W^klmn
+ W_lmR + W`MoZ + WbMo\ + WcpqP + WXrr\
+ d       6.12 
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where PrR denotes duration for registering a property; EnfC symbolizes duration 
for contract enforcement; CrInf stands for credit information index; OSS 
signifies operational self sufficiency; WomB indicates number of women 
borrowers; DomC refers to domestic credit divided by GDP; SFL and SFG 
respectively mean sources of funds from loans and credit; NNGO (not-for-profit 
NGO) connotes type of institution and doubles as proxy for regulation; βs 
represent the coefficients of the set of external environment and MFI specific 
variables and the subscript ‘it’ shows that the variables are for each institution 
(country) and for a given year.  
 
6.5 Results and Discussion 
We precede this section with a brief descriptive statistic (median) across regions. 
The input/output variables for the production function and the explanatory 
factors of estimated efficiency are described prior to a discussion on the 
inferential statistics. In line with the objectives of this study, the results and 
discussion are presented as follows: (1) patterns and trends of disaggregated 
efficiency (pure technical and scale) based on MFI scope of financial 
sustainability measure (narrow and broad) and objectives (financial systems or 
poverty reduction); (2) comparison of observed efficiency trends and previous 
studies using operating expense ratio; and (3) examination of the set of 
coefficients likely to drive efficiency of MFIs. Interpretation of results and 
inference are tailored to model specification and the type of statistical software 
used. The latter is as a result of the evolving nature of statistical and econometric 
software’s incorporation of the various dimensions of efficiency computation. 
Efficiency scores to examine patterns are computed based on the DEA model and 
use of STATA 10. Ji and Lee (2009) for the first time provide a platform in 
STATA to estimate DEA based on Farrell’s (1957) efficiency computation. 
Estimates derived are interpreted in the context of technical efficiency. Simar and 
Wilson’s (2007) parametric bias-corrected efficiency estimates generate 
Shephard’s (1970) distance function using FEAR 1.12 which is built on the R 
software platform. For the sake of consistency, we find the reciprocal of 
Shephard’s (1970) estimates to arrive at Farrell’s (1957) technical efficiency. 
MFIs with a score of one lie on the frontier, and the closer an institution is to the 
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frontier (one) the greater the level of efficiency. By contrast, the parametric 
stochastic frontier estimates technical inefficiency and for that matter has a 
reverse interpretation.  
 
Descriptive Statistic 
We rely on the median, for the summary statistic in view of observed outliers. 
For example, in terms of an MFI’s personnel, BRAC in Bangladesh has a staff 
capacity of approximately 24,453 compared to an overall average of 459 (minus 
BRAC). Observed patterns of single indicators were consistent with our 
expectations. For instance, size of operations (Gross loan portfolio) is larger in 
South Asia (SA) and Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) than the other four 
regions. This can be attributed to the predominance of microfinance activities in 
these two regions relative to the others. Examining operating expense and 
financial revenue to infer performance/efficiency based on a single input and 
output, we observe a positive correlation. This directly suggests that institutions 
investing more reap higher. However, some drift away from the above is 
observed given patterns of Gross Loan Portfolio and personnel in LAC compared 
to sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) and East Asia and the Pacific (EAP). That is, 
although LAC has a higher Gross Loan Portfolio, it employs only about 50 
percent of the size of SSA as well as EAP.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
176 
 
Table 6.3a - Descriptive Statistic (median) across Regions 
Variables Regions 
Input/output  SSA1 EAP2 ECA3 LAC 4 MENA5 SA5 ALL 
 Operating Expense a 2757443 1876923 1113221 1970971 1371735 3277104 1819579 
 Personnel a 215 251 56 127 116 769 133 
 Gross Loan Portfolio a, b 8186146 8133794 6771017 8302929 7647169 19900000 8005443 
 Financial Revenue a 4284150 3137801 2141785 3377599 2214420 5472288 2868730 
 Women Borrowers a, b 15278 40427 2427 11579 12412 83556 10885 
 Cost per Staff b 12798 6802 21535 16390 12749 3664 14713 
 Cost per Loan b 10.60 8.78 83.72 46.23 6.05 9.83 21.56 
Efficiency 
Drivers  
 
       
 Age of Institution  12 13 8 14 10 11 10 
 Operational Self Sufficiency 110 131 125 118 129 110 120 
 Credit Information Index  1 0 4 5 2 2 4 
 Duration for Property 
Registration  9 7 7 7 7 5 7 
 Duration for Contract 
Enforcement  39 44 38 38 40 46 39 
 Domestic Credit as a 
Proportion of GDP 17.50 16.23 31.54 42.84 90.71 59.28 40.79 
1- Sub-Saharan Africa; 2 – East Asia and Pacific; 3 – Eastern Europe and Central Asia; 4 – Latin America 
and the Caribbean; 5 – South Asia; 6 – Middle East and North Africa; a – variable used DEA; b – variable 
used for parametric SFA. 
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Table 6.3b Correlation Matrix 
Variables 
Operating 
Expense Personnel 
Gross 
Loan 
Portfolio 
Financial 
Revenue 
Women 
Borrowers 
Cost 
per 
Staff 
Cost per 
Borrower 
Age 
of 
MFI 
Operational 
Self 
Sufficiency 
Credit 
Information 
Index 
Property 
Registration 
Enforcement 
of Contract 
Domestic 
Credit 
Operating Expense 1.00 
Personnel 0.64 1.00 
Gross Loan Portfolio 0.95 0.64 1.00 
Financial Revenue 0.98 0.64 0.96 1.00 
Women Borrowers 0.60 0.98 0.60 0.61 1.00 
Cost per Staff 0.19 -0.17 0.19 0.17 -0.19 1.00 
Cost per Borrower -0.01 -0.06 0.01 0.00 -0.07 0.27 1.00 
Age of MFI 0.34 0.39 0.33 0.33 0.37 -0.06 -0.12 1.00 
Operational Self 
Sufficiency 0.05 0.14 0.12 0.12 0.15 -0.08 -0.12 0.06 1.00 
Credit Information 
Index 0.11 -0.06 0.11 0.13 -0.06 0.37 0.05 0.10 -0.01 1.00 
Property Registration 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.03 -0.02 -0.06 0.11 0.05 -0.13 1.00 
Enforcement of 
Contract 0.14 0.12 0.14 0.14 0.12 -0.13 -0.14 -0.02 0.12 -0.22 -0.02   1.00 
Domestic Credit 0.01 0.06 0.02 0.01 0.07 -0.07 -0.12 0.05 0.05 0.19 0.03 -0.1009   1.0000 
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Similar to patterns of microfinance prevalence across regions, financial depth at 
the macro level shows that SSA and EAP have the lowest rates. In the context of 
the debate between financial sustainability and efficiency, the highest OSS is 
recorded in EAP. Comparing this pattern with the earlier observation on 
efficiency (operating expense) an early bird inference for EAP is a potential 
trade-off between operational sustainability and efficiency. 
 
Patterns and Trends of Efficiency 
In the context of pure technical and scale dimensions of efficiency, we focus on 
the location and institutional patterns of MFIs. As a recall, pure technical 
efficiency is mostly attributed to managerial/implementation decisions while 
scale efficiency is associated with the size of operations and normally aligned 
with the role of top management/owners. In view of the computational 
assumptions underlying constant and variable returns to scale, pure technical 
efficiency values are necessarily lower than scale efficiency scores. As indicated 
earlier, these dimensions of efficiency are examined in the context of the scope 
of financial sustainability and objectives of MFIs. Tables 4a and 4b show that 
overall (without disaggregating by location and type of MFI), pure technical and 
scale efficiencies have changed differently across patterns and directions over 
time. With the exception of an increase in narrow financial efficiency all other 
scores reveal a fall over the period 2007 to 2008. Since the broad measure takes 
into consideration the effect of loan losses, it provides a convincing true measure 
of the MFI’s performance. This finding to a large extent validates observations 
emerging from the use of ratios to capture efficiency trends. Thus, the effect of 
the global financial crisis could have impacted adversely on the efficiency of 
MFIs. 
 
Pure technical efficiency tends to show upward changes while scale (size of 
operations) points to a reduction. This pattern is observed irrespective of the 
scope of sustainability measure or objective of the MFI. The increasing 
efficiency score for pure technical efficiency signals improvement in MFIs’ 
strategies. This can be attributed to the wide scope of innovations that have 
recently sprung-up in the industry. Among these are branchless banking and 
electronic service delivery. This finding is consistent with Haq et al.’s (2009) 
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conclusion that over time, cost efficient managers have better managed and 
monitored client’s financial activities. On the flipside, the declining scale 
efficiency potentially suggests that MFIs have reached their optimum size of 
operations, in which case further increases are slowing performance.  In this 
regard, revisiting the likelihood of an overestimated demand for financial 
services is a worthy course.  
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Table 6.4a - Patterns of MFIs Mean Efficiency across Regions and Overtime 
Year Region Efficiency 
  Pure Technical (VRS) Scale (CRS/VRS) 
Sustainability Outreach Sustainability Outreach 
Narrow Broad Outreach Narrow Broad Outreach 
2004 SSA 0.422 0.585 0.657 0.873 0.944 0.973 
 EAP 0.342 0.480 0.600 0.758 0.924 0.984 
ECA 0.483 0.649 0.668 0.906 0.963 0.969 
LAC 0.448 0.577 0.613 0.836 0.935 0.951 
MENA 0.341 0.555 0.604 0.847 0.948 0.976 
SA 0.357 0.423 0.559 0.828 0.933 0.982 
ALL 0.427 0.575 0.628 0.856 0.945 0.967 
2005 SSA 0.406 0.538 0.600 0.874 0.956 0.982 
 EAP 0.367 0.518 0.620 0.759 0.932 0.986 
ECA 0.504 0.652 0.671 0.920 0.971 0.975 
LAC 0.460 0.596 0.630 0.853 0.936 0.957 
MENA 0.361 0.565 0.611 0.831 0.942 0.978 
SA 0.422 0.467 0.632 0.763 0.916 0.980 
ALL 0.444 0.583 0.634 0.857 0.947 0.972 
2006 SSA 0.414 0.538 0.608 0.875 0.961 0.982 
 EAP 0.390 0.554 0.626 0.750 0.926 0.986 
ECA 0.553 0.667 0.681 0..925 0.973 0.976 
LAC 0.492 0.613 0.645 0.852 0.932 0.956 
MENA 0.408 0.581 0.628 0.820 0.945 0.964 
SA 0.472 0.520 0.672 0.750 0.882 0.974 
ALL 0.480 0.601 0.649 0.856 0.944 0.970 
2007 SSA 0.415 0.533 0.599 0.872 0.947 0.981 
 EAP 0.444 0.585 0.665 0.749 0.918 0.980 
ECA 0.625 0.700 0.711 0.930 0.969 0.972 
LAC 0.527 0.637 0.672 0.864 0.933 0.953 
MENA 0.452 0.631 0.674 0.819 0.928 0.960 
SA 0.529 0.559 0.710 0.683 0.837 0.925 
ALL 0.525 0.628 0.675 0.854 0.935 0.962 
2008 SSA 0.421 0.534 0.603 0.868 0.948 0.978 
 EAP 0.488 0.586 0.675 0.742 0.924 0.974 
ECA 0.656 0.694 0.705 0.927 0.962 0.963 
LAC 0.532 0.622 0.653 0.865 0.926 0.946 
MENA 0.463 0.605 0.641 0.818 0.925 0.955 
SA 0.562 0.574 0.713 0.653 
0.850 
0.813 0.921 
ALL 0.543 0.620 0.666 0.929 0.956 
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While ECA consistently, recorded the highest pure technical scores, scale 
efficiency shows some variations depending on the objective of the MFI. Though 
lamentable, the increasing focus of commercial funding to the region in the past 
few years might be a reason for improved managerial efficiency. However, due 
to regional, country and MFI specific effects, it is largely difficult and 
inappropriate to push forward such plausible reasons.  Comparing efficiency of 
MFIs across pure technical and scale, we observe that the most populated regions 
(ECA and SA) score high for the latter but not necessarily for the former. In the 
context of overall declining scale efficiency, this prompts the need for populated 
regions to assess strategies for improving their managerial operations. Broadly, 
these findings justify the need for identifying the best practices of efficient MFIs. 
 
Efficiency superior of different categories of MFIs86 varies consistently overtime 
depending on (1) pure technical and scale efficiency and (2) scope of financial 
sustainability measure and objectives of MFIs. Bank’s superior efficiency 
advantage in the context financial managerial and technical operations (pure 
technical) is confirmed. Table 6.4b shows that out of the fifteen dimensions of 
pure technical efficiency (five institutions (over five year) and three different 
perspectives (narrow, broad and outreach)), Banks record the highest score 
eleven times. On the flipside, and unexpectedly, social efficiency (outreach) 
superiority of not-for-profit non-governmental organizations (NNGOs) is not 
consistently observed. From both pure technical and scale efficiency view points, 
Banks and Non-bank financial institutions (NBFIs) respectively emerge superior 
on the front of social efficiency. However, on average terms for scale social 
efficiency, NNGOs possess relative superior advantage. Therefore, in spite of the 
findings from average terms and earlier studies (Haq et al., 2009 and Gutierrez-
Neito et al., 2009), the dichotomy between pure technical and scale social 
efficiency of different categories of MFIs is worth examining. 
 
 
                                                 
86
 Since the last category (other) is difficult to describe, we restrict the comparison of different 
types of MFIs to Banks, NBFIs, NNGOs and CUCs.  
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Table 6.4b - Patterns of MFIs Mean Efficiency across Type of MFI and 
Overtime 
Year Types 
of MFIs 
Efficiency 
  Pure Technical (VRS) Scale CRS/VRS) 
Sustainability Outreach Sustainability Outreach 
Narrow Broad Outreach Narrow Broad Outreach 
2004 BANK 0.509 0.607 0.626 0.848 0.946 0.955 
 NBFI a 0.419 0.587 0.630 0.891 0.962 0.977 
NNGO b 0.404 0.554 0.631 0.819 0.924 0.960 
CUC c 0.583 0.644 0.645 0.895 0.953 0.956 
Other d 0.257 0.352 0.393 0.778 0.987 0.997 
ALL 0.427 0.575 0.628 0.856 0.945 0.967 
2005 BANK 0.557 0.650 0.685 0.842 0.919 0.926 
 NBFI a 0.455 0.599 0.643 0.887 0.966 0.983 
NNGO b 0.401 0.552 0.622 0.825 0.933 0.972 
CUC c 0.560 0.638 0.640 0.908 0.948 0.951 
Other d 0.287 0.404 0.433 0.813 0.981 0.991 
ALL 0.444 0.583 0.634 0.857 0.947 0.972 
2006 BANK 0.623 0.669 0.701 0.826 0.905 0.916 
 NBFI a 0.501 0.634 0.677 0.885 0.962 0.983 
NNGO b 0.428 0.558 0.621 0.824 0.933 0.969 
CUC c 0.556 0.631 0.634 0.923 0.942 0.946 
Other d  0.277 0.399 0.428 0.794 0.962 0.987 
ALL 0.480 0.601 0.649 0.856 0.944 0.970 
2007 BANK 0.646 0.704 0.730 0.842 0.885 0.902 
 NBFI a 0.577 0.661 0.701 0.876 0.954 0.975 
NNGO b 0.455 0.585 0.651 0.827 0.924 0.963 
CUC c 0.557 0.639 0.640 0.914 0.932 0.935 
Other d 0.245 0.452 0.494 0.795 0.938 0.983 
ALL 0.525 0.628 0.675 0.854 0.935 0.962 
2008 BANK 0.684 0.697 0.722 0.850 0.894 0.901 
 NBFI a 0.609 0.659 0.694 0.863 0.943 0.967 
NNGO b 0.455 0.565 0.631 0.829 0.923 0.961 
CUC c 0.577 0.677 0.678 0.911 0.909 0.910 
Other d 0.286 0.503 0.541 0.801 0.920 0.977 
ALL 0.543 0.620 0.666 0.850 0.929 0.956 
a – Non-Bank Financial Institution;  b – Not-for-profit NGO; c – Credit Unions and Cooperatives and e – 
Includes Rural banks and other financial institutions offering some form of microfinance. 
 
Credit Union/Co-operative appears to possess competitive efficiency scores 
across different measures and objectives of MFIs. For instance, prior to 2006, 
Credit Union/Co-operative (CUC) was the most efficient category of MFI 
irrespective of MFIs inclination to either of the dual objectives. In terms of size 
of operations (scale), NBFI consistently emerged as the most efficient MFI 
category over time and across financial (broad and narrow) and social efficiency 
perspectives.  
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Benchmarking the observed findings with Figure 6.1, the concern ignited by the 
flat curvature depicting increasing and rising cost of operating expense is 
sustained. Efficiency scores from this study show varying trends and patterns 
depending on the type of measure and MFIs objectives. Figure 6.3 fails to reveal 
marked changes with the exception of the narrow definition of financial 
efficiency. As these findings spark a number of questions, the next section 
identifies the drivers of efficiency, to enable some inference. 
 
 
Figure 6.3 - Pure Technical and Scale Efficiency of MFIs’ Objectives 
 
 
 
 
Drivers of Efficiency 
Table 6.2 indicates that in our models (DEA bias-corrected truncated regression 
and parametric SFA) outreach (number of women); sources of funds (loans and 
grants) and regulation (Banks and NNGOs) are hypothesized to have different 
effects depending on the scope of financial sustainability and objectives of the 
MFIs. We argue that all other variables will have the same directional effect 
irrespective of the scope of financial sustainability measure and objective of 
MFI. The a priori signs are informed by both previous empirical studies and 
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intuition. For instance, it is intuitive to posit that longer duration in both property 
registration and enforcement of contract reduces the efficiency of MFIs. Also as 
established in the microfinance industry and empirically verified by Gutierrez-
Neito et al. (2009), NNGOs are expected to have a positive (negative) sign in 
terms of social (financial) efficiency. 
 
As a recall, the specific hypotheses are:  (1) operational financial sustainability 
complements efficiency (financial and social); (2) MFIs’ targeting women trade-
off their financial efficiency; and (3) external environment (credit information, 
property rights and financial development) has a significant positive effect on 
MFIs social efficiency while financial development impacts only on financial 
efficiency. Tables 6.5 and 6.6 respectively use efficiency and inefficiency data as 
the dependent variable hence signs of the coefficients are interpreted in this 
regard. That is, positive signs in Table 6.5 are comparable to negative signs in 
Table 6.6. The same explanatory variables are used in both estimates for 
purposes of comparability. Consistent with long run neo-classical production 
theory which suggests co-movement in capital and labour, the parametric SFA 
results in Table 6.6 (using the translog production function of Equation 6.11), 
identify collinearity among the input variables. However, with the exception of 
cost per loan, other inputs and quantity of output significantly determine 
efficiency scores.  
 
Operational self sufficiency, a measure of MFIs’ financial sustainability 
consistently explains efficiency. Irrespective of an MFI’s objective and 
estimation technique, operational self sufficiency (OSS) indicates a positive 
relationship with efficiency. The observed link between OSS and efficiency, 
augments the case for commercialization of MFIs since it transcends the 
promotion of financial efficiency to facilitate the achievement of the poverty 
reduction (outreach) objective. In contrast to OSS consistently complementing 
efficiency, mixed results emerge on the relationship between outreach and 
efficiency. Similar to the findings of Hermes et al. (2008) and Hermes et al. 
(2009), the hypothesis of a trade-off between outreach and efficiency is observed 
in the one step maximum likelihood parametric stochastic frontier estimation. 
This suggests that targeting women comes with a cost. However, the parametric 
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SFA estimation is unable to provide further information of the type of cost. 
While Table 6.5 indicates that there is not enough evidence to support the 
association between financial efficiency and outreach, the last column signals a 
positive relationship between the latter and social efficiency. The parallel results 
of a trade-off between outreach and efficiency in Table 6.6 and a complementary 
relationship in Table 6.5, set the stage for segmenting MFIs based on their 
relative efficiency in dispensing either of the dual objectives. This suggests that 
contextualizing type of efficiency and identifying best performing MFIs remains 
imperative for the success of the MFI industry.  
 
In a similar vein and intuitively, other variables (source of funds and regulation) 
that were hypothesized in Table 6.2 to have varying signs depending on MFIs’ 
objectives show contrasting results when we compare the estimates of the 
disaggregated efficiency scores in Table 6.5 with those of the parametric SFA in 
Table 6.6. Despite methodological issues, the contrasting results reinforce the 
need to contextualize scope of efficiency measure (broad and narrow) and MFI 
objectives. NNGOs consistently show a reducing effect on efficiency irrespective 
of methodology, scope of financial efficiency measure and MFI’s objective. 
While this suggests a gloomy situation for NNGOs it needs to be interpreted in 
the context of pure technical efficiency since the descriptive statistics revealed 
that NNGOs had the highest overall social efficiency average score given size of 
operation (scale). 
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Table 6.5 - Efficiency Drivers of Bias-corrected Pure Technical DEA 
Estimates87 
 
 
MFI specific 
characteristics and 
External Environment  
Narrow Financial 
Efficiency 
Broad Financial 
Efficiency 
Social Efficiency 
(Breadth of Outreach) 
Coef. z-valuea Coef. z-value Coef. z-value 
Property registration -0.011 (-1.24) -0.001 (-0.89) -0.006 -(3.96)** 
Credit Information index 0.002 (0.16) 0.014 (10.48)** 0.009 (5.73)** 
Contract Enforcement -0.009 (-1.51) -0.001 (-1.22) 0.002 (2.13)* 
Operational Self Sufficiency 0.404 (3.01)** 0.369 (28.62)** 0.354 (23.70)** 
Women Borrowers 0.000 (1.74) + 0.000 (0.40) 0.000 (2.22)* 
Domestic Credit/GDP -0.001 (-1.36) 0.000 (-3.30)** 0.000 (-0.11) 
Loan as a source of Funds -0.141 (-2.14)* -0.016 (-1.74) + 0.016 (1.50) 
Grants as a source of Funds -0.151 (-3.39)** -0.008 (-1.16) -0.008 (-0.94) 
Age 0.008 (0.75) 0.002 (1.11) 0.006 (2.25)* 
Age^2 -0.001 (-1.64) 0.000 (-1.00) 0.000 (-2.19)* 
Year Dummy for 04 -07 -0.118 (-2.83)** -0.029 (-3.99)** -0.020 (-2.23)* 
Bank -0.007 (-0.14) 0.027 (2.27)* 0.029 (2.29)* 
Not-for-profit NGO -0.078 (-1.67)+ -0.040 (-6.57)** -0.017 (-2.39)* 
Constant 0.690 (2.74)** 0.154 (4.37)** 0.088 (2.33)* 
Sigma88 0.342 (4.12)** 0.073 (28.70)** 0.088 (32.95)** 
Number of Observations 753 753 753 
Wald Chi-Square (Prob.) 59.67.72 (0.000) 1342.36 (0.000) 820.91 (0.000) 
a - Z- values are based on 1000 bootstrap estimations of the truncated regression.  ** - significant 
at one percent; * - significant at five percent; + - significant at ten percent 
 
Table 6.5 shows that in contrast to most of the external environment factors 
explaining social efficiency (credit information, duration for registering a 
property and enforcing contract), none of them is significant in determining 
narrow efficiency and only a couple explained the broader perspective of 
financial efficiency. This finding is consistent with the argument that the 
outreach objective of MFIs requires an external drive and their financial 
performance is mainly internally determined.  
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 The variation in sample size for the two estimations is as a result of the different estimation 
techniques. For instance, the truncation from Table 6.5 drops observations at the extremes. 
88
 This tests the null hypothesis of no inefficiency. The probability value suggests a failure to 
accept the H0 
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Table 6.6 - One Step Maximum Likelihood Parametric Stochastic Frontier 
Estimation 28 
Estimating Inefficiency Determining Drivers of Efficiency 
Input prices, quantity of Output and 
Hicks' Natural technical-
technological progress Coef. z-value 
MFI specific characteristics 
and External Environment Coef. z-value 
ln of (cost per staffsq) 0.368 (3.52)** Property registration 0.035 (6.11)** 
ln of (cost per loansq) -0.043 (-0.69) Credit Information index -0.008 (-1.14) 
ln of (Gross loan portfoliosq) 0.553 (9.66)** Contract Enforcement -0.001 (-0.45) 
ln of (cost per staff)*ln of (cost per 
loan) -0.031 (-2.89)** Operational Self Sufficiency -0.778 (-12.7)** 
ln of (cost per staff)*ln of (Gross Loan 
Portfolio) -0.034 (-2.58)* Women Borrowers 0.000 (4.85)** 
ln of (cost per loan)*ln of (Gross loan 
portfolio) 0.024 (3.78)** Domestic Credit/GDP -0.001 (-3.23)** 
Year 0.020 (1.66)* Loan as a source of Funds 0.047 (1.25) 
Constant -46.42 (-1.90)* Grants as a source of Funds -0.119 (-4.08)** 
   Age 0.045 (4.78)** 
   Age^2 -0.001 (-4.40)** 
   Year Dummy for 04 -07 0.048 (0.95) 
   Bank 0.007 (0.15) 
   Not-for-profit NGO 0.096 (3.27)** 
   Constant 1.176 (6.33)** 
   Number of Observations 736 
   Wald chi-square(7) 9275.81 (0.000) 
   Lnsigma289 -2.3945 (0.000) 
** - significant at one percent; * - significant at five percent; + - significant at ten percent 
 
 
In Tables 6.5 and 6.6 longer duration of registering a property indicates a 
reducing effect on efficiency. However, there is lack of enough statistical 
evidence to support the link between duration for registering a property and 
financial efficiency in the case of the bias corrected DEA scores. In spite of this, 
the observed efficiency reducing effect of longer property registering duration 
indicates a transmission mechanism through which MFIs efficiency can be 
enhanced.  Consistent with Hermes et al. (2009) an improving efficiency effect is 
observed for the measure of financial deepening in the context of parametric 
SFA. This finding is modestly articulate, as the DEA analysis fails to confirm the 
significant effect. 
 
6.6 Conclusion 
This study set out to examine patterns, trends and drivers of MFIs’ efficiency in 
the context of underlying returns to scale assumptions (pure technical and scale) 
                                                 
89
 This is the logarithmic form of the sum of the two error components of Equation 6.11. The 
probability value suggests that we fail to accept H0 of no inefficient MFIs 
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and the dual objectives (financial and social) of the microfinance paradigm. The 
anecdotal evidence of some connection between the recent global financial crisis 
and the slowdown of microfinance operations is sustained. This is primarily due 
to the observation that the broader financial and social efficiency measures 
exhibit a turning point in 2007. In contrast to the narrow financial efficiency 
measure, the broad and social efficiency measures provide a comprehensive and 
true picture of microfinance operations.   
 
Mapping MFI classification onto the type of efficiency measure and objectives of 
the microfinance paradigm offers revealing relative advantage superiority results. 
The evidence of NBFIs and CUCs closely competing with Banks and NNGOs on 
their known respective advantages of financial and social efficiency provide 
alternatives for interventions and possibility of linkages to tap specialized niches 
of each MFI category. 
 
On the front of efficiency drivers, complementarity between financial 
sustainability and efficiency is confirmed. The observed varying relationship 
between outreach and efficiency as a result of the nature of conceptualization, 
institutional goal and methodology indicates the need for: (1) identifying MFIs 
with their objectives, and (2) engaging in further country and institution specific 
studies. This study also confirms the argument that unlike the financial goal, 
MFIs’ social efficiency and outreach require the role of external factors including 
other institutions providing services within the business environment. The ability 
of such institutions in reducing bureaucracy that unduly delays economic 
transactions and providing financial related information improves the social 
efficiency of microfinance institutions.  
 
With most of the institutions depicting increasing returns to scale, identifying 
and absorbing any external adverse shock will add to the bright future of the 
microfinance paradigm. That is, in spite of the observed size of operation (scale) 
constraint, MFI operational (managerial) performance is fertile and can be 
harnessed for the growth of the industry. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN  
 
CONCLUSION 
7.0 Introduction 
Among the several conjectures cited about microfinance operations and its capability 
to anchor the development path of developing economies, this thesis, empirically 
tests eight hypotheses using different microeconometric techniques. The hypotheses 
tested aim at contributing to the existing academic literature and policy direction on 
the following issues: (1) targeting of clients vis-à-vis financial sustainability; (2) loan 
size effect of interest rate and clients’ well-being status; (3) economic governance 
and the dual objectives of microfinance institutions and (4) patterns, trends and 
drivers of microfinance efficiency. The thesis focuses on operational issues that 
affect institutional performance and outreach of microfinance institutions rather than 
the impact of microfinance on poverty reduction. In the next section, this chapter 
summarizes the results and provides policy implications for each of the four 
empirical chapters. Also in the penultimate section of this chapter, we outline some 
caveats related to the microeconometric techniques used and finally suggests areas 
for further considerations in the context of the thesis focus. 
 
7.1 Summary of Results  
The first empirical chapter questioned the sustainability of microfinance institutions 
in view of the heavy investment received from both development partners and 
government. This study tested the hypotheses: (i) formal MFIs that mobilized their 
own funds reach non-poor clients; and (ii) concentrating on the achievement of 
financial sustainability causes an institution to target non-poor clients. Using 
household level data from Ghana with a sample size of 1598, we revisited the 
microfinance argument of serving poorer clients on a commercial basis. Unlike 
financial self-sufficiency, operational self-sufficiency shows a positive effect in 
reaching poorer clients. The study upholds the sceptics’ view of a trade-off between 
financial self-sufficiency and poverty reduction. Formal institutions dispensing their 
own funds target less poor clients. Using instrumental variable estimation, plausible 
problems of endogeneity emerging via measurement error were observed. We 
instrumented financial and operational self-sufficiency with density of microfinance 
institutions in a given location and group lending mechanism to resolve attenuation 
bias.  
190 
 
 
In the second empirical chapter, we integrated the well-being of a microfinance 
client into a loan size equation to examine the effect of interest rate. Using household 
level data from Ghana with a sample size of 1598, we tested the hypothesis of loan 
price inelasticity. Quantile and least squares regression were employed. The quantile 
regression showed pronounced variations in responsiveness of loan size to interest 
rate changes at different percentiles. In contrast to an inverse relationship depicted 
between the 20th and 40th quantiles, we observed respective positive and fairly flat 
curvatures at the extremes and around the median. We therefore interacted household 
poverty scores and lending rates to examine the effect of interest. The semi-elasticity 
of loan amount responsiveness to a unit change in interest rate was more than 
proportionate and significant for the poorest group. This suggests circumspection in 
designing loan price operational policies for the fifth poorest group of clients.  
 
The third empirical chapter investigated a hypothesized relationship between 
economic governance and the dual objectives of microfinance institutions (MFIs). 
For economic governance, defined in the context of securing property rights, 
contract enforcement and collective action, we hypothesized a positive relationship 
between changes in these factors and the social objective of MFIs. We used an 
unbalanced panel data of 531 MFIs for the period 2005 to 2007. Comparing four 
panel estimates, the effect of economic governance on the social objective of MFIs 
was confirmed. Specifically, less time in securing property and the availability of 
credit information showed positive effects in targeting poorer clients. Potential 
biases due to slow changing and time invariant variables were resolved using the 
Hausman-Taylor (HT) and Fixed Effects Vector Decomposition (FEVD).  
 
The fourth empirical chapter argued that patterns, trends and drivers of MFIs’ 
efficiency depend on the scope of financial sustainability measures and MFIs’ 
inclination to either of the dual objectives of financial systems and outreach. A 
balanced panel data of 164 MFIs for the period 2004-08 was extracted from the MIX 
website. Both parametric and non-parametric efficiency estimation techniques were 
used. We observed that both type (pure technical and scale) and scope (narrow and 
broad) of financial efficiency show varying trends. Although not-for-profit NGOs 
have been identified with better outreach, their social efficiency superiority relative 
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to other categories of MFIs was observed only in terms of overall scale efficiency. 
While consistent complementarity between operational self sufficiency and 
efficiency was observed across the methodology and microfinance objectives, the 
effect of outreach varies depending on institutional goal. Contrary to a trade-off 
between financial efficiency and outreach, the latter tends to have a positive link 
with social efficiency. Negative effects of bureaucracies in property registration and 
lack of credit information on social efficiency were also observed.  
 
7.2 Policy Implications 
From a policy perspective, four issues are prescribed either for microfinance 
practitioners or funders (government and development partners). Firstly, we 
recommend deliberate harmonization of microfinance programmes irrespective of 
the source of funds. Thus, microfinance investors should refrain from conditioning 
on-lending funds that constrains MFIs in pooling together funds. This will enable 
MFIs to disburse loans based on a broad institutional policy and minimize potential 
market fragmentation and distortion. On the part of MFI management, we 
recommend linkages between different categories of MFIs in view of the observed 
combined effect of source of funds and type of MFIs on targeting. 
 
Secondly, in the context of loan pricing, management of MFIs are advised to 
segment the market based on poverty levels of clients. In addition to recent market 
segmentation advocacy, we propose the use of borrower’s responsiveness to 
complement traditional client differentiation methods including type of economic 
activity and community level indicators. This will enhance the achievement of client 
specific needs to complement location specific and type of economic activity driven 
needs. This policy prescription will require simulation of different interest rates for 
various groups of clients based on country level poverty patterns. 
 
Thirdly, creating an enabling atmosphere is recommended for achieving the poverty 
reduction goal of microfinance paradigm. We propose a re-channelling ( in case 
extra funds cannot be accessed) of government and development partners financial 
resources from on-lending funds to the creation of an enabling external governance 
(business) environment that addresses issues such as bureaucracies in property 
registration and provides credit related information. 
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Finally, we recommend that MFIs should publish their efficiency levels (both 
financial and social) based on a multiple input-output framework. The rationale is to 
motivate inefficient institutions and inform microfinance funders on where to invest 
their funds, obviously depending on their motives. The latter is underpinned by the 
fact that the financial and social classification of MFIs’ efficiency levels enables the 
identification of each MFI’s comparative advantage. 
 
7.3 Caveats 
This section of the thesis attempts to acknowledge some limitations related to the 
methods of study used in each of the four empirical chapters. As microeconometric 
techniques are currently evolving at a very fast pace and data restrictions are quite 
often insurmountable within a given time period, some limitations of the thesis were 
inevitable.   
 
The study relies on two types of quantitative datasets. Household cross section, and 
institutional and country panel datasets are respectively used for the first two and last 
two empirical chapters. In view of the rippling and complex interaction between 
household financial decision making and MFI service delivery, results emerging 
from the household cross section can be enhanced with qualitative information that 
tackles second and third tier probes.  
 
In particular, the method of capturing household well-being status for purposes of 
comparison across different households and over time, and making inferences, has 
attracted wide pedagogic discourse. Although this thesis does not contribute directly 
to this debate, it is worthwhile acknowledging the limitations that accompany its 
application. To this end, in the context of the first two empirical chapters, three 
broad limitations have been identified. Firstly, measurement of household poverty 
attracts criticisms related to the use of a subjective measure and trade-offs that 
emerge in the use of a multi-dimensional poverty index.  Secondly, the choice of 
cross sectional econometric techniques (least squares (ordinary and second stage 
regressions) and quantile regression) makes the results vulnerable to biases that 
otherwise would have been corrected with a panel dataset. For instance, although we 
attempt resolving the problem of endogeneity using instrumental variable estimation, 
the search of a good instrument within the limits of the dataset was extremely 
193 
 
daunting. Finally, since the data used for the first two empirical chapters was 
collected purposively to engage in a rapid household poverty comparison between 
MFI clients and non-clients, it was impossible to apply other cross sectional data 
analysis methods such as propensity score matching, treatment effects and non-
parametric estimations. 
 
 
The third and fourth empirical chapters’ use of panel data commands a degree of 
reliability in view of its ability to control for unobserved MFI specific heterogeneity 
and allows for a host of approaches in minimizing the effect of endogeneity. Whilst 
estimation reliability has been carefully considered in this thesis, data generation and 
span (duration) of the MIX data set requires circumspection in interpreting the 
results and restricts the use of some of the very recent panel estimation techniques 
including dynamic panel approaches 
 
In sum, given the complex relationship between microfinance operations, broad 
financial sector, economic growth/development and poverty reduction, it is 
imperative to combine qualitative and quantitative data sets and engage in different 
forms of analysis other than econometric techniques. In spite of these limitations, 
this thesis offers a platform for future empirical considerations. However the 
observed evidence of: a trade-off between financial sustainability and depth of 
outreach; client interest rate sensitivity; importance of external governance to the 
social objective of MFIs; and differences in MFI efficiency, cautions against over 
enthusiasm in extolling the virtues of the microfinance paradigm. The final sub-
section of the concluding chapter identifies some of the empirical considerations that 
will add to and/or improve the approach used in this thesis. 
 
 
7.4 Future Considerations 
This thesis has benefitted from comments received during conference presentations 
and from reviewers in an attempt to get some of the empirical chapters published. 
However given time and other resource limitations, the author has not been able to 
incorporate all the comments received.  In this section, we outline some of these 
comments that this thesis fails to deal with. 
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In the case of the first empirical chapter, that addresses trade-off/mutuality between 
outreach and financial self sufficiency, a couple of issues have been identified. 
Firstly, using the same dataset to examine the relationship between all different 
measures of outreach (worth, length, scope, breath, scale and depth) and financial 
self sufficiency will provide a better understanding on the win-win hypothesis. 
Secondly, the issue of endogeneity need to be addressed with more persuasive 
instrument to replace group mechanism and number of MFIs in a region as exclusion 
variables. 
 
The second empirical chapter has the potential of unravelling more interdependence 
between interest rate and other covariates such as repayment schedule, loan duration, 
type of economic activity and poverty. In addition to exploring higher order 
interaction terms, the observed insensitivity and positive relationship between 
interest rate and loan size for the average poor and non-poor groups respectively, 
require further scrutiny as it contrasts economic theory of pricing.  This suggests the 
exploration of other estimation techniques such as non-linear and non-parametric 
econometric techniques. 
 
This chapter on economic governance will explore other datasets such as the Country 
Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA), UNECA African Governance Indicators 
(AGI) and the Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG). This exploration will 
provide some benchmark assessment of the economic governance variables used this 
thesis. While focus will still be placed on economic governance issues such as 
property registration, contract enforcement and credit information, political and 
institutional governance indicators will provide some robustness check. More 
importantly, some of these variables can be used as external instruments instead of 
the current reliance on lags as internal instruments. This is important in view of the 
potential simultaneous effect of measurement error and slowing changing 
governance indicators that causes correlation between the explanatory variable and 
the idiosyncratic error term. This will lead to exploring use of traditional 
Instrumental Variable Estimation in the context of Panel. The case of using external 
Instrumental Variable Estimation is further justified due to two reasons. Firstly, 
potential sampling bias and reverse causality between outreach/profitability and the 
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microfinance financial performance indicators such as operating expense and yield 
on gross loan portfolio. Secondly, institutions reporting on the mixed market do so 
voluntarily and that might be correlated with some unobserved criteria.  
 
The final empirical chapter will apply Malmquist efficiency index to identify 
institution specific changes in efficiency over time. This is essential in the context of 
DEA as efficiency over time is likely to be correlated. In the case of Translog cost 
function, symmetry and other restrictions will be further investigated as robustness 
check prior to its comparison with alternative measures such as DEA. Also, we will 
examine the potential dampening effect on the coefficients as a result of sampling 
bias and reverse causality between efficiency (social and financial) and microfinance 
characteristic such as MFI character type and source of funds. Finally, the potential 
policy implications of the final chapter would be better identified with country 
specific studies, hence it is imperative to investigate nation specific efficiency 
patterns, trends and drivers. 
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APPENDICES 
APPENDIX I - Raymond W. Goldsmith’s (1969, pp. 44-48): Stylized Facts on 
Financial Structure 
 
1. In the course of economic development a country’s financial super structure grows 
more rapidly than the infrastructure of national product and national wealth. Hence 
the financial interrelations ratio (the quotient of the aggregate market value of all the 
financial instruments in existence in a country at a given date to the value of its 
tangible net national wealth) has a tendency to increase. 
2. This increase in a country’s financial interrelations ratio, however, is not a process 
that continues without limit. 
3. Economically less developed countries have much lower financial interrelations 
ratios than those which prevail in Europe or North-America. 
4. The main determinant of the relative size of a country’s financial superstructure is 
the separation of the functions of saving and investing among different economic 
units and groups of them. 
5. In most countries the share of financial institutions in the issuance and the ownership 
of financial assets has considerably increased in the process of economic 
development. 
6. This “institutionalization” of saving and of the ownership of financial assets has 
affected the main types of financial instruments differently. 
7. Financial development in the modern sense has started everywhere with the banking 
system and has been dependent on the diffusion of scriptural money through the 
economy. 
8. As economic development has progressed, the share of the banking system in the 
assets of all financial institutions has declined, though its share in the country’s total 
financial assets has continued to increase for a while. 
9. Foreign financing, as either a source of funds supplementing those domestically 
available or as an outlet for funds not easily utilizable within the country, has played 
a substantial role in some phase of the development of most countries. 
10. Probably as important for the financial development of most countries as these flows 
of funds across international boundaries was the example provided by the more 
advanced countries. Transfers of technology and entrepreneurship have been easier 
to accomplish, and on the whole more successful, with respect to financial 
instruments and financial institutions than in many other fields. 
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11. The cost of financing, including interest rates and other charges, is directly lower in 
financially developed than in less developed countries, with occasional exceptions 
mainly reflecting the effects of inflation. 
12. As real income and wealth increase, in the aggregate and per head per population, 
the size and complexity of the financial superstructure grows. 
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APPENDIX II - Poverty Conceptualization, Contextualization and 
Measurement 
 
Introduction 
Recent reworking of the international poverty line from $1/day to $1.25/day and 
counter responses on its reliability and validity demonstrates the dynamism, 
multidimensionality, location specificity and uncertainty characterizing the 
identification and measurement of poverty. Narayan et al. (2000) assert that poverty 
is location specific, gender biased, dynamic, institutionally embedded and complex. 
This appendix is structured to offer an insight into the complexity and evolving 
approaches in conceptualizing, contextualizing and measuring poverty. We will 
review recent literature on the nature, types, and tools and techniques of poverty 
measurement. This is followed by a description of the poverty situation in Ghana to 
provide readers with a broader perspective of the validation of the MPAT used in the 
third and fourth empirical chapters. 
  
Nature of Poverty 
The manifestation of poverty has yielded diverse terminologies describing three key 
issues of well-being: deprivation, functioning and capabilities (Sen, 1973; 1980; 
1985).  From the perspective of deprivation, lack of income was overly prominent in 
the definition of poverty. Its emergence and use dates back over a century, as it can 
be traced to Rowntree’s study of poverty in the English City of York in 1899 (World 
Development Report, 2000). In contrast,  Narayan and Petesch (2002) posit that the 
poor’s experiential view transcends income, other materialistic and tangible objects, 
physiological and psychological defects and hinges on risks that are associated with 
both anticipated and unanticipated adverse effects, structure of the political economy 
and the role of institutions. This viewpoint demonstrates extensions both within and 
beyond deprivation. 
 
The ideological change between Rowntree’s study and Narayan and Petesch’s (2002) 
observation did not begin until the 1970s, partly due to the dominance of classical 
economists’ use of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita. Agitations to test the 
veracity of GDP per capita as a measure of a society’s well-being kickstarted after 
World War II and the real adverse effects of the Great Depression ensued. This 
prompted a number of academics and researchers (Townsend, 1970; Seers, 1972; 
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Sen, 1973) to question the use of GDP per capita as a yardstick for economic 
development and human welfare.  
 
The compelling intervention by Townsend at the brink of the 1970s incited much 
detailed assessment of the philosophical and theoretical underpinnings of income as 
a measure of well-being. The concerns of Townsend and others were premised 
mainly on the mismatch between food nutritional intake, which was used as a 
benchmark for estimating a required minimum income level, and actual household 
income. Townsend (1970) alluded to some proximate variables that could possibly 
result in individual differential needs for food nutritional intake. Among the factors 
are body size, rate of metabolism, and energy demands of work and leisure. These 
factors certainly impede the designation of an income threshold that will be 
applicable to different individuals and households. In pursuance to the quest of 
identifying comparable criteria for well-being given individual differential needs, 
Townsend suggested five resources: (1) current cash income, (2) capital assets, (3) 
occupational fringe benefits, (4) social service benefits, and (5) private income in-
kind, for determining poverty (Williamson & Hyer, 1975).  
 
The obvious parallel between the criticisms and set of indicators offered to measure 
the diversity and complexity of well-being provoked philosophers, mainly John 
Rawls and Amartya Sen, to review the tenets of Utilitarianism, the scope of 
indicators, the measurability, equality and equity in relation to poverty. In spite of 
this and other pedagogic, compelling writings including Streeten (1981) and Sen 
(1973; 1980; 1985) on the shortcomings of income or consumption expenditures’, 
they still dominate in the 21st century.  
 
However, Townsend’s intervention and later studies in the 1980s and early part of 
the 1990s provided significant contributions to the advancement of poverty studies.  
Most notable is the unifying consensus that has led to the transformation of a 
unidimensional conceptualization to a mutlidimensional perspective. Typical and 
recognizable developments attributable to the works of this period are the Human 
Development Indicators (Human Development Index, Human Poverty Index I & II 
and Gender Poverty Index), nutritional-based measures, wealth scores and ranking 
based on the basic needs and the asset framework. Variability in evidence based on 
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the different approaches in conceptualizing and measuring poverty has created a 
knowledge gap between measures and the identification of poverty. For instance, 
countries such as Cuba, Tajikistan and the Republic of Moldova evidence a gap of 
43, 34 and 33 points between their rankings of GDP per capita and HDI rank 
(UNDP, 2006). These positive values indicate that, subtracting their HDI rank from 
GDP per capita rank, these countries seem to be relatively better-off measuring well-
being from a broader perspective (using the HDI) than the GDP per capita. In 
contrast to this, some other countries observe a negative gap in their ranking of GDP 
per capita minus HDI. Examples include Equatorial Guinea (-90), Botswana (-73) 
and South Africa (-60) (UNDP, 2006). Thus these economies seem relatively worse-
off measuring well-being from a broader perspective. These obvious gaps provide 
credibility for investigating issues on well-being beyond deprivation. 
 
Sen’s phenomenal contribution that extends poverty from deprivation to include 
functioning and capability unveiled the notion of time and frequency of poverty. As 
a result recent literature, in addition to multidimensionality and location specificity, 
has tackled issues such as extent (depth and severity), susceptibility (vulnerability) 
and spells of poverty. Lately, vulnerability and spells (expected and unexpected) 
poverty are emerging due to increasing respective incidence, and the effects of 
shocks and dynamics to well-being.  
 
A third dimension – sustainable development and environment – has been added to 
the complexity surrounding the classical GDP and quality of life approaches to well-
being. Stiglitz et al.(2009), in their report on “Measurement of Economic 
Performance and Social Progress” to the French President Nicholas Sarkozy, 
outlined inadequacies of GDP given the evolution of different comprehensive well-
being measures but acknowledged the need for continuous discourse in view of the 
societal complexities. 
 
Measures and Types of Poverty 
Chambers (2006) inclines that the interests and backgrounds of policymakers, 
academics and researchers influence identification and measurement of poverty. This 
contributes to a divergence between a measure and identification of who is poor. 
This is rationalized by the differences in perceived knowledge of professionals in 
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contrast to ‘agent’ (individual and group) experiences. Chambers’ assertion has been 
exemplified by the host of typologies in trying to identify and measure poverty.  The 
process of identifying and measuring poverty has also been influenced by the causes 
of poverty. Human rights parlance questions the role of structural inequalities and 
inequities that make some people poor. For the sake of brevity, this appendix skips 
the discussion on poverty variability emerging from differences in causes. Related 
work on physiological and sociological poverty is ignored as we limit our review to 
types based on the differences between professionals’ notion and that of the ‘agent’ 
(poor individual or household).   
 
Objective and Subjective Poverty 
Objective measures of poverty emanate strictly from the perspective of a 
professional (medical professionals, physiologists and philosophers). The 
professional predetermines a minimum living requirement to sustain different levels 
of survival or ‘normal way’ of life. It is an a priori setting of a threshold based on 
criteria such as daily calorie intake, concrete floor for dwelling, two persons per 
room, access to pipe borne water, basic level education, etc. The choice of indicator 
and weight is based on the professionals’ perceived knowledge and experience. This 
approach mostly leads to the identification of a threshold below which agents are 
classified as poor. To allow for comparability across agents of study an absolute 
threshold is identified irrespective of the peculiarities. This is termed as the absolute 
poverty line and a typical example is the World Bank’s threshold of US$1 and US$2 
per day. 
 
The World Banks’ approach is precedent on a designated minimum requirement for 
physical human survival. Households incapable of accessing this minimum 
requirement are classified as poor. The threshold is based on an equivalent cost of a 
basket of goods that satisfies essential food (nutritional) and non-food needs. This 
criterion underlies the computation of poverty from Living Standard Measurement 
Surveys (LSMS) in most developing countries including Ghana. This approach is 
arbitrary, as the decision on the criteria does not involve the agent. 
 
In contrast, subjective measures of poverty elicit information from agents 
(individual, household, community, etc) based on their perception ofwell-being. This 
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approach is consistent with the theoretical underpinning of consumer choice since 
poverty is dependent on the intrinsic value that individuals, households, and 
community attach to goods and services. The value that is derived from the inherent 
level of satisfaction (utility) overrides any a priori criteria in defining poverty. The 
eminent problems that emerge are heterogeneity of preferences and the culminating 
task of aggregating across several different units of analysis and over time. This 
implies that from a practical perspective, reaching an absolute poverty threshold 
using a subjective conceptualization can be extremely prohibitive based on the 
diversity of, and non-cardinality that emerges from, individual preferences.   
 
To overcome this, some studies (Diener, 1984; Ravalllion & Lockshin, 2000; 2001; 
Lawson et al., 2006) have employed the Participatory Poverty Assessment (PPA) 
methodologies, using ranks to measure and compare poverty. The approach 
prioritizes people's perceptions in the context of prevailing personal aspirations, and 
the social, cultural, economic and political setting at a given point in time.  
 
In spite of the heavy laden constraint of incomparability, subjective poverty 
measures possess two distinct advantages. Firstly, they overcome the normative 
attribute of objective measures and enhance the measurement of poverty from a 
relative perspective.  Secondly they inspire a continuous review of the 
multidimensional scope poverty measurement through the collation of well being 
perspectives. The latter has come about as a result of the participatory approach. 
 
Both objective and subjective types of poverty lend their conceptualization to most 
classifications of poverty measurement and emerging extensions on well-being. 
Among these are: money-metric (monetary) or non-money metric (non-monetary); 
ordinal and cardinal; severity and depth and vulnerability and spells of poverty. 
 
Measurement of Poverty in Ghana 
Poverty measurement in Ghana is based on the phenomenal work of Foster, Greer 
and Throbecke (FGT) (1984) to measure incidence, depth and severity of poverty. 
The conceptualization is precedent on the objective presumption of a minimum 
calorific intake. The equivalent of a required basket of goods is estimated based on 
household expenditure of food and non-food items.  
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The FGT poverty measure in discrete terms is specified as Equation 2.II.1 below 
 
 
 --2.II-1 
 
where Pα represents the type of poverty measure depending on the value α. Alpha 
takes on values 0, 1 or 2 and the respective resultants gives the headcount 
(incidence), depth (poverty gap) and severity of poverty. N is the sample size; G is 
the number of poor people; yi is household expenditure; and z is the absolute poverty 
line.  
 
The headcount measure is the most commonly referenced measure of poverty as it is 
easily interpretable, especially to policymakers. It identifies the number of people 
below the poverty line. The measure is criticized for its inability to assess the extent 
of poverty by way of poverty gap. Representing alpha by 1 gives a measure of the 
extent of poverty and this is relevant for policy as it indicates the required resources 
to get people out of poverty. The third measure, squared poverty gap, places weight 
on the poverty gaps to assess the inequality among the poor. The FGT measures of 
poverty are complementary, as groups of people exhibit different characteristics of 
poverty. The FGT however is criticized on the arbitrariness of the alpha value and 
interpretation of further increases in the value. 
 
Poverty Headcount in Ghana 
The comparison of poverty head count across regions and overtime is cursorily 
assessed in this thesis. Coulombe and McKay (1995; 2000 and 2008), provide a 
detailed assessment of poverty trends in Ghana based on the Living Standard 
Measurement Surveys.  In each of these papers, caveats such as effects of inflations 
and comparability of instruments are acknowledged. 
 
Poverty incidence in Ghana over the period 1991-92 to 2005-06 has fallen by 23.2 
percent for the poor and 18.3 percent for the extreme poor using the national poverty 
lines (Table II-1). In the case of extreme poverty, the 1991-92 poverty line of 
¢700,000 ≈ $77/annum is compared GHC 288.47 ≈  USD203/annum in 2005-06. In 
∑
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July 2007 the Ghanaian currency was redenominated by literally slashing off four 
zeros, for instance the existing old currency of 10,000 Cedis is now traded at GHC1. 
 
However, wide variations in terms of regional ranking are observed over the period. 
While the national administrative capital maintains its position as the least worse-off 
region, the incidence of poverty shows a U-shape as it increases between 1999-00 
and 2005-06.  
 
 
Table II-1 - Incidence of Poverty by Region in Ghana 
Extremely Poor   Poor  
 
REGIONS 
1991/92 
% 
1998/99 
% 
2005/06 
% 
(GHC 288.47) 
 1991/92 
% 
1998/99 
% 
2005/06 
% 
(GHC 370.89) 
Western 42.0 13.6 7.9  59.6 27.3 18.4 
Central 24.1 31.5 9.7  44.3 48.4 19.9 
Greater Accra 13.4 2.4 6.2  25.8 5.2 11.8 
Volta 42.1 20.4 15.2  57.0 37.7 31.4 
Eastern 34.8 30.4 6.6  48.0 43.7 15.1 
Ashanti 25.5 16.4 11.2  41.2 27.7 20.3 
Brong Ahafo 45.9 18.8 14.9  65.0 35.8 29.5 
Northern 54.1 57.4 38.7  63.4 69.2 52.3 
Upper East 53.5 79.6 60.1  66.9 88.2 70.4 
Upper West 74.3 68.3 79.0  88.4 83.9 87.9 
All 36.5 26.8 18.2  51.7 39.5 28.5 
Source: Ghana Statistical Service 2007 
 
Table II-2 - Regional Ranking of Incidence of Poverty (Upper Poverty Line) in 
Ghana 
 
REGIONS 
Rounds of Living Standard Measurement Surveys 
1991/92 1998/99 2005/06 
Western 5th 2nd 3rd 
Central 2nd 7th 4th 
Greater Accra 1st 1st 1st 
Volta 6th 5th 7th 
Eastern 4th 6th 2nd 
Ashanti 3rd 3rd 5th 
Brong-Ahafo 7th 4th 6th 
Northern 9th 8th 8th 
Upper East 8th 10th 9th 
Upper West 10th 9th 10th 
Source: Based on the table above 
The Northern ecological zone of the country consistently remains as the poorest 
region; however evidence of intra-zonal competition in terms of poverty ranking is 
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observed. The ranking of central and the eastern regions showed marked variations. 
The inter-regional and intra-zonal variations over the three rounds of the LSMS 
provoke concern as to what is being measured and the potential impact of regional 
level policies over the period. 
 
In conclusion, we surmise that conceptualizing poverty from an expenditure view 
point has inadvertently led to policy instruments related to the provision of financial 
resources and other income generating interventions. Widening the scope of 
conceptualization in view of the different types of poverty incidence (chronic, 
transient, and spells among others) justifies the call for both qualitative and 
quantitative approaches to the measure of poverty.  
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APPENDIX III - Estimating Poverty Index - Microfinance Poverty Assessment 
Tool 
In the context of multidimensional approaches, MPAT possesses peculiar merits of 
assessing poverty relative to other methods such as Rapid Appraisals and 
Participatory Appraisals. Both approaches to the measure of poverty are dominantly 
subjective as they are mainly people-centric in nature. Though this allows for a 
holistic approach and reflects entirely the experiential levels of poverty, 
complications tend to emerge if opinions of the community leaders are at variance 
with that of households in the case of Rapid Appraisals and also when a researcher 
has to deal with large sample sizes for the Participatory approach. The MPAT 
operates midway and chooses a sample to estimate a poverty score, then applies an 
arbitrary cut-off poverty point to segment the sample into different categories. This 
invariably permits some degree of an objective approach, though the arbitrary choice 
of the cut-off, that is, either terciles or quintiles, is subject to some degree of 
criticism.  
 
The approach collects household level data using a contextualized generic instrument 
that has six main subcomponents. The subcomponents of the instrument are:  
 
o Demographic structure and economic activities 
o Footwear and clothing expenditure 
o Food security and vulnerability 
o Housing indicators 
o Land ownership 
o Ownership of assets 
 
Indicators for each of these components are structured to elicit both ordinal and 
ratio-scaled data. For instance, while specific questions on footwear and clothing 
expenditure elicit ratio-scaled data, food security obtains information on a ranked 
basis such as ‘how many times was food served in the past two days?’ Questions of 
this nature transcend the narrow perspective of a money-metric perspective of 
poverty and provide further information on, for instance, food security, coping 
mechanisms, depth of poverty and vulnerability. 
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The estimation procedure is built on two descriptive statistical methods: Linear 
Correlation Coefficient (LCC) and the Principal Component Analysis (PCA). The 
MPAT approaches the computational measure with a bias for household per capita 
expenditure on footwear and clothing as this is chosen as the benchmark variable. 
The choice of this variable, though arbitrary, is consistent with the level of 
prominence accorded to this variable in the early work of Streeten et al. (1981) on 
basic needs. The LCC is the primary means of filtering poverty indicators to 
ascertain variables that best capture variations in relative household poverty (Henry 
et al., 2003). The initial step is to run a bivariate correlation test of all the other 
indicators against household per capita expenditure on footwear and clothing. The 
statistical criteria of P<0.01 and P<0.05 significance levels have been designated to 
identify variables that correlate very strongly and strongly respectively. A table 
ranking the variables based on the level of significance, value and sign of correlation 
matrix, and number of cases with missing values is generated to facilitate the 
implementation of the PCA. 
 
The PCA enables the extraction of a poverty component that can be used to extract a 
household specific index of relative poverty. It is capable of achieving this objective 
as it initially filters variables that have a strong correlation with a poverty benchmark 
indicator. Each component extracted captures a unique attribute shared by survey 
households on the presumption of their relative poverty characteristics. This does not 
preclude the presence of other associated reasons such as geographical location, 
cultural practices and occupation. To minimize the extent to which other reasons 
might lead to the extraction of components other than the poverty component, further 
filtering at the initial stage is done to limit the indicators to variables that are very 
strongly correlated with household per capita expenditure on footwear and clothing. 
Some degree of intuition is applied to reduce the number of indicators; for instance, 
number of missing values for a particular indicator, a cluster of a number of 
indicators for one component, and spread of indicators, to capture other dimensions. 
 
The PCA allows for the computation of a linear combination of indicator variables. 
The ‘component-loading’ that represents the amount of correlation between the 
component variable and the indicator variable is successively revised based on factor 
analysis to arrive at a household relative poverty score. 
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Appendix IV - Table IV- 1: Scope of MFIs Inputs/Outputs based on 
Sustainability and Outreach 
Goals of Microfinance 
Institutions 
Type of 
Efficiency 
Input Output 
Intermediation/Production Models 
 
 
Sustainability 
 
Financial 
Technical/ 
Allocative 
Efficiency? 
Operating expense 
 
Personnel 
 
Total Assets 
 
Total Equity 
Financial revenue 
 
 
Gross loan portfolio I 
Operational 
 
 
Technical/ 
Allocative 
Efficiency? 
Total expense 
 
Total Assets 
 
Personnel 
 
Total Equity 
Financial revenue I 
 
Gross loan portfolio I 
 
 
Outreach90 
 
Scale91 
Technical/ 
Allocative 
Efficiency? 
Operating/Financial 
expense 
 
Personnel 
 
Total Assets 
 
Total Equity 
Number of Active Borrowers P 
 
Number of Depositors P* 
Depth92 
Technical/ 
Allocative 
Efficiency? 
Average loan size/GNI per capita 
Breadth93 
Technical/ 
Allocative 
Efficiency? 
Total number of women borrowers P 
 
APPENDIX V - Table V-1 Geographical Spread of Microfinance Institutions 
for Chapter Six 
Regions Country- N (%) MFIs- N (%) 
Africa (SSA) 13 (21) 24  (15) 
East Asia and Pacific (EAP) 4 (7) 12 (7) 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia (ECA) 17 (28) 46 (28) 
Latin America and the Caribbean  (LAC) 15(25) 50 (30) 
Middle East and North Africa (MENA) 7 (11) 17 (10) 
South Asia (SA) 5 (8) 15 (9) 
Total 61 (100) 164(100) 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
90
 Other dimensions of outreach including length and scope have been excluded from this framework  
     for purposes of brevity. 
91
 Scale of outreach measures the magnitude of clients simply in terms of numbers. 
92
 Depth of outreach captures the relativity or extent of poor clients reached by the MFI. 
93
 Breadth of outreach is defined as the economic and demographic characteristics of clients. 
209 
 
APPENDIX VI – Ghana’s Key Macroeconomic, Financial and Microfinance 
Indicators 
 
This appendix provides a snapshot overview of the Ghanaian economy in terms of 
overall macro economy, financial and microfinance performance. The selected 
indicators below coupled with a Gross National Income of just 14.7billion USD and 
a Gini index coefficient of 40.2 justifies the search for a development strategy that is 
capable of offering both development and poverty reduction strategies. With a 
relatively low access to financial service, Ghana has identified microfinance as a 
plausible development and poverty reduction strategy that can lift the economy out 
of the low income category. 
• Gross Domestic Product growth rate – 4.5 percent: 2009 (World 
Development Indicators, 2009)  
• Gross National Income per capita - 6300USD: 2008 Atlas method (World 
Development Indicators, 2009)  
• Extreme Poverty Rate – 18.2 percent: 2005 (GSS, 2007)  
• Driver of Economy – Agriculture  
• Inflation (Consumer Price Index) – 13.3 percent: March 2010 (Bank of 
Ghana, 2010)  
• Access to Finance – 16 percent (Honohan, 2007)  
• Prime rate – 15.0 percent:  April 2010 (Bank of Ghana, 2010)  
• Average Lending Rates – April 2010 (Bank of Ghana, 2010) 
 
Figure VI-1 provides a very loose 94  overview of key microfinance in Ghana 
compared to the averages for the various regions and all MFIs reporting on the MIX 
market. However, the high return on assets (profitability measure) alongside high 
portfolio risk (measure of potential default) yields a mixed perception about the 
efficiency of MFIs in Ghana. The low average loan size as proportion of GNIpc may 
signal the reach of poorer clients but the indicator requires caution with its 
interpretation. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
94
 We hesitate in drawing inferences due to the use of simple averages.  
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Figure VI-1 Key Microfinance Indicators for Ghana compared to other Regions 
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